Sabella analysis in California

2007The trial court ruled the damage was covered by the insureds' homeowner's policy, based on the concurrent causation analysis in Partridge . ( Garvey, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 399-401, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 .) The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, the "efficient proximate cause" analysis of Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 , and not the "concurrent cause" analysis of Partridge , should control first party coverage cases. ( Garvey, at pp. 412-413, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 .) Under the Sabella analysis, "`where there is a concurrence of

2007The trial court ruled the damage was covered by the insureds' homeowner's policy, based on the concurrent causation analysis in Partridge . ( Garvey, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 399-401, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 .) The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, the "efficient proximate cause" analysis of Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 689 , 377 P.2d 889 , and not the "concurrent cause" analysis of Partridge , should control first party coverage cases. ( Garvey, at pp. 412-413, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 770 P.2d 704 .) Under the Sabella analysis, "`where there is a concurrence of

1997When a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and specifically excluded risks, the loss is covered if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of the loss. . . . [T]he question of what caused the loss is generally a question of fact, and the loss is not covered if the covered risk was only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was *1019 the efficient proximate, or predominate cause.” (54 Cal.3d at pp. 1131-1132.) “[I]f third party negligence is not excluded under such a policy, it is a covered peril.” 6 ( 54 Cal.3d at p. 1132 .) In Garvey, supra, 48 Cal.3d 395 , the

1997When a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and specifically excluded risks, the loss is covered if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of the loss. . . . [T]he question of what caused the loss is generally a question of fact, and the loss is not covered if the covered risk was only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was *1019 the efficient proximate, or predominate cause.” (54 Cal.3d at pp. 1131-1132.) “[I]f third party negligence is not excluded under such a policy, it is a covered peril.” 6 ( 54 Cal.3d at p. 1132 .) In Garvey, supra, 48 Cal.3d 395 , the

1990Co. v. Welch (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 720 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 657 ].

1990Co. v. Welch (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 720 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 657 ].

2023As we do here, “ ‘The court can look to how many lawyers the other side utilized in similar situations as an indication of the effort required.’ ” (See Donahue v. Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 .) Sabella also cites an example where a Mayer Brown attorney spent 59.5 hours on an opposition to Sabella’s motion to strike Rostack’s motion for summary judgment.

2022Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 949 .) In evaluating whether claimed attorney misconduct is prejudicial, courts should examine the following four Sabella factors: “(1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) the general atmosphere, including the judge’s control of the trial; (3) the likelihood of actual prejudice on the jury; and (4) the efficacy of objections or admonitions under all the circumstances.” (Martinez v. Department of Transportation (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 559, 568 , citing Sabella v. Southern Pac.

2022Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 311, 320-321 .) 11 3.

2022Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 949 .) In evaluating whether claimed attorney misconduct is prejudicial, courts should examine the following four Sabella factors: “(1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) the general atmosphere, including the judge’s control of the trial; (3) the likelihood of actual prejudice on the jury; and (4) the efficacy of objections or admonitions under all the circumstances.” (Martinez v. Department of Transportation (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 559, 568 , citing Sabella v. Southern Pac.

2008(Finn, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 72 .) Finn disagreed, explaining, “The Sabella analysis has no application here because leakage and broken pipes are not two distinct or separate perils.

2008(Finn, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 72 .) Finn disagreed, explaining, “The Sabella analysis has no application here because leakage and broken pipes are not two distinct or separate perils.

1992Co. v. Welch (1983) rain (covered); heavy rainfall (excluded)]; Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 708 ] [fire (covered); earth movement and water damage (excluded)]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Von Der Lieth, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1123 [third party negligence (covered); earth movement and natural groundwater (excluded)].) *1583 Farmers argues, however, that this case does not involve two distinct perils and thus the Sabella analysis does not apply.

1992Co. v. Welch (1983) rain (covered); heavy rainfall (excluded)]; Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 708 ] [fire (covered); earth movement and water damage (excluded)]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Von Der Lieth, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1123 [third party negligence (covered); earth movement and natural groundwater (excluded)].) *1583 Farmers argues, however, that this case does not involve two distinct perils and thus the Sabella analysis does not apply.

1989Indeed, Guyton specifically stated that “the twin causes in Partridge were independent only in the sense that each cause had an independent origin, not that they did not interact with one another to cause the loss.” ( 692 F.2d at p. 555 .) As amici curiae for defendant point out, however, Guyton, supra, 692 F.2d 551 , was actually “a classic case of dependent causation” requiring use of a Sabella analysis.

1989Indeed, Guyton specifically stated that “the twin causes in Partridge were independent only in the sense that each cause had an independent origin, not that they did not interact with one another to cause the loss.” ( 692 F.2d at p. 555 .) As amici curiae for defendant point out, however, Guyton, supra, 692 F.2d 551 , was actually “a classic case of dependent causation” requiring use of a Sabella analysis.