anti-SLAPP analysis in California

2026Our Supreme Court detailed the procedure for the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis in Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995 : In “determining whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity . . . , courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Thus, “[i]f a caus

2026Our Supreme Court detailed the procedure for the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis in Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995 : In “determining whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity . . . , courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Thus, “[i]f a caus

2026As a general rule, allegations that such declarations were forged or that representations made to the court during oral argument were false and disparaging do not remove them from anti-SLAPP protection at step one, because courts do not decide the legitimacy of such litigation activities at step one.10 (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 [“any ‘claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s [step two] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s case’ ”

2026(Id., subd. (e)(1), (2); see Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 , 1117-1118.) If defendants make a sufficient showing under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show the targeted causes of action are legally sufficient and supported by evidence that, if credited, would sustain a judgment for plaintiffs. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396; Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and

2026The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that “it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323 .) The privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.

2026Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] … [i]n any … judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official proceeding authorized by law[.]” The litigation privilege “is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 .) Thus, if the litigation privilege precludes a finding of liability for breach on the part of Mario and Sienna, Stockdale cann

2026The second step A. Procedural standards At step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 .) The court considers the pleadings as well as evidence submitted by the parties.

2026(See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 [only “[i]f the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute” is the “second step . . . reached”]; see Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 811 [“Because of the conclusions we 30 have reached regarding the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we need not proceed to evaluate whether plaintiffs adequately showed a probability of prevailing in the action.”].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying Outfront’s special motion to strike is affirmed.

2026Our Supreme Court’s warning against finding all investigatory acts protected, including the initiation of an investigation, is relevant here: “ ‘Any employer that initiates an investigation of an employee, whether for lawful or unlawful motives, would be at liberty to claim that its conduct was protected and thereby shift the burden of proof to the employee, who, without the benefit of discovery and with the threat of attorney fees looming, would be obligated to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.’ [Citation.] Conflating, in the anti-SLAPP analysis, discriminatory decisions

2026Our Supreme Court’s warning against finding all investigatory acts protected, including the initiation of an investigation, is relevant here: “ ‘Any employer that initiates an investigation of an employee, whether for lawful or unlawful motives, would be at liberty to claim that its conduct was protected and thereby shift the burden of proof to the employee, who, without the benefit of discovery and with the threat of attorney fees looming, would be obligated to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.’ [Citation.] Conflating, in the anti-SLAPP analysis, discriminatory decisions

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 .) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient 11 and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) A. Litigation Privilege Barenholtz contends Jesse’s tort claims are barred by the litigation

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2026(Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This in turn requires us to consider whether Stockdale’s breach of contract complaint arose from acts taken by defendants or their agent in furtherance of the “right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As to prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Stockdale notes in its brief: “[Stockdale] recognizes the Supreme Court has determined ‘the mere fact the constitutional speech occurred in violation of a contract did n

2025(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) Concluding that Pham’s complaint arose from Olivia’s alleged aiding and abetting of the wrongful transfer of the property (and not from the 2014 stipulated order), the trial court did not consider the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry—whether Pham had shown that her claims had “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 .) A panel of this court reversed, concluding that Pham’s claims did arise from protected activity, and remanded to the trial cour

2026Step One – Legal Standards “The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).) “Although at one time courts were applying a gravamen test in the first step of an anti-SLAPP analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear it is not the proper inquiry.” (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616 , 628 (Sandoval), citing Bonni v. St.

2026A Defendant Must Make Two Showings at the First Step of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis itself requires the defendant to make “two related showings.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 (Wilson).) First, “[c]omparing its statements and conduct against the [anti-SLAPP] statute, it must demonstrate activity qualifying for protection.” (Ibid.) The type of activity protected “include[s] a specified range of statements, writings, and conduct in connection with official proceedings and matters of public interest.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at

2026(Id., subd. (e)(1), (2); see Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 , 1117-1118.) If defendants make a sufficient showing under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show the targeted causes of action are legally sufficient and supported by evidence that, if credited, would sustain a judgment for plaintiffs. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396; Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and

2025(See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 , 1117-1118.) If the defendant makes a sufficient showing under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show that their causes of action are legally sufficient and supported by evidence that, if credited, would sustain a judgment in their favor. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396; Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal me

2025(See Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 [“Arguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.”]; Castleman v. Sagaser, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 493 [“We do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiffs’] allegations in determining whether their claims arise from protected speech or petitioning activity”]; Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 733 [it is irrelevant that the defendant might prevail on the merits of the claims where the defendant cannot meet the first prong of the analysis]; City of Cos

2024DISCUSSION Defendants on appeal contend Lingenfelter’s FAC was not a “cognizable pleading,” as it allegedly failed to include any viable cause of action, “merely attached more than 100 pages of emails, photographs, letters, and other documents,” and read “exactly like an opening statement” when it states in “every single sentence” that “ ‘the evidence will show.’ ”6 Defendants therefore contend that the entire FAC “must be treated as one giant accusation, and because at least some of the statements are protected, the 6 “Arguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step

2026(Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 945 , italics added.) However, that holding did not end the inquiry because the defendants argued the plaintiff was required to satisfy other preconditions to admissibility at the anti-SLAPP hearing.

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2025(City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69 , 80-81; White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270 , 290.) The superior court correctly denied the motion at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the moving defendant must make a “threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76 .) The critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on protected activity.

2022We “accept as true all evidence favorable to 4 the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's submission as a matter of law.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699-700 .) She need only show a “minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5 ; see Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93 [anti-SLAPP statute “poses no obstacle to suits that possess [even] minimal merit”].) B.

2016Potential Merit of Yahoo!’s Claims As discussed earlier, the central question in step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether the complaint is “ ‘both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citation.]” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291 ; Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821 ; Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 741 .) “In making this assessment it is ‘the court’s responsibility . . . to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff . . . ’ [Citation

2026Prong Two: Stockdale has Burden to Show a Probability of Success on the Merits of Breach of Contract Claim To establish a reasonable probability of prevailing under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821 .) “In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both

2025In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a 4 matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’“ (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 .

2024(Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 ; Beroiz v. Wahl, supra, 17. 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 .) Although the anti-SLAPP statute “places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 .) Thus, “[d]uring the second prong of a court’s anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant bears the burden of proving a privilege’s applicability.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc.

2015Although defendants may ultimately defeat Sprengel’s claims by proving the absence of an attorney-client relationship, that does not alter the substance of her claims. 7 (See Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670 [the “court must . . . focus on the substance of the plaintiff’s lawsuit in analyzing the first prong of a special motion to strike”].) 8 Because we agree with the trial court’s finding that defendants failed to establish plaintiff’s claims arise from protected petitioning activity, we need not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2026By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.]” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 , 734-735, fn. omitted.) We therefore agree with the trial court that Asif sufficiently established that plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution arises from his protected activity under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025DISCUSSION Because this court has determined that Pham’s claims arose from Olivia’s protected activity, Pham bore the burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that her claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit’ ”—i.e., “ ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 (Wilson) [noting plaintiff’s “second-step burden is a limited one”]; Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 .) In our de novo review, we neither “ ‘ “weigh evidence [n]or resolve conflicting factual claims” ’ ” but limi

2026(Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117 , citation omitted.) We cannot, as Sarraf would have us do, disregard our Supreme Court’s 9 Though we do not consider Sarraf’s evidence except to determine if it defeats Bagish’s showing as a matter of law, we note Sarraf avoids stating under penalty of perjury that Bagish made a threat to “‘slash’” him. 13 longstanding prohibition on resolving factual claims, weighing credibility, and comparing the weight of the evidence in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384-385; Oasis West Re

2025(See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820.) The trial court elected to analyze and rule on the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, concluding even if Contreras’s activity were protected, her motion should still be denied.

2026(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908 ; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062-1065.) Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 .) Where applicable, the privilege “ ‘immunize[s] defendants from tort liability.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 3 The additional publications Rand-Lewis describes in declarations opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, which are not alleged in the complaint, are not relevant for the purposes of our anti-SLAPP analysis, because an anti-SLAPP analysis is based on “ ‘all allegations o

2014But it is well established that “a plaintiff opposing an anti- SLAPP motion cannot rely on allegations in the complaint, but must set forth evidence that would be admissible at trial.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699 (Overstock).) Even if the complaint in this case were verified—it is not—the allegations therein would be insufficient to satisfy the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2013Code, § 17204.) Based on this provision, our Supreme Court has established that to have standing in an action under the UCL, a plaintiff "must 16 demonstrate some form of economic injury." (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 323 (Kwikset).) In a UCL action, " 'each element [of standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.' " (Id. at p. 327.)6 When seeking to meet its burden for the second prong of the anti-SLAP

2025(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 , 325-326; Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 768 .) We do not weigh the evidence, and we accept “ ‘ “ ‘as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff’ ” ’ ” and evaluate “ ‘ “ ‘the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’ ” ’ ” (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1478 (Feldman).) To satisfy the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant must demonstrate “that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within

2024“The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’ ” (Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 .) To overcome this bar, Narvaez must show that this privilege is inapplicable as a matter of law or make a prima facie showing of facts that, if accepted, would negate the defense.

2026(Monster Energy, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788 .) However, finding statements were protected in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis did not end our inquiry.

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2025(Ibid.) Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that our Supreme Court’s decision in Action Apartment Association, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 15 41 Cal.4th 1232 (Action Apartment) requires us to conclude at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis that Harvey’s claims are based on protected activity and also requires us to conclude that Harvey’s claims for damages are barred by the litigation privilege.

2025The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 .) Where applicable, the privilege “ ‘immunize[s] defendants from tort liability.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 3 The additional publications Rand-Lewis describes in declarations opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, which are not alleged in the complaint, are not relevant for the purposes of our anti-SLAPP analysis, because an anti-SLAPP analysis is based on “ ‘all allegations o

2022(See Seltzer, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 964-967 [plaintiff claimed her insurer’s attorney secretly negotiated settlement with third party that deprived plaintiff of insurance coverage]; Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 118 , 123- 124 [protected activity found even where there were allegations of nondisclosure or fraudulent statements made during settlement process].) “[A] court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the

2017Exchange v. Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 822.) “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 ].) “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of

2026(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908 ; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062-1065.) Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2022Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part that “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding 23 authorized by law[.]” The privilege is “relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323 .) “This privilege is absolute in nature

2025The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 .) Where applicable, the privilege “ ‘immunize[s] defendants from tort liability.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 3 The additional publications Rand-Lewis describes in declarations opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, which are not alleged in the complaint, are not relevant for the purposes of our anti-SLAPP analysis, because an anti-SLAPP analysis is based on “ ‘all allegations o

2022It attaches well before the parties enter the courtroom, covering “‘preliminary conversations and interviews’ related to contemplated action” and other “‘steps taken prior’ to judicial proceedings.” (Rubin, at p. 1195.) 11 The litigation privilege bars liability for “any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that ha[s] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 .) It is “relevant to the second step in

2026(City of Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 420 ; Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 ; Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89; Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 713-715 .) Although the plaintiff’s burden is not high, the plaintiff may not rely solely on the complaint, even if verified, but must present competent and admissible evidence to demonstrate the merit of the claim. ( Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th 6 at p. 940, 946; Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35 , 43 (Wisner); Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 768

2026(Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140 , 151 [plaintiff’s claims that the challenged activity constituted harassment under section 527.6 was not sufficient to establish illegality to defeat the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis].) “[I]llegal means criminal and not merely a violation of some statute. [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 762 [“purported illegality of [defendant’s] conduct did not preclude application of the anti-SLAPP statute”].) Nor does Saenz’s conduct constitute a “true threat.” Ortiz cla

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2024Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff.” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) 8 “Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo. [Citation.] [Like the trial court, we] consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits … upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) II Analysis A Prong One Narvaez makes several arguments concerning th

2022(See Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1062 [“a standard ‘similar to that employed in determining nonsuit, directed verdict or summary judgment motions’ ”]; Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 317 [“plaintiff’s burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment”][, disapproved on another ground in Newport Harbor Ventures, 20 LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 646 ]; Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907 [“similar to the standard used in determining

2022And as to how we decide that step, we set forth the governing law in Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 , 989-990 (Grewal): “ ‘We decide the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis on consideration of “the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) Looking at those affidavits, “[w]e do not weigh credibility, nor do we evaluate the weight of the evidence.

2026Rather, whether Leon or Vasquez engaged in the surreptitious recording is a “factual dispute go[ing] to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] claims and is not relevant to the first [step] of the anti-SLAPP inquiry.” (Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1037 , 1047 (Simmons); see also Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 939 [“A defendant’s declaration denying that he or she engaged in the conduct alleged in the complaint does not foreclose the possibility that a fact finder could later find that he or she did in fact engage in that conduct.”].) Defendant L

2026(Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 937 .) “The question is what is pled—not what is proven.” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 942 .) Moreover, in evaluating the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we read the complaint as a whole and its allegations in context.