11 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2004All the appellants in the present case, except the Farinases, grounded their claims on both the common law and statutory standards. *559 The Florida Supreme Court announced the case law standard for insurer good faith in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So.2d 783 (Fla.1980). 2003The Florida Supreme Court announced the case law standard for insurer good faith in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So.2d 783 (Fla.1980). | 2 | 2 |
ALVIN DUNBAR v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen1 sentence2018Dunbar v. State, 230 So. 3d 8, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Dale v. Stategreen1 sentence2018A deadly weapon has been defined in the case law and standard jury instruction on robbery in two ways.3 First, as an object “used or threatened to be used in a way likely 3 In Dale v. State, 703 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 1997), the supreme court stated that “[a]lthough section 812.13 fails to define the terms ‘firearm’ and ‘weapon,’ the definitions for these terms contained in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions are a 4 to produce death or great bodily harm.” Fla. Std. | 1 | 1 |
Pratt v. Philbrookgreen1 sentence2003Corp., 148 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1998); Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814 , 825 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 940 F.Supp. 437, 440 (D.R.I.1996); see also Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18 , 19 n. 1 (1st Cir.1997). [5] Pratt . [6] We note parenthetically that although the term "excusable neglect" defies precise definition, patterns emanate from the case law applying rule 1.540 from which some very general principles emerge. | 1 | 1 |
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Islandgreen1 sentence2003Corp., 148 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1998); Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814 , 825 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 940 F.Supp. 437, 440 (D.R.I.1996); see also Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18 , 19 n. 1 (1st Cir.1997). [5] Pratt . [6] We note parenthetically that although the term "excusable neglect" defies precise definition, patterns emanate from the case law applying rule 1.540 from which some very general principles emerge. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence1998See, e.g., Williams v. State, 711 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 4th DCA1998). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Reedgreen1 sentence1983Estate of Reed, 354 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knauer v. Barnett
green
1 sentence2009The Pertinent Case Law An issue similar to the issue in this case was closely examined by the First District in Barnett v. Barnett, 336 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), and by the Florida Supreme Court in its review of Barnett in Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1978). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Barnett v. Barnett
green
1 sentence2009The Pertinent Case Law An issue similar to the issue in this case was closely examined by the First District in Barnett v. Barnett, 336 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), and by the Florida Supreme Court in its review of Barnett in Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1978). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
cluster 724016
green
1 sentence2003Corp., 148 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1998); Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814 , 825 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 940 F.Supp. 437, 440 (D.R.I.1996); see also Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18 , 19 n. 1 (1st Cir.1997). [5] Pratt . [6] We note parenthetically that although the term "excusable neglect" defies precise definition, patterns emanate from the case law applying rule 1.540 from which some very general principles emerge. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
David Raymond v. International Business MacHines Corp.
green
1 sentence2003Corp., 148 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1998); Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814 , 825 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 940 F.Supp. 437, 440 (D.R.I.1996); see also Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18 , 19 n. 1 (1st Cir.1997). [5] Pratt . [6] We note parenthetically that although the term "excusable neglect" defies precise definition, patterns emanate from the case law applying rule 1.540 from which some very general principles emerge. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lawley v. State
green
1 sentence2002The case law applying rule 3.700(c)(1) states that even in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, it is reversible error for a successor judge to sentence a defendant where the record does not show that the substitution of judges is "necessary" or dictated by an "emergency." Campbell v. State, 622 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Madrigal v. State, 683 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Lawley v. State, 377 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Madrigal v. State
green
1 sentence2002The case law applying rule 3.700(c)(1) states that even in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, it is reversible error for a successor judge to sentence a defendant where the record does not show that the substitution of judges is "necessary" or dictated by an "emergency." Campbell v. State, 622 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Madrigal v. State, 683 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Lawley v. State, 377 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Campbell v. State
green
1 sentence2002The case law applying rule 3.700(c)(1) states that even in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, it is reversible error for a successor judge to sentence a defendant where the record does not show that the substitution of judges is "necessary" or dictated by an "emergency." Campbell v. State, 622 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Madrigal v. State, 683 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Lawley v. State, 377 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio
green
1 sentence1983The case-law requirement of disclosure, set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in such cases as Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1961), has been “suppllanted by statute . . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In Re Livingston's Estate
green
1 sentence1982The district court, in reversing, found no basis for reading into Florida's pretermitted spouse statute the prior case-law requirement that the provision in the will be made "in contemplation of marriage." The district court recognized that this holding was in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Steinert's Estate , but concluded that the Second District had receded from Steinert's Estate in In Re Livingston's Estate, 172 So.2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Myers v. Askew
neutral
1 sentence1980Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Myers v. Askew, 338 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences1980Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Myers v. Askew, 338 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). 1980Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Myers v. Askew, 338 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.