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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2025(See Davis, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 7 .) Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that Prentice’s exception to the American Rule that each side pays its 19 Because we conclude Suffolk is not entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, we need not address the District’s claim that the prime contract bars Suffolk’s claim for attorney fees as contractual damages. 44 own attorney fees was limited to “cases involving ‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Davis, at p. 7; see Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 267 [“the Davis case has been read, and we think properly, to have confined Prentice to its 2013Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (Prentice); Heckert v. McDonald (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 .) The doctrine provides: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. [Citations.]” ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) In Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court cautioned that “the Prentice exception was | 2 | 4 |
Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp.green2 sentences2013Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (Prentice); Heckert v. McDonald (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 .) The doctrine provides: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. [Citations.]” ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) In Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court cautioned that “the Prentice exception was 2013Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (Prentice); Heckert v. McDonald (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 .) The doctrine provides: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. [Citations.]” ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) In Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court cautioned that “the Prentice exception was | 2 | 4 |
Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc.green2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 815 [insured alleging tort claims against insurer could recover attorney fees reasonably necessary to collect the benefits due under the policy]; Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410, 413-414, 419 [when record company interfered with exclusive recording contract by releasing bootleg recording, the artist and her record company could recover attorney fees incurred in bringing injunctions to prevent the distribution and sale of bootleg record].) In 1978, the Supreme Court stated, in a product 2025(See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 815 [insured alleging tort claims against insurer could recover attorney fees reasonably necessary to collect the benefits due under the policy]; Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410, 413-414, 419 [when record company interfered with exclusive recording contract by releasing bootleg recording, the artist and her record company could recover attorney fees incurred in bringing injunctions to prevent the distribution and sale of bootleg record].) In 1978, the Supreme Court stated, in a product | 2 | 2 |
Harbor City Discount Auto Center, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.green2 sentences2025(See Davis, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 7 .) Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that Prentice’s exception to the American Rule that each side pays its 19 Because we conclude Suffolk is not entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, we need not address the District’s claim that the prime contract bars Suffolk’s claim for attorney fees as contractual damages. 44 own attorney fees was limited to “cases involving ‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Davis, at p. 7; see Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 267 [“the Davis case has been read, and we think properly, to have confined Prentice to its 1980If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative *267 rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. [Fn. and citations omitted.] To avoid this result, Prentice limits its authorization of fee shifting to cases involving ‘exceptional circumstances.’ [Citation.]” Indeed, the Davis case has been read, and we think properly, to have confined Prentice to its own facts (see Harbor City Discount Auto Center, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 886, 891 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 438 ]). | 2 | 2 |
Watson v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2014It would substantially expand the notion of duty under the law of torts to compensation of the litigation expenses incurred by all persons, however connected to any tortious event, whom the injured plaintiff elects to sue who succeed in establishing lack of liability.” (Watson v. Department of Transportation (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 885, 894 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 ].) 18 Tellingly, in making its argument, HWH’s brief relies primarily on tort cases involving physical harm to plaintiffs. 2013As the court in Watson v. Department of Transportation (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 885, 894 , explained: “The extension of the Prentice rule to the commonplace case of an exonerated alleged tortfeasor would go a long way toward abrogation of the American rule that each party to a lawsuit must 14 ordinarily pay his or her own attorney’s fees. | 1 | 3 |
Sooy v. Petergreen2 sentences1998Such *894 a rule was not intended by this court.” 6 (Also see, e.g., Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 151 ] [The indemnity to which Prentice speaks is founded upon the traditional tort duty between indemnitee and indemnitor.]; see generally, Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 610 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ] [in applying a generalized statement of liability the focus must be on the policy by which an existing duty is extended].) The extension of the Prentice rule to the commonplace case of an exonerated alleged tortfeasor would go a long way toward abro 1998Such *894 a rule was not intended by this court.” 6 (Also see, e.g., Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 151 ] [The indemnity to which Prentice speaks is founded upon the traditional tort duty between indemnitee and indemnitor.]; see generally, Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 610 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ] [in applying a generalized statement of liability the focus must be on the policy by which an existing duty is extended].) The extension of the Prentice rule to the commonplace case of an exonerated alleged tortfeasor would go a long way toward abro | 1 | 2 |
Heckert v. MacDonaldgreen2 sentences2013Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (Prentice); Heckert v. McDonald (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 .) The doctrine provides: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. [Citations.]” ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) In Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court cautioned that “the Prentice exception was 2013Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (Prentice); Heckert v. McDonald (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 .) The doctrine provides: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred. [Citations.]” ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) In Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court cautioned that “the Prentice exception was | 1 | 2 |
De La Hoya v. Slim's Gun Shopgreen2 sentences2025Suffolk’s cases, De La Hoya v. Slim’s Gun Shop (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10 (De La Hoya), Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Copenbarger), Monster, LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1228 (Monster) and Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504 , 512 (Mai) are inapposite.20 De La Hoya, a case from the appellate division of the superior court, stated there was “no reason” not to extend Prentice to a breach of contract claim because other jurisdictions had adopted the rule “that attorney fees incurred in litigation with third 2025Suffolk’s cases, De La Hoya v. Slim’s Gun Shop (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10 (De La Hoya), Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Copenbarger), Monster, LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1228 (Monster) and Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504 , 512 (Mai) are inapposite.20 De La Hoya, a case from the appellate division of the superior court, stated there was “no reason” not to extend Prentice to a breach of contract claim because other jurisdictions had adopted the rule “that attorney fees incurred in litigation with third | 1 | 1 |
Brandt v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 815 [insured alleging tort claims against insurer could recover attorney fees reasonably necessary to collect the benefits due under the policy]; Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410, 413-414, 419 [when record company interfered with exclusive recording contract by releasing bootleg recording, the artist and her record company could recover attorney fees incurred in bringing injunctions to prevent the distribution and sale of bootleg record].) In 1978, the Supreme Court stated, in a product 2025(See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 815 [insured alleging tort claims against insurer could recover attorney fees reasonably necessary to collect the benefits due under the policy]; Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 410, 413-414, 419 [when record company interfered with exclusive recording contract by releasing bootleg recording, the artist and her record company could recover attorney fees incurred in bringing injunctions to prevent the distribution and sale of bootleg record].) In 1978, the Supreme Court stated, in a product | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Schanielgreen1 sentence2025(See Davis, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 7 .) Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that Prentice’s exception to the American Rule that each side pays its 19 Because we conclude Suffolk is not entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, we need not address the District’s claim that the prime contract bars Suffolk’s claim for attorney fees as contractual damages. 44 own attorney fees was limited to “cases involving ‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Davis, at p. 7; see Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 267 [“the Davis case has been read, and we think properly, to have confined Prentice to its | 1 | 1 |
Monster, LLC v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.green1 sentence2025Suffolk’s cases, De La Hoya v. Slim’s Gun Shop (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10 (De La Hoya), Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Copenbarger), Monster, LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1228 (Monster) and Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504 , 512 (Mai) are inapposite.20 De La Hoya, a case from the appellate division of the superior court, stated there was “no reason” not to extend Prentice to a breach of contract claim because other jurisdictions had adopted the rule “that attorney fees incurred in litigation with third | 1 | 1 |
Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc.green1 sentence2025Suffolk’s cases, De La Hoya v. Slim’s Gun Shop (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10 (De La Hoya), Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Copenbarger), Monster, LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1228 (Monster) and Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504 , 512 (Mai) are inapposite.20 De La Hoya, a case from the appellate division of the superior court, stated there was “no reason” not to extend Prentice to a breach of contract claim because other jurisdictions had adopted the rule “that attorney fees incurred in litigation with third | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc.green1 sentence2014It would substantially expand the notion of duty under the law of torts to compensation of the litigation expenses incurred by all persons, however connected to any tortious event, whom the injured plaintiff elects to sue who succeed in establishing lack of liability.” (Watson v. Department of Transportation (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 885, 894 .) 27 such, “nearly all of the cases which have applied the [tort of another] doctrine involve a clear violation of a traditional tort duty between the tortfeasor who is required to pay the attorney fees and the person seeking compensation for those fees.” (S | 1 | 1 |
David v. Hermanngreen2 sentences2013If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 7, fn. omitted; see also David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“The courts have refrained from expanding the rule in a way that would undermine the general rule that a party bears his own attorney fees”].) Accordingly, the tort of another doctrine has not been extended to enable a defendant to recover fees and expenses incurred in defending against allegations of his or her own wrongdoing. 2013If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 7, fn. omitted; see also David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“The courts have refrained from expanding the rule in a way that would undermine the general rule that a party bears his own attorney fees”].) Accordingly, the tort of another doctrine has not been extended to enable a defendant to recover fees and expenses incurred in defending against allegations of his or her own wrongdoing. | 1 | 1 |
Andalon v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998Such *894 a rule was not intended by this court.” 6 (Also see, e.g., Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 151 ] [The indemnity to which Prentice speaks is founded upon the traditional tort duty between indemnitee and indemnitor.]; see generally, Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 610 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ] [in applying a generalized statement of liability the focus must be on the policy by which an existing duty is extended].) The extension of the Prentice rule to the commonplace case of an exonerated alleged tortfeasor would go a long way toward abro 1998Such *894 a rule was not intended by this court.” 6 (Also see, e.g., Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 151 ] [The indemnity to which Prentice speaks is founded upon the traditional tort duty between indemnitee and indemnitor.]; see generally, Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 610 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ] [in applying a generalized statement of liability the focus must be on the policy by which an existing duty is extended].) The extension of the Prentice rule to the commonplace case of an exonerated alleged tortfeasor would go a long way toward abro | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. Marlergreen2 sentences1980As to Silvas, the attorneys’ fees measure of damages is improper here and the judgment based on misrepresentation likewise must be reversed. 4 Keeping in mind application of the Prentice exception is made on a case-by-case basis and will be applied only where, among other things, we are dealing with “separate litigation brought about by the wrongdoing of the ultimate single tortfeasor” (see Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse etc. Air Brake Co. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 519, 524 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 30 ]; and see Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 29-30 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), we find Sc 1980As to Silvas, the attorneys’ fees measure of damages is improper here and the judgment based on misrepresentation likewise must be reversed. 4 Keeping in mind application of the Prentice exception is made on a case-by-case basis and will be applied only where, among other things, we are dealing with “separate litigation brought about by the wrongdoing of the ultimate single tortfeasor” (see Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse etc. Air Brake Co. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 519, 524 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 30 ]; and see Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 29-30 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), we find Sc | 1 | 1 |
Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co.green2 sentences1980As to Silvas, the attorneys’ fees measure of damages is improper here and the judgment based on misrepresentation likewise must be reversed. 4 Keeping in mind application of the Prentice exception is made on a case-by-case basis and will be applied only where, among other things, we are dealing with “separate litigation brought about by the wrongdoing of the ultimate single tortfeasor” (see Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse etc. Air Brake Co. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 519, 524 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 30 ]; and see Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 29-30 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), we find Sc 1980As to Silvas, the attorneys’ fees measure of damages is improper here and the judgment based on misrepresentation likewise must be reversed. 4 Keeping in mind application of the Prentice exception is made on a case-by-case basis and will be applied only where, among other things, we are dealing with “separate litigation brought about by the wrongdoing of the ultimate single tortfeasor” (see Trails Trucking, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse etc. Air Brake Co. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 519, 524 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 30 ]; and see Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 29-30 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), we find Sc | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Valley Restaurants, Inc.green2 sentences1978If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. 9 (§ 1021; Reid v. Valley Restaurants, Inc. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 606, 610 [ 311 P.2d 473 ].) To avoid this result, Prentice limits its authorization of fee shifting to cases involving “exceptional circumstances.” (Prentice v. North Amer. 1978If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. 9 (§ 1021; Reid v. Valley Restaurants, Inc. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 606, 610 [ 311 P.2d 473 ].) To avoid this result, Prentice limits its authorization of fee shifting to cases involving “exceptional circumstances.” (Prentice v. North Amer. | 1 | 1 |
Lang v. Klingergreen2 sentences1978(Compare Lang v. Klinger (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 987, 993 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 532 ]; Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 438-439.) Walters is entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Leseman and Lampliter. 1978(Compare Lang v. Klinger (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 987, 993 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 532 ]; Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 438-439.) Walters is entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Leseman and Lampliter. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||