unlicensed person violation in California

1992But as said in Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 [citation]: ‘. . . when the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of caring on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordinance is void.’ ” (Id. at p. 641) This treatment of the contract as a nullity was

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

2009(Buchwald v. Katz[, supra,] 8 Cal.3d 493 , 496 . . . ; see Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 360-361 .) Having so determined, the Commissioner may declare the contract void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act. [Citations.] It follows that a claim to this effect must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court.” ( Styne, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 54-56, fn. omitted.) Styne continued, “Our conclusion that [Labor Code] section 1700.44,

2001(Buchwald v. Katz (1972) 8 Cal.3d 493, 496 [105 *55 Cal.Rptr. 368, 503 P.2d 1376 ]; see Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 360-361 .) 6 Having so determined, the Commissioner may declare the contract void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act.

2009(Buchwald v. Katz[, supra,] 8 Cal.3d 493 , 496 . . . ; see Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 360-361 .) Having so determined, the Commissioner may declare the contract void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act. [Citations.] It follows that a claim to this effect must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court.” ( Styne, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 54-56, fn. omitted.) Styne continued, “Our conclusion that [Labor Code] section 1700.44,

2001(Buchwald v. Katz (1972) 8 Cal.3d 493, 496 [105 *55 Cal.Rptr. 368, 503 P.2d 1376 ]; see Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 360-361 .) 6 Having so determined, the Commissioner may declare the contract void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act.

2007(Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 55-56 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ] [whether a contract is void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act “must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court”].) Appellants never raised this issue below and we decline to consider it.

2007(Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 55-56 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ] [whether a contract is void and unenforceable as involving the services of an unlicensed person in violation of the Act “must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court”].) Appellants never raised this issue below and we decline to consider it.

2007“California courts refuse to consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when those arguments are not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on appeal. 1 “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be considered [citations].” ’ ” (California Assn, for Safety Education v. Brown (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 ]; see also Mercury Casualty Co. v. Hertz Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 414, 425 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 9 ] [“ ‘As a gen

2007“California courts refuse to consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when those arguments are not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on appeal. 1 “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be considered [citations].” ’ ” (California Assn, for Safety Education v. Brown (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 ]; see also Mercury Casualty Co. v. Hertz Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 414, 425 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 9 ] [“ ‘As a gen

2007“California courts refuse to consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when those arguments are not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on appeal. 1 “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be considered [citations].” ’ ” (California Assn, for Safety Education v. Brown (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 ]; see also Mercury Casualty Co. v. Hertz Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 414, 425 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 9 ] [“ ‘As a gen

2007“California courts refuse to consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when those arguments are not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on appeal. 1 “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be considered [citations].” ’ ” (California Assn, for Safety Education v. Brown (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 ]; see also Mercury Casualty Co. v. Hertz Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 414, 425 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 9 ] [“ ‘As a gen

2005(Wilson v. Steele (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1059-1060 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 851 ].) Plaintiff does not explain how a void contract can be enforced.

2005(Wilson v. Steele (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1059-1060 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 851 ].) Plaintiff does not explain how a void contract can be enforced.

2001(See, e.g., Park, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468 ; REO Broadcasting, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 492, 500; Humes, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 486, 492, 494-495 .) It follows that a claim to this effect must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that *56 forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court.

2001(See, e.g., Park, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468 ; REO Broadcasting, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 492, 500; Humes, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 486, 492, 494-495 .) It follows that a claim to this effect must first be submitted to the Commissioner, and that *56 forum must be exhausted, before the matter can be determined by the superior court.

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1989Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 152 [ 308 P.2d 713 ]; Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 289 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 703 , 696 P.2d 95 ].) 2 “[W]hen the object of the statute or ordinance in requiring a license for the privilege of carrying on a certain business is to prevent improper persons from engaging in that particular business, or is for the purpose of regulating it for the protection of the public . . . , the imposition of the penalty amounts to a prohibition against doing the business without a license and a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute or ordina

1954(Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 614 [ 204 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, appellants rightly conclude that if there was an oral contract it was illegal and void and the trial court erred in not so finding.

1954(Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 614 [ 204 P.2d 23 ].) Therefore, appellants rightly conclude that if there was an oral contract it was illegal and void and the trial court erred in not so finding.

1952(Joseph v. Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 577 [ 225 P.2d 504 ]; Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 [ 143 P. 691 , L.R.A. 1915B 851 ].) Defendant’s failure to comply with the licensing provision of section 1620 therefore precludes her recovery of compensation for the work and services performed and monies advanced while so unlicensed.

1952(Joseph v. Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 577 [ 225 P.2d 504 ]; Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 [ 143 P. 691 , L.R.A. 1915B 851 ].) Defendant’s failure to comply with the licensing provision of section 1620 therefore precludes her recovery of compensation for the work and services performed and monies advanced while so unlicensed.