case law rule in California

2020The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: “This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct.” The court in Hester points out that rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of “the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed,” and acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights. ( Hester, supra, at p

2020The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: “This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct.” The court in Hester points out that rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of “the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed,” and acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights. ( Hester, supra, at p

2020The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: “This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct.” The court in Hester points out that rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of “the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed,” and acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights. ( Hester, supra, at p

2010The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: "This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct." Rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of "the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed." ( People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 , 992 P.2d 569 ] ( Hester ).) Hester states that acceptance of a ple

1992(See Estate of Patterson (1923) 64 Cal.App. 643, 646 [ 222 P. 374 ].) He also overlooks the fact that even if this were true joint tenancy property, the court’s orders affecting the property terminated the unities of interest essential to a joint tenancy.

1992(See Estate of Patterson (1923) 64 Cal.App. 643, 646 [ 222 P. 374 ].) He also overlooks the fact that even if this were true joint tenancy property, the court’s orders affecting the property terminated the unities of interest essential to a joint tenancy.

1991This is consistent with the earlier case law requirement that ‘the party is unable, from causes beyond his control, to bring the case to trial[.]’ (Christin [v. Superior Court], supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 532.)” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hudson), supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at P- 473.) It is clear here that the fact that plaintiffs’ case was off the civil active list did not contribute in any significant way to their failure to bring the case to trial.

1990This is consistent with the earlier case law requirement that “the party is unable, from causes beyond his control, to bring the case to trial[.]” (Christin, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 532 .) This policy is expressly recognized in the Commission comment.

2020(Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 961–963 & fn. 6; see King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1191 (King).) At the time it was repealed, Civil Code section 2280 provided that “[u]nless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust, every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor by writing filed with the trustee.” (Huscher, at p. 963.) The first part of this sentence was preserved in the current section 15400, which now reads in part: “Unless a trust is expressly made irrevocable by the trust instrument, the trust is revocable by the settlor.” 18 We agree wi

2017All that is required to establish future [surgeries] is that from all the evidence, including the expert testimony, ... it satisfactorily appears that such [future surgeries] will occur with reasonable certainty. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Id . at pp. 97-98, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 100 , first, second, and second to last brackets in original, other brackets added; accord, Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582 , 602, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 712 ( Regalado ).) " '[I]t is generally a question for the [trier of fact] to determine from the evidence whether or not the claimed prospective detriment is reas

2017All that is required to establish future [surgeries] is that from all the evidence, including the expert testimony, ... it satisfactorily appears that such [future surgeries] will occur with reasonable certainty. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Id . at pp. 97-98, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 100 , first, second, and second to last brackets in original, other brackets added; accord, Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582 , 602, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 712 ( Regalado ).) " '[I]t is generally a question for the [trier of fact] to determine from the evidence whether or not the claimed prospective detriment is reas

2017(Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, fn. 6 [ 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ]; see People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] [purpose of rule].) Here, the admission of the Martin letter into evidence is challenged by Honeywell on the grounds stated in the following heading: “The trial court erroneously admitted the Martin letter, which was not relevant and unduly prejudiced the jury against Honeywell.” 15 (Boldface omitted.) Based on the *1078 contents of the briefs, the rule of court, and the case law applying that rule, we conclude Honeywell has not challeng

2017(Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, fn. 6 [ 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ]; see People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] [purpose of rule].) Here, the admission of the Martin letter into evidence is challenged by Honeywell on the grounds stated in the following heading: “The trial court erroneously admitted the Martin letter, which was not relevant and unduly prejudiced the jury against Honeywell.” 15 (Boldface omitted.) Based on the *1078 contents of the briefs, the rule of court, and the case law applying that rule, we conclude Honeywell has not challeng

2017(Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, fn. 6 [ 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ]; see People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] [purpose of rule].) Here, the admission of the Martin letter into evidence is challenged by Honeywell on the grounds stated in the following heading: “The trial court erroneously admitted the Martin letter, which was not relevant and unduly prejudiced the jury against Honeywell.” 15 (Boldface omitted.) Based on the *1078 contents of the briefs, the rule of court, and the case law applying that rule, we conclude Honeywell has not challeng

2017(Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, fn. 6 [ 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ]; see People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] [purpose of rule].) Here, the admission of the Martin letter into evidence is challenged by Honeywell on the grounds stated in the following heading: “The trial court erroneously admitted the Martin letter, which was not relevant and unduly prejudiced the jury against Honeywell.” 15 (Boldface omitted.) Based on the *1078 contents of the briefs, the rule of court, and the case law applying that rule, we conclude Honeywell has not challeng

2017All that is required to establish future [surgeries] is that from all the evidence, including the expert testimony, ... it satisfactorily appears that such [future surgeries] will occur with reasonable certainty. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Id . at pp. 97-98, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 100 , first, second, and second to last brackets in original, other brackets added; accord, Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582 , 602, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 712 ( Regalado ).) " '[I]t is generally a question for the [trier of fact] to determine from the evidence whether or not the claimed prospective detriment is reas

2017All that is required to establish future [surgeries] is that from all the evidence, including the expert testimony, ... it satisfactorily appears that such [future surgeries] will occur with reasonable certainty. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Id . at pp. 97-98, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 100 , first, second, and second to last brackets in original, other brackets added; accord, Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582 , 602, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 712 ( Regalado ).) " '[I]t is generally a question for the [trier of fact] to determine from the evidence whether or not the claimed prospective detriment is reas

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006Factual issues are resolved under the substantial evidence test: whether there is substantial evidence to support factual determinations reached by the trial court. [Citations.] Once the pertinent factual issues are settled, the question whether the trial court’s ruling should be upheld is determined under the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citations.]” (Millsap v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 196, 200 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 ].) Here, as in Eubanks , “the significant facts were largely undisputed.

2006Factual issues are resolved under the substantial evidence test: whether there is substantial evidence to support factual determinations reached by the trial court. [Citations.] Once the pertinent factual issues are settled, the question whether the trial court’s ruling should be upheld is determined under the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citations.]” (Millsap v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 196, 200 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 ].) Here, as in Eubanks , “the significant facts were largely undisputed.

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2006The statute provides that a recusal motion “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The statute supersedes the case law rule that previously allowed a defendant to recuse a district attorney by showing “a conflict of interest which might prejudice him [or her] against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect, his [or her] ability to impartially perform the discretionary fimctions of his [or her] office.” (People v. Superior Cour

2005(In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 347 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 612 P.2d 882 ].) n CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Both Experts, Robbins and Forensis, contend the trial court erroneously applied the relevant case law to rule that Experts’ indemnity claims were barred for public policy reasons.

2005(In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 347 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 612 P.2d 882 ].) n CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Both Experts, Robbins and Forensis, contend the trial court erroneously applied the relevant case law to rule that Experts’ indemnity claims were barred for public policy reasons.

1997See e.g., Bank of America N.T. & S.A. v. Mantz, 4 Cal.2d 322 [ 49 P.2d 279 ](1935).

1997See e.g., Bank of America N.T. & S.A. v. Mantz, 4 Cal.2d 322 [ 49 P.2d 279 ](1935).

1996However, once we move beyond the section 526a areas clearly defined by case law such as property owner sues city and state taxpayer sues state official, the prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction to hear a constitutional claim—the requirement that the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the challenged policy (see, e.g., Valley Forge College v. Americans United (1982) 454 U.S. 464, 471-476 [ 70 L.Ed.2d 700, 708-712 , 102 S.Ct. 752 ])—takes on greater significance and should, we believe, be a factor to be considered in determining whether standing under section 52

1996However, once we move beyond the section 526a areas clearly defined by case law such as property owner sues city and state taxpayer sues state official, the prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction to hear a constitutional claim—the requirement that the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of the challenged policy (see, e.g., Valley Forge College v. Americans United (1982) 454 U.S. 464, 471-476 [ 70 L.Ed.2d 700, 708-712 , 102 S.Ct. 752 ])—takes on greater significance and should, we believe, be a factor to be considered in determining whether standing under section 52

1993However, the present federal rule granting primacy to the interpretations of the federal agency rests upon Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 843 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 703 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ], decided in 1984, well after the formation of the contracts at issue. 6 Many contracts for sale of natural gas entered into after the advent of the NGPA contain pricing provisions anticipating the deregulation of natural gas prices and providing for repricing in that event.

1993However, the present federal rule granting primacy to the interpretations of the federal agency rests upon Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 843 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 703 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ], decided in 1984, well after the formation of the contracts at issue. 6 Many contracts for sale of natural gas entered into after the advent of the NGPA contain pricing provisions anticipating the deregulation of natural gas prices and providing for repricing in that event.