anti-SLAPP framework in Massachusetts

2024See Duracraft, supra. In Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 155-156, 159-161 , and Blanchard II, 483 Mass. at 206-207 , in an attempt to more precisely protect petitioning and more clearly permit other lawsuits not based on "classic" petitioning activity to proceed, this court chose to revisit the anti-SLAPP framework in two significant and complex ways.

2008In an Anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, the moving party (here, JCAM) must first “make a threshold showing through the pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are based on the petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-68 (1998) (upholding the denial of a special motion to dismiss a complaint for breach of a non-disclosure agreement by a deponent in the course of a deposition).

2024See Duracraft, supra. In Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 155-156, 159-161 , and Blanchard II, 483 Mass. at 206-207 , in an attempt to more precisely protect petitioning and more clearly permit other lawsuits not based on "classic" petitioning activity to proceed, this court chose to revisit the anti-SLAPP framework in two significant and complex ways.

2017See, e.g., Blanchard , 477 Mass. at 149-153 (determining whether each ground supporting plaintiff's single count of defamation satisfies first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis). a.

2024See Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at 555-556; 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC, 477 Mass. 162, 168 (2017).

2017See, e.g., Harrison , 477 Mass. at 171 (proceeding to stage two of Duracraft analysis only in regard to defendants' petitioning activity). 2.

2026See Keystone Freight Corp. v. Bartlett Consol., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 313 (2010) ("We must interpret and apply the anti-SLAPP statute and our case law in such a way as to continue to permit, where appropriate and consistent with the intent of § 59H, claims of abuse of process as delineated by the Massachusetts common law").

2024See Duracraft, supra. In Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 155-156, 159-161 , and Blanchard II, 483 Mass. at 206-207 , in an attempt to more precisely protect petitioning and more clearly permit other lawsuits not based on "classic" petitioning activity to proceed, this court chose to revisit the anti-SLAPP framework in two significant and complex ways.

2017See also Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 333 . 25 At the first stage of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, courts assess whether the nonmoving party’s claim is solely “based on” the special movant’s petitioning activity in the sense that the nonmoving party’s claim itself arises only from and complains only of that petitioning activity.

2017See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524 .

2014Ct. 1995) (Roseman, J.) (abuse of process claim based on petitioning activity as well as other alleged conduct constituting essential elements of the claim, i.e. ulterior purpose and malice), with Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 5-6 (2008) (Anti-SLAPP motion granted where verified complaint stated malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims arose from petitioning activity, and all other conduct alleged only pertained to c. 93A claim), and Mantell v. P&J.

2008If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the moving party lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in the law for its petitioning activity.” Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-54 (2001).

2005See Adams v. Whitman, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 858 (2005) (“Although the trial court did not perform this portion of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we reach it on appeal since only one conclusion is possible on this record”).