physical requirement in California

2019The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life' [citation], thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice." ( People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615 , 626, 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , fn. omitted ( Patterson ).) In assessing whether a crime is inherently dangerous to human life, a court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not at the particular facts of the case. ( Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582 , 51 Ca

2019The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life' [citation], thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice." ( People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615 , 626, 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , fn. omitted ( Patterson ).) In assessing whether a crime is inherently dangerous to human life, a court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not at the particular facts of the case. ( Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582 , 51 Ca

2019The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life' [citation], thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice." ( People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615 , 626, 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , fn. omitted ( Patterson ).) In assessing whether a crime is inherently dangerous to human life, a court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not at the particular facts of the case. ( Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582 , 51 Ca

2019The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life' [citation], thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice." ( People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615 , 626, 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , fn. omitted ( Patterson ).) In assessing whether a crime is inherently dangerous to human life, a court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not at the particular facts of the case. ( Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582 , 51 Ca

2009The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed `an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life' ([ People v. ] Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300 ), thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice." ( Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626.) The second degree felony-murder rule is venerable.

2009The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life’ ([People v.] Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300 ), thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice.” (Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626.) The second degree felony-murder rule is venerable.

2025The use of the words “placed in” to describe certain categories of defendants, but not those serving a state prison sentence, indicates the Legislature understood how to impose a physical requirement when it wanted to, and that it chose not to do so for felons who had been convicted and sentenced to state prison. “‘“Ordinarily, where the Legislature uses a different word or phrase in one part of a statute than it does in other sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.”’” (Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 19

2023Rather, by explaining how the jury should apply conventional circumstantial evidence rules, and by focusing on the physical factors informing whether a defendant has 25 PEOPLE v. MUMIN Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. exhibited an intent to create a kill zone (see discussion post), Canizales emphasized that only a rare set of circumstances would warrant a concurrent intent instruction and “there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608 .) Courts should reserve instruction to those fairly unus

2019If in such circumstances a court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous.' " ( Patterson, supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 622 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , quoting People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 , 830, 201 Cal.Rptr. 319

2019If in such circumstances a court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous.' " ( Patterson, supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 622 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , quoting People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 , 830, 201 Cal.Rptr. 319

2019If in such circumstances a court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous.' " ( Patterson, supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 622 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , quoting People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 , 830, 201 Cal.Rptr. 319

2019If in such circumstances a court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous.' " ( Patterson, supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 622 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 195 , 778 P.2d 549 , quoting People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 , 830, 201 Cal.Rptr. 319

2019(Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582 ; People v. Howard (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129 , this issue, however, and we need not address it because it does not appear the Legislature intended for this amendment to apply retroactively. (§ 3 [“ ‘No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.’ ”]; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319 .) 22 1135 (Howard).) In doing so, the court ensures the felony “ ‘by its very nature . . . cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed . . . .’ ” ( Howard, supra, at p. 1135 .) “ ‘This form of [viewed-in

2011In view of these considerations, the organized, long-distance, group bicycle ride qualifies as a ‘sport’ for purposes of the application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1221, fn. omitted.) In Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 ] (Truong), two personal watercrafts (strangers to one another) collided, resulting in injury to one of the drivers and the death of that driver’s passenger.

2011In view of these considerations, the organized, long-distance, group bicycle ride qualifies as a ‘sport’ for purposes of the application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1221, fn. omitted.) In Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 ] (Truong), two personal watercrafts (strangers to one another) collided, resulting in injury to one of the drivers and the death of that driver’s passenger.

2010Substantial evidence must show the physical factors actually prevent or substantially hinder *846 an existing use or lot’s economic viability.” (Mammoth, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 555 .) This language “sets an exacting standard” that must be met in order to justify redevelopment.

1998(E.g., People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 827 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) The refusal to "consent" to a physical test for drugs "is not in itself criminal" and compelling such "consent" is not a measure "reasonably related to future criminality" in the absence of a showing that substance abuse by the minor has played a role in his misconduct or has even occurred. ( Ibid., also c.f., e.g., In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 , 169 Cal.Rptr. 625 ; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 269, 278-280 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 898 ; In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 6 , all

1998(E.g., People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 827 , 143 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) The refusal to "consent" to a physical test for drugs "is not in itself criminal" and compelling such "consent" is not a measure "reasonably related to future criminality" in the absence of a showing that substance abuse by the minor has played a role in his misconduct or has even occurred. ( Ibid., also c.f., e.g., In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 , 169 Cal.Rptr. 625 ; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 269, 278-280 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 898 ; In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 6 , all

1989An *627 act is inherently dangerous to human life when there is "a high probability that it will result in death." ( People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300 , italics added; see also People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 262 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]; People v. Poddar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 750, 757 [ 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 , 518 P.2d 342 ]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 321 [ 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 782 ; People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 [ 261 P.2d 1 ].) We therefore conclude — by analogy to the established

1986In that regard, he admitted that “the main usefulness [of the MMPI] is whether they were honest or not on the test.” The primary focus of the trial court’s inquiry into Dr. Walker’s testimony had, therefore, to be the validity of the physical test as a gauge of sexual deviancy. “ [Admissibility of expert testimony based upon the application of a new scientific technique traditionally involves a two-step process: (1) the reliability of the method must be established, usually by expert testimony, and [(]2) the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an o