anti-SLAPP analysis in Georgia

2024As described above, the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the trial court to determine if the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Wilkes, 306 Ga. at 262 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023ACLU v. Zeh, 312 Ga. at 652 (1) (c). (a) “As explained above, the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is to decide whether the party or parties filing the anti-SLAPP motion -- here, [Mainstreet] --made a threshold showing that [Morgan’s] claims are ones ‘arising from’ protected activity.” Wilkes & McHugh, 306 Ga. at 263 (3).

2023ACLU v. Zeh, 312 Ga. at 652 (1) (c). (a) “As explained above, the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is to decide whether the party or parties filing the anti-SLAPP motion -- here, [Mainstreet] --made a threshold showing that [Morgan’s] claims are ones ‘arising from’ protected activity.” Wilkes & McHugh, 306 Ga. at 263 (3).

2022In American Civil Liberties Union v. Zeh3 (“Zeh II”), the Supreme Court of Georgia granted the ACLU’s petition for certiorari “to address what standard of judicial review applies in this situation and whether, under that standard, the trial court erred by denying the anti-SLAPP motion to strike.”4 The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred because Zeh had not established a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim under the second part of the anti-SLAPP test.5 The Court thus reversed our decision upholding the trial court’s ruling.6 “That conclusion does not fully resolve this c

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2026The elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure;[27] (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.28 The defendants insist that Dr. Harms has f

2026The elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure;[27] (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.28 The defendants insist that Dr. Harms has f

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025Giraldi’s Facebook message was privileged because it was sent to encourage the recipient to “be careful” regarding the possibility of staph infections, and thus was a privileged statement “made in good faith in the performance of a public duty” or a “legal or moral private duty.” OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)-(2); Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 20-21 (2) (2002) (a defamation cause of action requires an unprivileged communication to a third party).

2023In his complaint, Morgan asserted a claim of libel per se against Mainstreet, which generally “consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality.” Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Assn., 231 Ga. App. 685, 688 (2) ( 500 SE2d 1 ) (1998).

2023In his complaint, Morgan asserted a claim of libel per se against Mainstreet, which generally “consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality.” Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Assn., 231 Ga. App. 685, 688 (2) ( 500 SE2d 1 ) (1998).

2022In light of the circumstances of this case, and keeping in mind that the heart of the anti-SLAPP statute is the First Amendment, Royalty Network, Inc. 14 v. Harris, 756 F3d 1351, 1356 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2014), we agree with the trial court that Greene made a showing that the speech underlying EPM’s cause of action could reasonably be construed as fitting within one of the categories spelled out in OCGA § 9- 11-11.1 (c). (b) We turn now to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2020See generally Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36, 41 (3) ( 783 SE2d 426 ) (2016) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on appeal and are therefore presumed to be binding and correct.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 668 (2) (b) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (concluding that review of a State Bar grievance “could reasonably be construed as statements made in connection with official proceedings”); Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 199-200 (1) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012) (finding that complaints to the Office of the General Counsel

2020See generally Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36, 41 (3) ( 783 SE2d 426 ) (2016) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on appeal and are therefore presumed to be binding and correct.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 668 (2) (b) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (concluding that review of a State Bar grievance “could reasonably be construed as statements made in connection with official proceedings”); Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 199-200 (1) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012) (finding that complaints to the Office of the General Counsel

2020See generally Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36, 41 (3) ( 783 SE2d 426 ) (2016) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on appeal and are therefore presumed to be binding and correct.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 668 (2) (b) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (concluding that review of a State Bar grievance “could reasonably be construed as statements made in connection with official proceedings”); Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 199-200 (1) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012) (finding that complaints to the Office of the General Counsel

2020See generally Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36, 41 (3) ( 783 SE2d 426 ) (2016) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on appeal and are therefore presumed to be binding and correct.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 668 (2) (b) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (concluding that review of a State Bar grievance “could reasonably be construed as statements made in connection with official proceedings”); Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 199-200 (1) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012) (finding that complaints to the Office of the General Counsel

2020Ga. Feb. 14, 2017) (noting that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute “essentially creates a Rule 12 (b) (6) ‘plus’ standard for cases with a First Amendment nexus”); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (a) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018). 10 The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis having been established, the burden shifted to Dellinger-Allen to establish “that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on [her] claim.” Mellberg, No. A20A0004, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 303 , at *4.

2020Ga. Feb. 14, 2017) (noting that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute “essentially creates a Rule 12 (b) (6) ‘plus’ standard for cases with a First Amendment nexus”); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (a) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018). 10 The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis having been established, the burden shifted to Dellinger-Allen to establish “that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on [her] claim.” Mellberg, No. A20A0004, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 303 , at *4.

2012The motion shall be heard not more than 30 days after service . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 13 See Farrar v. Macie, 297 Ga. App. 192, 194-195 (3) ( 676 SE2d 840 ) (2009) (dealing with immunity for psychologists licensed under Chapter 39 of Title 43). 7 The record reflects that no hearing was held on the Anti-SLAPP defense, as required by the statute.14 Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing as required by the Anti-SLAPP statute.

2012The motion shall be heard not more than 30 days after service . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 13 See Farrar v. Macie, 297 Ga. App. 192, 194-195 (3) ( 676 SE2d 840 ) (2009) (dealing with immunity for psychologists licensed under Chapter 39 of Title 43). 7 The record reflects that no hearing was held on the Anti-SLAPP defense, as required by the statute.14 Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing as required by the Anti-SLAPP statute.