Moss motion in Georgia

2025To preserve his mistrial motion for appellate review, Moss needed to make a “contemporaneous mo- tion … at the time [he] became aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. 579, 581 (2020).

2025The court concluded there was no “manifest necessity” for a mistrial. (b) Moss’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial is not preserved for appeal because Moss did not move for a mistrial “at the earliest opportunity in the trial court.” See Bates v. State, 317 Ga. 809, 818 (2023) (explaining how a mistrial motion is preserved).

2025See Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66 , 82–85 (2023) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain statements into evidence over the defendant’s hearsay objection because, although the trial court concluded that the statements fell within a “statutory exception[]” to the hearsay rule, some of the statements actually were “not hearsay at all,” such that “they did not need to qualify for a hearsay exception to be admissible”); Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711 , 716 n.3 (2020) (holding that a co-indictee’s out-of-court statement shortly after the victim’s murder asking

2022“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.” Williams v. State, 333 Ga. App. 879, 879 ( 777 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.” Williams v. State, 333 Ga. App. 879, 879 ( 777 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 393 (850 SE2d 41) (2020) (although the defendant was convicted only of felony murder based on aggravated assault and his complaints about all other 12 charges in the indictment were moot, this Court nevertheless considered his contentions about alleged defects in the count charging the predicate felony of aggravated assault).

2021See Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 393 (850 SE2d 41) (2020) (although the defendant was convicted only of felony murder based on aggravated assault and his complaints about all other 12 charges in the indictment were moot, this Court nevertheless considered his contentions about alleged defects in the count charging the predicate felony of aggravated assault).

2021See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 .

2021See 288 Ga. at 514-515 (8). (i) Pecuniary Interest.

2020See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a); Lynch, 286 Ga. at 102 (2); White, 282 Ga. at 860 (1); Savage, 173 Ga. App. at 271 .

2020See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a); Lynch, 286 Ga. at 102 (2); White, 282 Ga. at 860 (1); Savage, 173 Ga. App. at 271 .

2018See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 ( 386 SE2d 884 ) (1989).2 If a party timely applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we will grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

2018See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 ( 386 SE2d 884 ) (1989).2 If a party timely applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we will grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

2015He contends that the State failed to establish that the checkpoint had a valid purpose when viewed at the programmatic level, in accordance with the Supreme Court of Georgia’s *876 recent decisions in Williams v. State, 293 Ga. 883 ( 750 SE2d 355 ) (2013), and Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787 ( 750 SE2d 148 ) (2013). 1 In denying Moss’ motion to suppress, the trial court explicitly found that “[a]t the programmatic level, the testimony indicated that the purpose for the checkpoints is to check licenses, the drivers’ conditions, and vehicle registration.” Because this finding was supported by some e

2015He contends that the State failed to establish that the checkpoint had a valid purpose when viewed at the programmatic level, in accordance with the Supreme Court of Georgia’s *876 recent decisions in Williams v. State, 293 Ga. 883 ( 750 SE2d 355 ) (2013), and Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787 ( 750 SE2d 148 ) (2013). 1 In denying Moss’ motion to suppress, the trial court explicitly found that “[a]t the programmatic level, the testimony indicated that the purpose for the checkpoints is to check licenses, the drivers’ conditions, and vehicle registration.” Because this finding was supported by some e

2015In some circumstances, “this Court may take judicial notice of the records of other cases before this Court, in the interest of doing substantial justice and as a means of judicial economy.” Davis v. State, 287 Ga. 414, 415, n. 1 ( 696 SE2d 644 ) (2010).

2015In some circumstances, “this Court may take judicial notice of the records of other cases before this Court, in the interest of doing substantial justice and as a means of judicial economy.” Davis v. State, 287 Ga. 414, 415, n. 1 ( 696 SE2d 644 ) (2010).

2005DeVooght v. Hobbs, 265 Ga. App. at 334 (4) (any evidence standard). (c) Moreover, the record does not support Moss’ claim that Weiss prevented her from filing suit against the hospital by concealing the use of ice packs.

1996See Hollingsworth, supra at 18-19 .

1990Further, Moss’ brief cannot be used to add evidence to the record (Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 ( 330 SE2d 102 ); see Patterson v. State, 256 Ga. 740 (2) ( 353 SE2d 338 )), and we cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record.

1990Further, Moss’ brief cannot be used to add evidence to the record (Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 ( 330 SE2d 102 ); see Patterson v. State, 256 Ga. 740 (2) ( 353 SE2d 338 )), and we cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record.

1990Further, Moss’ brief cannot be used to add evidence to the record (Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 ( 330 SE2d 102 ); see Patterson v. State, 256 Ga. 740 (2) ( 353 SE2d 338 )), and we cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record.

1990Further, Moss’ brief cannot be used to add evidence to the record (Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 ( 330 SE2d 102 ); see Patterson v. State, 256 Ga. 740 (2) ( 353 SE2d 338 )), and we cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record.