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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co.green2 sentences1930(See Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 574 [14 Ann. 1927See Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 574 [14 Ann. | 1 | 2 |
Salas v. Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2026(Janney, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 391; see also Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074 [plaintiffs failed to carry burden of demonstrating evidentiary error by “arguing only generalities” regarding the expert’s qualifications and factors considered and failing to specify the evidentiary objections or discuss the grounds on which each objection was sustained].) By failing to identify the specific evidentiary objections at issue or individually discuss the grounds on which each objection was sustained, Cohen has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Gill v. Hughesgreen2 sentences1999Therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely in that it was filed more than 30 days after denial of the motion by operation of law, and not within the maximum 90-day period.” (Miller v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 226-228, italics added, fns. omitted; accord, Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1311-1312 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; but see Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607-1608, fn. 5 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 887 ] [criticized Miller to the extent it suggested that a postjudgment motion for reconsideration extends the time to appeal].) Applying 1999Therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely in that it was filed more than 30 days after denial of the motion by operation of law, and not within the maximum 90-day period.” (Miller v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 226-228, italics added, fns. omitted; accord, Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1311-1312 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; but see Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607-1608, fn. 5 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 887 ] [criticized Miller to the extent it suggested that a postjudgment motion for reconsideration extends the time to appeal].) Applying | 1 | 1 |
Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carvillegreen2 sentences1989In other words, subject to the qualifications stated in rule 3, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider normally extends the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original ruling until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration.” (Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009-1010 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 594 ], fn. omitted.) Miller contends the appeal is timely because the notice of entry denying his motion to reconsider was not entered until January 21, 1987. 3 But this contention presumes the denial had not already been automatically entered. 1989In other words, subject to the qualifications stated in rule 3, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider normally extends the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original ruling until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration.” (Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009-1010 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 594 ], fn. omitted.) Miller contends the appeal is timely because the notice of entry denying his motion to reconsider was not entered until January 21, 1987. 3 But this contention presumes the denial had not already been automatically entered. | 1 | 1 |
Dockter v. City of Santa Anagreen2 sentences1982(Dockter v. City of Santa Ana (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 69, 74 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 686 ].) In other words, subject to the qualifications stated in rule 3, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider normally extends the time for fil *1010 ing a notice of appeal from the original ruling until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration. 1 As Blue Mountain filed a timely motion to reconsider the denial of its application for writ of execution, the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original ruling was extended until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration. 1982(Dockter v. City of Santa Ana (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 69, 74 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 686 ].) In other words, subject to the qualifications stated in rule 3, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider normally extends the time for fil *1010 ing a notice of appeal from the original ruling until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration. 1 As Blue Mountain filed a timely motion to reconsider the denial of its application for writ of execution, the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original ruling was extended until 30 days after entry of the order denying reconsideration. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Passavanti v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1999Therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely in that it was filed more than 30 days after denial of the motion by operation of law, and not within the maximum 90-day period.” (Miller v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 226-228, italics added, fns. omitted; accord, Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1311-1312 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; but see Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607-1608, fn. 5 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 887 ] [criticized Miller to the extent it suggested that a postjudgment motion for reconsideration extends the time to appeal].) Applying 1999Therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely in that it was filed more than 30 days after denial of the motion by operation of law, and not within the maximum 90-day period.” (Miller v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 226-228, italics added, fns. omitted; accord, Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1311-1312 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]; but see Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607-1608, fn. 5 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 887 ] [criticized Miller to the extent it suggested that a postjudgment motion for reconsideration extends the time to appeal].) Applying | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whitman v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1992The qualifications requirement contemplates that the investigating officer will use significant discretion “to assess the circumstances under which the [extrajudicial] statement is made and to accurately describe those circumstances to the magistrate so as to increase the reliability of the underlying evidence.” (Whitman v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1074 .) *610 On the present record, there is no reason to believe Johnson did not fulfill the role of investigating officer as contemplated by section 872. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hough v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences1969He also suggests that the rationale of Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal.2d 273 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ], is controlling in the cause before this court. 1969He also suggests that the rationale of Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal.2d 273 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ], is controlling in the cause before this court. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Gelb v. Benjamin
green
2 sentences1955(See Gelb v. Benjamin, 78 Cal.App.2d 881 [ 178 P.2d 476 ], and cases cited in Witkin, supra, 1532-1533.) The facts bring our case within both of the qualifications of the rule above mentioned. 1955(See Gelb v. Benjamin, 78 Cal.App.2d 881 [ 178 P.2d 476 ], and cases cited in Witkin, supra, 1532-1533.) The facts bring our case within both of the qualifications of the rule above mentioned. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
McNulty v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1913Co., 203 Mo. 475 , [ 101 S. W. 1082 ].) Section 486 of the Civil Code provides that “the corporation is liable for all damages sustained by any person, and caused by its locomotives, train, or cars, when the provisions of this section are not complied with.” This, of course, is subject to the qualifications stated in the instruction, that the accident is due to such failure and there shall be an absence of contributory negligence. 1913Co., 203 Mo. 475 , [ 101 S. W. 1082 ].) Section 486 of the Civil Code provides that “the corporation is liable for all damages sustained by any person, and caused by its locomotives, train, or cars, when the provisions of this section are not complied with.” This, of course, is subject to the qualifications stated in the instruction, that the accident is due to such failure and there shall be an absence of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Mitchell v. Southern Pacific Railroad
green
1 sentence1911A. 130, 25 Pac. 245 ], that bars a recovery of damages, but it is the positive terms of a statute which, in my opinion, is not subject to the qualifications and exception which are imposed upon it by the opinion of the court. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.