permissible scope inquiry in California

1999Ill [ 84 S.Ct. at p. 245 , 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 191 ]; accord, Washoe Development Co. v. Guaranty Federal Bank (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ]; World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Accordingly, in determining whether to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the relevant parties, often referred to as “fundamental jurisdiction.” (Thorley v. Superior Court

1999Ill [ 84 S.Ct. at p. 245 , 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 191 ]; accord, Washoe Development Co. v. Guaranty Federal Bank (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ]; World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Accordingly, in determining whether to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the relevant parties, often referred to as “fundamental jurisdiction.” (Thorley v. Superior Court

2022In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Thorley v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 907 ; accord Bank of America, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 114 ; Washoe Dev.

2022First, as the Act was written as a response to the constitutional mandate of the full faith and credit clause, the principles underlying that provision inform our analysis. “ ‘ “With respect to judgments, ‘the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Blizzard Energy, Inc., v. Schaefers (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 295 , 298.) 8 “ ‘[T]he law is well established that upon a claim that a foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the court of forum had fundamental jurisdiction in the case.’

2022First, as the Act was written as a response to the constitutional mandate of the full faith and credit clause, the principles underlying that provision inform our analysis. “ ‘ “With respect to judgments, ‘the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Blizzard Energy, Inc., v. Schaefers (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 295 , 298.) 8 “ ‘[T]he law is well established that upon a claim that a foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the court of forum had fundamental jurisdiction in the case.’

1999Ill [ 84 S.Ct. at p. 245 , 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 191 ]; accord, Washoe Development Co. v. Guaranty Federal Bank (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ]; World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Accordingly, in determining whether to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the relevant parties, often referred to as “fundamental jurisdiction.” (Thorley v. Superior Court

1999(Indiana Insurance Co. v. Pettigrew (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 862, 864 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 770 ] and cases cited therein.) If, rather, “the court of the first state has expressly litigated the question of jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata and is itself protected by the full faith and credit clause.” (Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692 ].) California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act Partially in response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted the Sister State Money Judgments Act (the Act) to provi

1999(Indiana Insurance Co. v. Pettigrew (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 862, 864 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 770 ] and cases cited therein.) If, rather, “the court of the first state has expressly litigated the question of jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata and is itself protected by the full faith and credit clause.” (Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692 ].) California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act Partially in response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted the Sister State Money Judgments Act (the Act) to provi

1999(Indiana Insurance Co. v. Pettigrew (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 862, 864 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 770 ] and cases cited therein.) If, rather, “the court of the first state has expressly litigated the question of jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata and is itself protected by the full faith and credit clause.” (Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692 ].) California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act Partially in response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted the Sister State Money Judgments Act (the Act) to provi

1999(Indiana Insurance Co. v. Pettigrew (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 862, 864 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 770 ] and cases cited therein.) If, rather, “the court of the first state has expressly litigated the question of jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata and is itself protected by the full faith and credit clause.” (Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 692 ].) California’s Sister State Money Judgments Act Partially in response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted the Sister State Money Judgments Act (the Act) to provi

1996Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” (Id. at p. 1010; accord, Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 208 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 201 ]; Brinker v. Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1299-1300 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) It is undisputed that all the jurisdictional criteria specified in World Wide Imports were met in the instant case.

1996Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” (Id. at p. 1010; accord, Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 208 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 201 ]; Brinker v. Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1299-1300 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) It is undisputed that all the jurisdictional criteria specified in World Wide Imports were met in the instant case.

1996Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” (Id. at p. 1010; accord, Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 208 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 201 ]; Brinker v. Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1299-1300 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) It is undisputed that all the jurisdictional criteria specified in World Wide Imports were met in the instant case.

1996Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” (Id. at p. 1010; accord, Silbrico Corp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 208 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 201 ]; Brinker v. Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1299-1300 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) It is undisputed that all the jurisdictional criteria specified in World Wide Imports were met in the instant case.

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1985(See People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 235, fn. 2 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) [3] As to the concerns expressed in Chief Justice Bird's opinion regarding the permissible scope of inquiry, we note this issue has not been raised at any point by appellant and we therefore decline to address it here. [*] Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. [1] Throughout this opinion, references to the privilege against self-incrimination are intended to refer to the privileges in both the Fifth Amendment and articl

1985(See People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 235, fn. 2 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) [3] As to the concerns expressed in Chief Justice Bird's opinion regarding the permissible scope of inquiry, we note this issue has not been raised at any point by appellant and we therefore decline to address it here. [*] Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. [1] Throughout this opinion, references to the privilege against self-incrimination are intended to refer to the privileges in both the Fifth Amendment and articl

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1985(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Nothing in Beckwith v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 341, 345-347 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 6-8 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ] or People v. White (1968) 69 Cal.2d 751, 760-761 [ 72 Cal. Rptr. 873 , 446 P.2d 993 ], upon which the majority rely, compels their conclusion. [4] For example, in Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 498 [ 304 P.2d 1015 ], this court stated that "the Communist Party is a continuing conspiracy against our government [and l]oyalty on the part of public employees is essential to orderly and dependable government and is therefore relevant to fitness for

1984As has been repeatedly stated, California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata . . . .” (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010-1011 .) “The rare exceptions to the application of the full faith and credit clause arise only when there is a violation of somejfundamental state public policy.” (United Bank of Denver v. K & W Trucking Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 217, 222 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 49 ]; italics added.) Additionally, California has no public policy or state interest which would oppose an award of military ret

1984As has been repeatedly stated, California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata . . . .” (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010-1011 .) “The rare exceptions to the application of the full faith and credit clause arise only when there is a violation of somejfundamental state public policy.” (United Bank of Denver v. K & W Trucking Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 217, 222 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 49 ]; italics added.) Additionally, California has no public policy or state interest which would oppose an award of military ret

1984As has been repeatedly stated, California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata . . . .’ (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, [1983] 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010-1011 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].)” (Tyus v. Tyus, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 .) The subject matter jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court to decide the validity of an Oklahoma adoption cannot be questioned. “[T]he status of adoption (or lack of adoption) is determined by the laws of the state where the alleged adoption was effected.” (Estate of O'Dea (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 759, 775

1984As has been repeatedly stated, California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata . . . .’ (World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel, supra, [1983] 145 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010-1011 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].)” (Tyus v. Tyus, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 .) The subject matter jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court to decide the validity of an Oklahoma adoption cannot be questioned. “[T]he status of adoption (or lack of adoption) is determined by the laws of the state where the alleged adoption was effected.” (Estate of O'Dea (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 759, 775

1983In Sanpietro v. Collins (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 203, 207 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], 7 a case dealing both with the full faith and credit clause and deficiency judgments, the court affirmed a summary judgment based upon a final judgment in Arizona and stated as follows: “With this background, the appealing defendants contend that the Arizona judgment did not afford a basis for the summary judgment in California.

1983In Sanpietro v. Collins (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 203, 207 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 219 ], 7 a case dealing both with the full faith and credit clause and deficiency judgments, the court affirmed a summary judgment based upon a final judgment in Arizona and stated as follows: “With this background, the appealing defendants contend that the Arizona judgment did not afford a basis for the summary judgment in California.

1978In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 [85 *908 L.Ed. 278, 282-283, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 ]; Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 186 , 84 S.Ct. 242 ]; Rest., Judgments, § 11; see also Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271 [ 75 P.2d 157, 162 ]; Pacific Mut.

1978In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 [85 *908 L.Ed. 278, 282-283, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 ]; Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 186 , 84 S.Ct. 242 ]; Rest., Judgments, § 11; see also Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271 [ 75 P.2d 157, 162 ]; Pacific Mut.

1978The permissible scope of inquiry upon such a party is limited to whether the court of rendition has “fundamental” jurisdiction (see generally Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-291 [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ]).

1978The permissible scope of inquiry upon such a party is limited to whether the court of rendition has “fundamental” jurisdiction (see generally Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-291 [ 109 P.2d 942 , 132 A.L.R. 715 ]).

1978In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 [85 *908 L.Ed. 278, 282-283, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 ]; Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 186 , 84 S.Ct. 242 ]; Rest., Judgments, § 11; see also Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271 [ 75 P.2d 157, 162 ]; Pacific Mut.

1978In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 [85 *908 L.Ed. 278, 282-283, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 ]; Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 186 , 84 S.Ct. 242 ]; Rest., Judgments, § 11; see also Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271 [ 75 P.2d 157, 162 ]; Pacific Mut.

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969(People v. Jones, 216 Cal.App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal.App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria, 181 Cal.App.2d 214, 218 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 78 A.L.R.2d 1275 ].) From the cases holding that circumstances “surrounding ’ ’ the offense (People v. Braun, 14 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 92 P.2d 402 ].) and circumstances ‘ ‘ comprising ’ ’ the offense (People v. David, 12 Cal.2d 639, 646 [ 86 P.2d 811 ]) cannot be elicited from the witness, the general rule emerges that the witness can be asked about anything which would appear on the face of the record of judgment (see

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria

1969Thus the name or nature of the crime may be asked [citations], and an inquiry into the place and date of the conviction is harmless as such details will appear in any event on the face of the record of judgment [citations]." ( Id. at p. 790.) [12] The permissible scope of inquiry into a defendant's prior felony record includes the right to question the defendant as to the number of felonies of which he has been convicted and when they were committed. ( People v. Jones, 216 Cal. App.2d 494 [ 31 Cal. Rptr. 79 ]; People v. Miller, 188 Cal. App.2d 156, 170 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; People v. Renteria