compulsory counterclaim rule in Texas

2026“In determining whether an inherent interrelationship exists, courts should be guided by the rule governing persons to be joined if feasible and the compulsory counterclaim rule.” Id.

2024Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294 . 10 “It is not required that the exact issues and all the parties be included in the first action before the second is filed, provided that the claim in the first suit may be amended to bring in all necessary and proper parties and issues.” Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247 . “[I]n determining whether an inherent interrelationship exists, courts should be guided by the rule governing persons to be joined if feasible and the compulsory counterclaim rule.” Id.; see also J.B.

2014See, e.g., Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1992) (under “transactional approach” to res judicata, court must analyze “the factual matters that make up the gist of the complaint” to determine if the causes of action arise out of the same facts).

1992The Texas Supreme Court recently drew a parallel between the transactional approach embodied in the compulsory counterclaim rule and the approach to be used when applying basic res judicata principles: A “transaction” ... determination is to be made pragmatically, ‘giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.’ Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.1992),

2009Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson , 796 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).

2002Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, pet. denied).

2015See verdict on their quest for exemplary damages because the id. terms of the Asset Sale Agreements, the relationship between the parties, and the superior bargaining position of BNSF [10] Both BNSF and SAW asserted claims in the Fort Worth gave rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing between case concerning operations on Track 9200.

2010Id.

2025Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (applying the dominant jurisdiction rule when a claim was not the subject of a pending action at the time of filing and the subject matter of the claim in the other suits otherwise satisfied the compulsory counterclaim rule); see also TEX.

2025Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 292 (modifying Wyatt’s statement of the compulsory-counterclaim rule)).

2015See Compass SAW's argument that the compulsory counterclaim rule Exploration, Inc. v. B–E Drilling Co., 60 S.W.3d 273 , 278– only applies to issues that were specifically submitted as 79 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.). jury issues in the prior case and that its right to non- suit counterclaims in the Fort Worth suit was unqualified [9] Both parties had claims in the Fort Worth case and absolute.

2008See Compass Exploration, Inc. v. B-E Drilling Co., 60 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).

2016Servs., Inc. v. Quickel, 314 S.W.3d 646, 651-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ("We conclude the Texas Supreme Court did not intend through an application of its compulsory counterclaim test, that it would create such an easy path of avoidance and thereby increase the number of lawsuits filed.”); see also Michol O’connor, O’connor’s Texas Rules * Civil Trials, § 6.1, at 148 (2015) ("If the claim cannot be the subject of a pending suit 'at the time of filing the answer,’ as stated by the Supreme Court, a party could avoid the compulsory-counterclaim rule by filing suit against th

2010Servs., Inc. v. Quickel , 314 S.W.3d 646, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (barring a second-filed lawsuit under the compulsory counterclaim rule even though the original defendant had not yet filed an answer or any other pleading in the first lawsuit).

1993Getty relies on Chandler v. Cashaway Building Materials, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ), where the court held that res judicata "applies to the cause of action which was actually filed by the plaintiff and not crossactions which might have been filed by a defendant, unless, of course, the compulsory counterclaim rule is applicable." See also Swiss Avenue Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

1993Getty relies on Chandler v. Cashaway Building Materials, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ), where the court held that res judicata “applies to the cause of action which was actually filed by the plaintiff and not cross-actions which might have been filed by a defendant, unless, of course, the compulsory counterclaim rule is applicable.” See also Swiss Avenue Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

2010See Community State Bank v. NSW Invs., L.L.C., 38 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (stating “capacity” as used in the context of the compulsory counterclaim rule as referring to the distinction between individual and representative capacities”).

2010See Community State Bank v. NSW Invs., L.L.C. , 38 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (stating “capacity” as used in the context of the compulsory counterclaim rule as referring to the distinction between individual and representative capacities”).

2022“The compulsory counterclaim rule is a means for bringing all logically related claims into a single litigation, through precluding a later assertion of omitted claims.” White v. Rupard, 788 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

2021“The compulsory counterclaim rule is a means of bringing all logically related claims into a single litigation, through precluding a later assertion of omitted claims.” White v. Rupard, 788 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

2015Regarding the compulsory counterclaim rule: The Supreme Court of Texas explained that “a counterclaim is compulsory if: (1) it is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) it is not at the time of filing the answer the subject of a pending action; (3) the action is mature and owned by the pleader at the time of filing the answer; (4) it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (5) it is against an opposing party in the same capacity; and (6) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court ca

2007Although Target cites Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp. , 997 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1999), that opinion discusses when an indemnitee's contractual claim for indemnification matures for purposes of the compulsory counterclaim rule.

2024See In re PlainsCapital Bank, No. 13-17-00021-CV, 2018 WL 2979836 , at *9 n.5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi- Edinburgh June 8, 2018, orig. proceeding) (citing Hopkins v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 822 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (which held that compulsory counterclaim need not be alleged in second suit for inherent interrelationship to exist).

2008See Hopkins v. NCNB Texas Nat’l Bank , 822 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (“There is an obvious inherent interrelationship between the issues that required the trial court to sustain NCNB’s plea and precludes our finding any abuse of the trial court’s discretion . . . .

2018See Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326 , 327–29 (Tex. Civ.

2015See Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2015These are “matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 26 ; see Dolenz, 620 S.W.2d at 575 .

2014These are 19 “matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 26 ; see Dolenz, 620 S.W.2d at 575 .

2010In the seminal case of Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. 1963), the court instructed that A[t]he rule of res judicata in Texas bars all litigation of all issues connected with a cause of action or defense which, with the exercise of diligence, might have been tried in a former trial, as well as those that were actually tried.@ Appellants argue that even if their legal malpractice claim would otherwise have been a compulsory counterclaim to appellees= bankruptcy court claim for attorney fees, because they have raised fact issues concerning when they knew, or in the exercise of reaso

2008In the seminal case of Ogletree v. Crates , 363 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. 1963), the court instructed that A [t]he rule of res judicata in Texas bars all litigation of all issues connected with a cause of action or defense which, with the exercise of diligence, might have been tried in a former trial, as well as those that were actually tried. @ Â Appellants argue that even if their legal malpractice claim would otherwise have been a compulsory counterclaim to appellees = bankruptcy court claim for attorney fees, because they have raised fact issues concerning when they knew, or in the exercise of

2010See KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 748 .

2010See KPMG Peat Marwick , 988 S.W.2d at 748 .

1993Getty relies on Chandler v. Cashaway Building Materials, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ), where the court held that res judicata "applies to the cause of action which was actually filed by the plaintiff and not crossactions which might have been filed by a defendant, unless, of course, the compulsory counterclaim rule is applicable." See also Swiss Avenue Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

1993Getty relies on Chandler v. Cashaway Building Materials, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ), where the court held that res judicata “applies to the cause of action which was actually filed by the plaintiff and not cross-actions which might have been filed by a defendant, unless, of course, the compulsory counterclaim rule is applicable.” See also Swiss Avenue Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

1992The doctrine of compulsory counterclaim “does not impose a duty upon anyone to intervene in a lawsuit_” Price v. Couch, 462 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.1970).

1992The doctrine of compulsory counterclaim “does not impose a duty upon anyone to intervene in a lawsuit_” Price v. Couch, 462 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.1970).

1986This rule requires a pleading to assert as a counterclaim any claim against the opposing party "if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim...." Decisions under this rule throw little light on the problem of determining what is "the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." The only pertinent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas is Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 496 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex.1973), which indicates that the compulsory counterclaim rule is broader than the rule of res judi

1986This rule requires a pleading to assert as a counterclaim any claim against the opposing party “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim....” Decisions under this rule throw little light on the problem of determining what is “the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” The only pertinent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas is Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 496 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex.1973), which indicates that the compulsory counterclaim rule is broader than the rule of res judi

2024In re Tex. Christian Univ., 571 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding) (citing TEX.

2022See Cmty. State Bank, 38 S.W.3d at 258–59 (fraudulent inducement claims in executing guarantees were logically related to claim enforcing the guarantees); Whites Stores, Inc. v. Nowaski, 760 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App.—Forth Worth 1988, no writ).

2015See id.

2013See Musgrave v. Owen, 67 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop.