anti-SLAPP analysis in Nevada

2022See Coker, 135 Nev. at 12-13, 432 P.3d at 750 (holding that a defendant who made no reference whatsoever in his declaration as to whether his statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood did not meet his burden under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis); cf. Delucchi v. Songer, 1. 33 Nev. 290 . 300, 396 P.3d 826 , 833 (2017) (holding that a defendant demonstrated that his com munication was true or rnade without knowledge of its falsehood when, in a declaration, he stated that the information contained in his communication "was truthful to the best of his knowledge, a

2020Cf. Coker, 135 Nev. at 12-13, 432 P.3d at 750 (holding that a defendant who made no reference whatsoever in his declaration as to whether his statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood did not meet his burden under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis).

2020Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims Because Sanson satisfied prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we must evaluate Abrams showing under prong two: whether her claims had minimal merit.3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712-13 (Cal. 2002) (establishing the "minimal merit" burden for a plaintiff).

2020Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims Because Sanson satisfied prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we must evaluate Abrams showing under prong two: whether her claims had minimal merit.3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712-13 (Cal. 2002) (establishing the "minimal merit" burden for a plaintiff).

2020In assessing whether Abrams' claims arising from protected communications have minimal merit, we must review each challenged claim independently and 3We need not review the likelihood of prevailing on the claims based on the Schoen statements because those statements do not satisf37 the first prong and are not protected. 13 assess Abrams probability of prevailing.4 See Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 613-14 (Cal. 2016).

2020In assessing whether Abrams' claims arising from protected communications have minimal merit, we must review each challenged claim independently and 3We need not review the likelihood of prevailing on the claims based on the Schoen statements because those statements do not satisf37 the first prong and are not protected. 13 assess Abrams probability of prevailing.4 See Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 613-14 (Cal. 2016).

2019In Shapiro, we explained that the Legislature had not defined public concern," and so we adopted California principles to guide the analysis. 133 Nev. at 39-40, 389 P.3d at 268 (adopting California's test for determining whether a statement is an issue of public interest as articulated in Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D.

2019In Shapiro, we explained that the Legislature had not defined public concern," and so we adopted California principles to guide the analysis. 133 Nev. at 39-40, 389 P.3d at 268 (adopting California's test for determining whether a statement is an issue of public interest as articulated in Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D.

2018Op. 11, 412 P.3d 68, 70 (2018). 2 'The Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute in 2015 Among other things, the amendments require a plaintiff in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate with "prima facie evidence," instead of "clear and convincing evidence," a probability of prevailing on the claim. 2015 Nev.

2018Op. 11, 412 P.3d 68, 70 (2018). 2 'The Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute in 2015 Among other things, the amendments require a plaintiff in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate with "prima facie evidence," instead of "clear and convincing evidence," a probability of prevailing on the claim. 2015 Nev.

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).

2026Thus, with respect to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we address only whether the communications were made "in good faith in that [they were] truthful or [were] made without knowledge of [their} falsehood," Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437 , 440, 495 P.3d 93, 97 (2021) (citation modified), or were statements of opinion that "cannot be false," Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 69, 481 P.3d at 1228.

2026Thus, with respect to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we address only whether the communications were made "in good faith in that [they were] truthful or [were] made without knowledge of [their} falsehood," Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437 , 440, 495 P.3d 93, 97 (2021) (citation modified), or were statements of opinion that "cannot be false," Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 69, 481 P.3d at 1228.

2026Op. 56 , 555 P.3d at 278 (explaining that "a public figure defamation claim does not have minimal merit, as a matter of law, if the plaintiffs evidence of actual malice would not be sufficient—even if credited—to sustain a favorable verdict under the clear and convincing standard").

2024Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes "a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995)).

2024Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes "a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Ct. App. 1995)).

2022See Coker, 135 Nev. at 12-13, 432 P.3d at 750 (holding that a defendant who made no reference whatsoever in his declaration as to whether his statements were truthful or made without knowledge of their falsehood did not meet his burden under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis); cf. Delucchi v. Songer, 1. 33 Nev. 290 . 300, 396 P.3d 826 , 833 (2017) (holding that a defendant demonstrated that his com munication was true or rnade without knowledge of its falsehood when, in a declaration, he stated that the information contained in his communication "was truthful to the best of his knowledge, a

2022Op. 73 , 499 P.3d 611, 616 (2021) (emphasis added).

2022Op. 73, 499 P.3d 611, 616 (2021) (emphasis added).

2021Id. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (recognizing that this court "look fsl to California law for guidance when analyzing Nevada's anti- SLAPP statute); see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that "Mlle litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4This holding is consistent with our prior caselaw.

2021Id. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (recognizing that this court "look fsl to California law for guidance when analyzing Nevada's anti- SLAPP statute); see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that "Mlle litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4This holding is consistent with our prior caselaw.

2021Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436, 441, 453 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2019) (observing that at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court should evaluate whether the "gist or stine of the at-issue statement is a protected communication).

2021Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436 , 441, 453 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2019) (observing that at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court should evaluate whether the "gist or stine of the at-issue statement is a protected communication).

2020DISCUSSION The district court erred in finding that Stark failed to satisfy prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis "A SLAPP suit is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates primarily to chill a defendanes exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights." Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 150, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (2013).

2020DISCUSSION The district court erred in finding that Stark failed to satisfy prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis "A SLAPP suit is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates primarily to chill a defendanes exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights." Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 150, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (2013).

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).