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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lenixgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura 2013On this record, we find that the trial court made “ ‘a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered’ ” and thus “ ‘its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614 .) The trial court indicated that it listened to the prosecutor’s stated reasons and defense counsel’s response, and it did not indiscriminately accept the prosecutor’s reasons. | 2 | 4 |
Miller-El v. Cockrellgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924 .) “[T]he issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the 5 prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.” (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 339 [ 123 S.Ct. 1029 ].) Because Batson/Wheeler motions call upon trial judges’ personal observations, we “review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror.” (People v. Hamilton 2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura | 2 | 3 |
People v. Cashgreen2 sentences2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha 2006(People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 971; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) We consider each of the eight challenged jurors, taking them in the order in which the prosecutor provided reasons for the peremptory challenges. | 2 | 2 |
People v. McDermottgreen2 sentences2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha 2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2002(People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ].) On this record we conclude the Wheeler motions were properly denied. 2002(People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ].) On this record we conclude the Wheeler motions were properly denied. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Reynosogreen2 sentences2014(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924 .) “[T]he issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the 5 prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.” (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 339 [ 123 S.Ct. 1029 ].) Because Batson/Wheeler motions call upon trial judges’ personal observations, we “review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror.” (People v. Hamilton 2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura | 1 | 3 |
People v. Burgenergreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1313 (Chism) [finding a trial court implicitly accepted the prosecutor’s stated justification for exercising a peremptory challenge].) At this third step, we “presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 .) “We review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a s 2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha | 1 | 2 |
Paulino v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura 2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104-105 ; accord, People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 627 ; see Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 ; Paulino v. Harrison, supra, 542 F.3d at p. 699 .) Deference does not, of course, “imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” (Miller-El v. Coc | 1 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104-105 ; accord, People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 627 ; see Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 ; Paulino v. Harrison, supra, 542 F.3d at p. 699 .) Deference does not, of course, “imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” (Miller-El v. Coc 2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104-105 ; accord, People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 627 ; see Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 ; Paulino v. Harrison, supra, 542 F.3d at p. 699 .) Deference does not, of course, “imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” (Miller-El v. Coc | 1 | 2 |
People v. Fuentesgreen2 sentences2002(People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ].) On this record we conclude the Wheeler motions were properly denied. 2002(People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ].) On this record we conclude the Wheeler motions were properly denied. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Chismgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1313 (Chism) [finding a trial court implicitly accepted the prosecutor’s stated justification for exercising a peremptory challenge].) At this third step, we “presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 .) “We review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a s | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boxgreen2 sentences2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha 2009(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 , 104—105 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ], citing People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory cha | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2006(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 395 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 ].) When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. 2006(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 395 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 ].) When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ariasgreen2 sentences2006(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 395 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 ].) When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. 2006(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 395 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 ].) When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences2022(See People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1313 (Chism) [finding a trial court implicitly accepted the prosecutor’s stated justification for exercising a peremptory challenge].) At this third step, we “presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 .) “We review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a s 2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura | 5 | 2013–2022 |
People v. Jurado
green
2 sentences2014(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jura 2013(People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 .) “When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104-105 ; accord, People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 627 ; see Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 ; Paulino v. Harrison, supra, 542 F.3d at p. 699 .) Deference does not, of course, “imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” (Miller-El v. Coc | 3 | 2009–2014 |
People v. Hall
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 167 .) ―Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that this act of mistaken identity is the most probable explanation of the events disclosed in the record and that there was no violation of Batson/Wheeler.‖ (Williams II, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 659 .) III. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Snyder v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2013It may also rely on the court’s own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges’ personal observations, we “review the decision of the trial court under the substantial evidence standard, according 11 deference to the trial court’s ruling when the court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror.” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 8 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 167 .) ―Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that this act of mistaken identity is the most probable explanation of the events disclosed in the record and that there was no violation of Batson/Wheeler.‖ (Williams II, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 659 .) III. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2013Such a mistake would not show racial bias ….‖ (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 366 .) Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court did not undertake ―a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate‖ each of the stated reasons for the challenge to Doris O. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.