case law requirement in New York

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1989However, this very same argument was specifically rejected by this court in Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co. ( 92 AD2d 110, 113 ), where it was stated: "Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, their allegation to the effect that [defendants] had 'intentionally ignored’ the known hazard * * * cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of 'specific acts’ directed at causing harm to 'particular employees’ necessary to bring this case within the 'intentional injury’ exception, and is tantamount to an allegation of gross negligence, or perhaps, even reckless conduct on the part of [defen

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1983Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the “exclusive remedy” provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ). 1 Assuming, arguendo, however, that the plaintiffs had been able to allege sufficient acts on the part of defendants-respondents to bring themselves within the foregoing exception, the fact remains that they would still be barred from maintaining these causes of action a

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1983Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the “exclusive remedy” provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ). 1 Assuming, arguendo, however, that the plaintiffs had been able to allege sufficient acts on the part of defendants-respondents to bring themselves within the foregoing exception, the fact remains that they would still be barred from maintaining these causes of action a

1984Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 41 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ).” Intentionally tortious conduct connotes conduct engaged in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the injurious act (Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 , supra).

1983Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the “exclusive remedy” provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ). 1 Assuming, arguendo, however, that the plaintiffs had been able to allege sufficient acts on the part of defendants-respondents to bring themselves within the foregoing exception, the fact remains that they would still be barred from maintaining these causes of action a

1997In opposition to the motion to dismiss, tenants contended, inter alia, that Real Property Law § 223-b is not the exclusive source of the retaliatory-eviction claim; that it existed in the case law prior to the enactment of the statute (see, e.g., Toms Point Apts. v Goudzward, 72 Misc 2d 629 , and cases cited therein; Edwards v Habib, 397 F2d 687); and that the case law claim continues to coexist with the statutory claim.

1997In this jurisdiction, both courts and commentators have assumed that the case law defense continues to coexist with the statute (see, e.g., Kew Gardens Assocs. v Regan, 106 Misc 2d 267; Scherer, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York § 11:20).

1996(Eschbach v Eschbach, supra; Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, supra.) In addition to the case law factors set forth above, the court, as previously stated herein, is now also mandated by statute to consider the impact of domestic violence on the child in custody /visitation proceedings.

1996(Eschbach v Eschbach, supra; Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, supra.) In addition to the case law factors set forth above, the court, as previously stated herein, is now also mandated by statute to consider the impact of domestic violence on the child in custody /visitation proceedings.

1995While the breadth of the court’s discretion varies with the circumstances presented (see, supra, at 136), there is ample foundation in the case law for the principle that when a verdict has been rendered in favor of the defendant in a tort case—especially if resolution of the case turns on evaluation of conflicting expert testimony—a court should be particularly hesitant to intervene (see, Wierzbicki v Kristel, 192 AD2d 906, 907 ; Kirkpatrick v Timber Log Homes, 190 AD2d 1072 ; Nicastro v Park, supra, at 134; Ellis v Hoelzel, 57 AD2d 968, 969 ).

1995While the breadth of the court’s discretion varies with the circumstances presented (see, supra, at 136), there is ample foundation in the case law for the principle that when a verdict has been rendered in favor of the defendant in a tort case—especially if resolution of the case turns on evaluation of conflicting expert testimony—a court should be particularly hesitant to intervene (see, Wierzbicki v Kristel, 192 AD2d 906, 907 ; Kirkpatrick v Timber Log Homes, 190 AD2d 1072 ; Nicastro v Park, supra, at 134; Ellis v Hoelzel, 57 AD2d 968, 969 ).

1995While the breadth of the court’s discretion varies with the circumstances presented (see, supra, at 136), there is ample foundation in the case law for the principle that when a verdict has been rendered in favor of the defendant in a tort case—especially if resolution of the case turns on evaluation of conflicting expert testimony—a court should be particularly hesitant to intervene (see, Wierzbicki v Kristel, 192 AD2d 906, 907 ; Kirkpatrick v Timber Log Homes, 190 AD2d 1072 ; Nicastro v Park, supra, at 134; Ellis v Hoelzel, 57 AD2d 968, 969 ).

1990(See, Schiff Assocs. v Flack, 51 NY2d 692 , supra; Hartford Ins.

1990Co., 55 NY2d 131, supra.) Be that as it may, there is still a case-law rule that where an insurer undertakes the defense of an entity despite the lack of coverage, it will be estopped from a later disclaimer if its conduct has prejudiced the entity in the interim.

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1986Viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, the allegation that the defendant ACMI intentionally ignored a known "hazard” cannot be deemed to satisfy the case-law requirement of "[sjpecific acts” directed at causing harm to "particular employees” necessary to bring this case within the "intentional injury” exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy (see, Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 ; Bardere v Zafir, 102 AD2d 422, 424 , affd 63 NY2d 850 ; Orzechowski v Warner-Lambert Co., 92 AD2d 110, 112-113 ; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ).

1985(General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125 .) This case law doctrine is currently acknowledged by General Obligations Law § 17-103 (4) (b).

1983Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, such conduct is not excepted from the “exclusive remedy” provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Mylroie v GAF Corp., 81 AD2d 994 , affd 55 NY2d 893 , supra; Finch v Swingly, 42 AD2d 1035 ; Santiago v Brill Monfort Co., 11 AD2d 1041 , affd 10 NY2d 718 ; Artonio v Hirsch, 3 AD2d 939 ). 1 Assuming, arguendo, however, that the plaintiffs had been able to allege sufficient acts on the part of defendants-respondents to bring themselves within the foregoing exception, the fact remains that they would still be barred from maintaining these causes of action a

1978Thus, in a generally accepted set of guidelines (see, e.g., Matter of Karras v Michaelis, 26 AD2d 640, 641 , revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 449 ; Matter of Cohalan v Schermerhorn, 77 Misc 2d 23, 28 ), Justice Meyer stated five criteria to be considered by zoning boards when considering applications for area variances: "(1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be pr

1978Thus, in a generally accepted set of guidelines (see, e.g., Matter of Karras v Michaelis, 26 AD2d 640, 641 , revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 449 ; Matter of Cohalan v Schermerhorn, 77 Misc 2d 23, 28 ), Justice Meyer stated five criteria to be considered by zoning boards when considering applications for area variances: "(1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be pr

1978Thus, in a generally accepted set of guidelines (see, e.g., Matter of Karras v Michaelis, 26 AD2d 640, 641 , revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 449 ; Matter of Cohalan v Schermerhorn, 77 Misc 2d 23, 28 ), Justice Meyer stated five criteria to be considered by zoning boards when considering applications for area variances: "(1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be pr

1978Although the phrase "practical difficulties” has apparently never been precisely defined (see Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis, 19 Misc 2d 909 ; 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 14.46, p 7; 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning [3d ed], p 45-26), it appears from the case law that the standard contemplates a balancing test of sorts whereby the hardship to the applicant 1 , by strict adherence to the zoning ordinance, is weighed against the detriment to neighboring property owners and the public generally should the variance be granted.

1978Thus, in a generally accepted set of guidelines (see, e.g., Matter of Karras v Michaelis, 26 AD2d 640, 641 , revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 449 ; Matter of Cohalan v Schermerhorn, 77 Misc 2d 23, 28 ), Justice Meyer stated five criteria to be considered by zoning boards when considering applications for area variances: "(1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be pr

1978Thus, in a generally accepted set of guidelines (see, e.g., Matter of Karras v Michaelis, 26 AD2d 640, 641 , revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 449 ; Matter of Cohalan v Schermerhorn, 77 Misc 2d 23, 28 ), Justice Meyer stated five criteria to be considered by zoning boards when considering applications for area variances: "(1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement, (2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like), (3) whether a substantial change will be pr

1964Corp., 266 N. Y. 391 ) has been followed without apparent legislative disapproval and therefore the theory was not inconsistent with the purpose or intent of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.