Jett exception in Connecticut

2002In the absence of any such legislative direction, we decline to do so. . . ." Referencing the Mingachos case and section 8A of the Second Restatement of Torts, the Court in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp ., 229 Conn. 99 , 108 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994) ( Suarez I ) held that "intent refers to the consequences of an act . . . [and] denote[s] that the actor desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to follow from it. . . .

2002In the absence of any such legislative direction, we decline to do so. . . ." Referencing the Mingachos case and section 8A of the Second Restatement of Torts, the Court in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp ., 229 Conn. 99 , 108 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994) ( Suarez I ) held that "intent refers to the consequences of an act . . . [and] denote[s] that the actor desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to follow from it. . . .

1994After the movant has met its burden of establishing the nonexistence of an issue of material fact, the plaintiff must "by affidavit or otherwise as provided by § 380 of the 1978 Practice Book, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Farrell v. Farrell , 182 Conn. 34 , 38 , 438 A.2d 415 (1980).

1994After the movant has met its burden of establishing the nonexistence of an issue of material fact, the plaintiff must "by affidavit or otherwise as provided by § 380 of the 1978 Practice Book, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Farrell v. Farrell , 182 Conn. 34 , 38 , 438 A.2d 415 (1980).

1993Our Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that over the years the legislature has worked out a complex statutory scheme in promulgating workers’ compensation statutes and that [a]n integral part of this complex structure is the accepted proposition that an employee surrenders other claims for the certainly of the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 760 , 610 A.2d 1245 (1992).

1993Our Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that over the years the legislature has worked out a complex statutory scheme in promulgating workers’ compensation statutes and that [a]n integral part of this complex structure is the accepted proposition that an employee surrenders other claims for the certainly of the exclusive workers’ compensation remedy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 760 , 610 A.2d 1245 (1992).

1993Furthermore, in his complaint, the plaintiff does not even allege that his employer acted "intentionally", but states only that SSC's actions were "willful and/or serious misconduct." Because the plaintiff has not offered any evidence which supports the application of the Jett exception, he has failed to establish a "factual predicate from which it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Connell v. Colwell, supra, 251 .

1993Furthermore, in his complaint, the plaintiff does not even allege that his employer acted "intentionally", but states only that SSC's actions were "willful and/or serious misconduct." Because the plaintiff has not offered any evidence which supports the application of the Jett exception, he has failed to establish a "factual predicate from which it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Connell v. Colwell, supra, 251 .

1993Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 775-77 , 607 A.2d 418 (1992).

1993Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 775-77 , 607 A.2d 418 (1992).

1992On the other hand, the Supreme Court refused to extend the Jett exception to include “ ‘accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of genuine intentional injury.’ ” Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 108, quoting 2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1976) § 68.13, pp. 13-18; Panaro v. Electrolux Corporation, 208 Conn. 589, 599 , 545 A.2d 1086 (1988); Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, supra. In Jett v. Dunlap, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that

1992On the other hand, the Supreme Court refused to extend the Jett exception to include “ ‘accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of genuine intentional injury.’ ” Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 108, quoting 2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1976) § 68.13, pp. 13-18; Panaro v. Electrolux Corporation, 208 Conn. 589, 599 , 545 A.2d 1086 (1988); Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, supra. In Jett v. Dunlap, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that

1992See Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, 203 Conn. 34, 40 , 522 A.2d 1235 (1987) (exception for minor who has been illegally employed); Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 218-19 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979) (exception for intentional torts committed or intentionally directed by employer); but see Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (declining to extend Jett exception to include “accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of genuine inte

1992See Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, 203 Conn. 34, 40 , 522 A.2d 1235 (1987) (exception for minor who has been illegally employed); Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 218-19 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979) (exception for intentional torts committed or intentionally directed by employer); but see Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (declining to extend Jett exception to include “accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of genuine inte