contra proferentem rule in Connecticut

2005Co., 259 Conn. 503, 509 , 789 A.2d 974 (2002) (doctrine of contra proferentem “is more rigorously applied in the context of insurance contracts rather than in other contracts”).

2005Co., 259 Conn. 503, 509 , 789 A.2d 974 (2002) (doctrine of contra proferentem “is more rigorously applied in the context of insurance contracts rather than in other contracts”).

2024We simply note that a [a party] who fails to present any evidence that would permit the fact finder to resolve a material ambiguity risks failing to satisfy [their] burden of proof.’’ Murchison v. Waterbury, 218 Conn. App. 396 , 415 n.19, 291 A.3d 1073 (2023). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Labieniec v. Megna conclude that a remand to the trial court is necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the enteri

2024We simply note that a [a party] who fails to present any evidence that would permit the fact finder to resolve a material ambiguity risks failing to satisfy [their] burden of proof.’’ Murchison v. Waterbury, 218 Conn. App. 396 , 415 n.19, 291 A.3d 1073 (2023). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Labieniec v. Megna conclude that a remand to the trial court is necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the enteri

2024We simply note that a [a party] who fails to present any evidence that would permit the fact finder to resolve a material ambiguity risks failing to satisfy [their] burden of proof.’’ Murchison v. Waterbury, 218 Conn. App. 396 , 415 n.19, 291 A.3d 1073 (2023). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Labieniec v. Megna conclude that a remand to the trial court is necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the enteri

2024We simply note that a [a party] who fails to present any evidence that would permit the fact finder to resolve a material ambiguity risks failing to satisfy [their] burden of proof.’’ Murchison v. Waterbury, 218 Conn. App. 396 , 415 n.19, 291 A.3d 1073 (2023). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Labieniec v. Megna conclude that a remand to the trial court is necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the enteri

2022There is a fundamental distinction between deciding what policy language means, on the one hand, and deciding, on the other hand, whether a particular policy option was bought.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 341–42.

2014Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, supra, 278 Conn. 779 , is not controlling because that decision involved only whether the contra proferentem rule of construction applied in determining the association’s obligations under a policy issued by an insolvent insurer, and did not concern the effect of the insurer’s conduct on the association’s obligations.

2014It also claims that the Pennsylvania court’s decision in Hall v. MPH Transportation, Inc., supra, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 482 , is both unpersuasive and distinguishable.

2014Somers & Associates, P.C. v. Busch, 283 Conn. 396 , 405 n.10, 927 A.2d 832 (2007); see also Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93 , 107, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). 8 We, likewise, disagree with the defendant to the extent it suggests that, had the court properly applied contra proferentem, it would have imposed the shorter noncompetition restriction set forth in § 1.2 because that would be most favorable to the plaintiff in an employment contract context.

2014Somers & Associates, P.C. v. Busch, 283 Conn. 396 , 405 n.10, 927 A.2d 832 (2007); see also Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93 , 107, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). 8 We, likewise, disagree with the defendant to the extent it suggests that, had the court properly applied contra proferentem, it would have imposed the shorter noncompetition restriction set forth in § 1.2 because that would be most favorable to the plaintiff in an employment contract context.

2012Because the reasonable expectations of the insured control when enforcing insurance contracts; Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., 225 Conn. 165 , 175 n.6, 622 A.2d 545 (1993); we conclude that the process best suited to effectuate the intent of the parties where the language is ambiguous as to the issue of historical fact whether the insured elected to buy a particular policy is to examine extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intentions, and if this examination does not resolve the question, other canons of construction, including perhaps the doctrine of contra proferentem, may be applied

2012Because the reasonable expectations of the insured control when enforcing insurance contracts; Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., 225 Conn. 165 , 175 n.6, 622 A.2d 545 (1993); we conclude that the process best suited to effectuate the intent of the parties where the language is ambiguous as to the issue of historical fact whether the insured elected to buy a particular policy is to examine extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intentions, and if this examination does not resolve the question, other canons of construction, including perhaps the doctrine of contra proferentem, may be applied

2007See, e.g., Updike, Kelly & Spellacy v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613 , 648 n.28, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (“an attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney , . . characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 184 , 627 A.2d 414 (1993) (“[t]he relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confident

2007See, e.g., Updike, Kelly & Spellacy v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613 , 648 n.28, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (“an attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney , . . characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 184 , 627 A.2d 414 (1993) (“[t]he relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confident

2001Where an ambiguity in a policy’s terms is present, courts “often apply the contra proferentem rule and interpret a policy against the insurer.” (Internal quotation marks omit ted.) Id.

1986Southern New England Contracting Co. v. State, 165 Conn. 644, 655-56 , 345 A.2d 550 (1974).

1986Southern New England Contracting Co. v. State, 165 Conn. 644, 655-56 , 345 A.2d 550 (1974).