tenable claim in California

2024Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, we reject Asiryan’s contention that Economy, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 1147 , provides a basis for extending either body of law to nevertheless support a tenable claim against GAMC based on the Medical Staff ’s actions.

2024Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, we reject Asiryan’s contention that Economy, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 1147 , provides a basis for extending either body of law to nevertheless support a tenable claim against GAMC based on the Medical Staff ’s actions.

2012(Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) As noted above, we consider (but we do not weigh) the evidence presented by both sides, and we may decide that respondents’ evidence defeats appellants’ showing as a matter of law, “ ‘such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element.’ [Citation.]” (Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 .) As explained below, we conclude that appellants have not established a tenable claim for slander of title.

2012(Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) As noted above, we consider (but we do not weigh) the evidence presented by both sides, and we may decide that respondents’ evidence defeats appellants’ showing as a matter of law, “ ‘such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element.’ [Citation.]” (Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 .) As explained below, we conclude that appellants have not established a tenable claim for slander of title.

2009(Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018 .) The question here is whether the evidence of record would support a finding that when Desmarais instituted or maintained his malicious prosecution suit, he either “relie[d] upon facts which he ha[d] no reasonable cause to believe to be true,” or was pursuing a theory that was “untenable under the facts known to him.” (Sangster v. Paetkau, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 164-165.) We think a jury could easily conclude that, whatever Desmarais might reasonably hope to prove about the other elements of his claim, he had no reasonable cause to believe that

2003In Speegle , an insurance agent employed at will by several insurers alleged that an association of insurers had induced some insurers to end their agency contracts with him. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 37-39, 172 P.2d 867 .) The court in Speegle held that his complaint alleged a tenable claim for interference with contract, reasoning that "the great majority of the cases have held that unjustifiable interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable." ( Id. at p. 39, 172 P.2d 867 .) Among the key cases the Speegle court cited in connection with t

2003In Speegle , an insurance agent employed at will by several insurers alleged that an association of insurers had induced some insurers to end their agency contracts with him. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 37-39, 172 P.2d 867 .) The court in Speegle held that his complaint alleged a tenable claim for interference with contract, reasoning that "the great majority of the cases have held that unjustifiable interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable." ( Id. at p. 39, 172 P.2d 867 .) Among the key cases the Speegle court cited in connection with t

2003In Speegle , an insurance agent employed at will by several insurers alleged that an association of insurers had induced some insurers to end their agency contracts with him. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 37-39, 172 P.2d 867 .) The court in Speegle held that his complaint alleged a tenable claim for interference with contract, reasoning that "the great majority of the cases have held that unjustifiable interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable." ( Id. at p. 39, 172 P.2d 867 .) Among the key cases the Speegle court cited in connection with t

2003In Speegle , an insurance agent employed at will by several insurers alleged that an association of insurers had induced some insurers to end their agency contracts with him. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 37-39, 172 P.2d 867 .) The court in Speegle held that his complaint alleged a tenable claim for interference with contract, reasoning that "the great majority of the cases have held that unjustifiable interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable." ( Id. at p. 39, 172 P.2d 867 .) Among the key cases the Speegle court cited in connection with t

1998Title Guaranty Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 381 P.2d 645 ]. 5 Prentice expressed the doctrine as follows: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” (Prentice v. North Amer.

1998Title Guaranty Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 381 P.2d 645 ]. 5 Prentice expressed the doctrine as follows: “A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” (Prentice v. North Amer.

1989(In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 574 .) He has been forthcoming and candid with prospective clients, friends and colleagues concerning his conviction and imprisonment.

1989(Std. 1.2(e)(vii).) By pleading guilty and foregoing a tenable defense of entrapment to the criminal charges, he indicated recognition of his wrongdoing and a desire to rehabilitate himself. ( In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 574 .) He has been forthcoming and candid with prospective clients, friends and colleagues concerning his conviction and imprisonment.

1988(Id. at p. 296.) See also United States v. Borum (10th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 896, 900 , “There is no suggestion as to the existence of a tenable defense which has been locked in by the amnesia”; People v. Stolze (1980) 100 Mich.App. 511 [ 299 N.W.2d 61, 62-63 ], defendant’s memory would have been of questionable help to defense counsel because of the number of witnesses and the extrinsic evidence implicating defendant in the crime.

1988(Id. at p. 296.) See also United States v. Borum (10th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 896, 900 , “There is no suggestion as to the existence of a tenable defense which has been locked in by the amnesia”; People v. Stolze (1980) 100 Mich.App. 511 [ 299 N.W.2d 61, 62-63 ], defendant’s memory would have been of questionable help to defense counsel because of the number of witnesses and the extrinsic evidence implicating defendant in the crime.

1988(Id. at p. 296.) See also United States v. Borum (10th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 896, 900 , “There is no suggestion as to the existence of a tenable defense which has been locked in by the amnesia”; People v. Stolze (1980) 100 Mich.App. 511 [ 299 N.W.2d 61, 62-63 ], defendant’s memory would have been of questionable help to defense counsel because of the number of witnesses and the extrinsic evidence implicating defendant in the crime.

1982At the very least, already wary agencies are discouraged from creating "internal procedures that will assure that disclosable information can be easily separated from that which is exempt." (See Vaughn v. Rosen, supra, 484 F.2d at p. 828 ; see also Irons v. Gottschalk (D.C.

1982At the very least, already wary agencies are discouraged from creating “internal procedures that will assure that disclosable information can be easily separated from that which is exempt.” (See Vaughn v. Rosen, supra, 484 F.2d at p. 828 ; see also Irons v. Gottschalk (D.C.Cir. 1976) 548 F.2d 992, 996 , cert. den., 434 U.S. 965 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 451 , 98 S.Ct. 505 ].) Finally, as modern society becomes more complex, so do the issues which confront us and the agencies that are supposed to serve us.

1975It is the attorney’s reasonable and honest belief that his client has a tenable claim that is the attorney’s probable cause for representation (Murdock v. Gerth, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d 170, 179 ; Kassan v. Bledsoe, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d 810, 816 ), and not the attorney’s conviction that his client must prevail.

1975It is the attorney’s reasonable and honest belief that his client has a tenable claim that is the attorney’s probable cause for representation (Murdock v. Gerth, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d 170, 179 ; Kassan v. Bledsoe, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d 810, 816 ), and not the attorney’s conviction that his client must prevail.

1934The misappropriation was alleged to *164 have taken place in 1930, and as said in State v. Aceto, 5 Boyce (Del.), 597 [ 96 Atl. 206 ], no subsequent arrangement could mitigate the offense or bar the state’s right of prosecution.