tort results violation in Georgia

2017Smith, Inc., 328 Ga.App. 713, 719 (3) (a) ( 760 SE2d 718 ) (2014) (“While privity of contract is generally not necessary to support an action in tort, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract.” (punctuation omitted)); Dominic, 310 Ga. App. at 830 (2) (“[WJhere privity of contract between the parties does not exist, to constitute a tort, the duty

2017Smith, Inc., 328 Ga. App. 713, 719 (3) (a) ( 760 SE2d 718 ) (2014) (“While privity of contract is generally not necessary to support an action in tort, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract.” (punctuation omitted)); Dominic, 310 Ga. App. at 830 (2) (“[W]here privity of contract between the parties does not exist, to constitute a tort, the duty

2013Accordingly, 1-11 (“no privity is necessary to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract. . . .”). 42 See 275 Ga. App. at 438 (2) (a). 24 Suntrust has failed to establish that the Special Master erred by finding the existence of a question of fact as to this cause of action. 8.

2013Accordingly, 1-11 (“no privity is necessary to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract. . . .”). 42 See 275 Ga. App. at 438 (2) (a). 24 Suntrust has failed to establish that the Special Master erred by finding the existence of a question of fact as to this cause of action. 8.

2017Smith, Inc., 328 Ga.App. 713, 719 (3) (a) ( 760 SE2d 718 ) (2014) (“While privity of contract is generally not necessary to support an action in tort, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract.” (punctuation omitted)); Dominic, 310 Ga. App. at 830 (2) (“[WJhere privity of contract between the parties does not exist, to constitute a tort, the duty

2017Smith, Inc., 328 Ga.App. 713, 719 (3) (a) ( 760 SE2d 718 ) (2014) (“While privity of contract is generally not necessary to support an action in tort, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract.” (punctuation omitted)); Dominic, 310 Ga. App. at 830 (2) (“[WJhere privity of contract between the parties does not exist, to constitute a tort, the duty

2017To the extent that these appellants have not abandoned that argument on appeal, their conversion claim is time-barred for the reasons discussed in Division 3 infra, and they have failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment or money had and received for the reasons given in Division 5 (b) infra. See Kramer v. Yokely, 291 Ga. App. 375, 383 (3) ( 662 SE2d 208 ) (2008) (noting that mere conclusory statements are not the kind of meaningful argument required by Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a) (3)); All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. W.

2017To the extent that these appellants have not abandoned that argument on appeal, their conversion claim is time-barred for the reasons discussed in Division 3 infra, and they have failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment or money had and received for the reasons given in Division 5 (b) infra. See Kramer v. Yokely, 291 Ga. App. 375, 383 (3) ( 662 SE2d 208 ) (2008) (noting that mere conclusory statements are not the kind of meaningful argument required by Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a) (3)); All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. W.

2011OCGA § 51-1-8.” Unger v. Bryant Equipment &c., 255 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 335 SE2d 109 ) (1985).

2011OCGA § 51-1-8.” Unger v. Bryant Equipment &c., 255 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 335 SE2d 109 ) (1985).

2007OCGA § 51-1-11 (a) provides that “if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract....” Where privity of contract between the parties does not exist, “to constitute a tort[,] the duty must arise independent of the contract.” Sheppard v. Yara Engineering Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 149 ( 281 SE2d 586 ) (1981).

2007OCGA § 51-1-11 (a) provides that “if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract....” Where privity of contract between the parties does not exist, “to constitute a tort[,] the duty must arise independent of the contract.” Sheppard v. Yara Engineering Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 149 ( 281 SE2d 586 ) (1981).

1992Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 479-481 (5) ( 206 SE2d 121 ) (1974).

1992Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 479-481 (5) ( 206 SE2d 121 ) (1974).

1992The legal duty owed by a professional need not arise out of a professional-client relationship but may arise “out of the general duty one owes to all the world not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201 ( 296 SE2d 693 ) (1982). “[I]n appropriate circumstances, a duty of care may be called for by contract and may be required by tort law at *572 the same time, and where this is true plaintiff requires no privity to maintain a tort action.” Sims v. American Cas.

1992The legal duty owed by a professional need not arise out of a professional-client relationship but may arise “out of the general duty one owes to all the world not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201 ( 296 SE2d 693 ) (1982). “[I]n appropriate circumstances, a duty of care may be called for by contract and may be required by tort law at *572 the same time, and where this is true plaintiff requires no privity to maintain a tort action.” Sims v. American Cas.

1982Appellee’s duty to inspect the premises for wood destroying organism infestation in the instant case arose initially out of contract with Bahin. “[T]hus, privity would be required unless [appellant] comes within the last stated exception, i.e., those cases where the party would have had a right of action independent of the contract.” Beam v. Omark Industries, 143 Ga. App. 142, 146 ( 237 SE2d 607 ) (1977). “[A] mere breach of warranty or violation of a contractual obligation will not support a right of action by a third party in tort where such third party could not recover independently of the

1982Appellee’s duty to inspect the premises for wood destroying organism infestation in the instant case arose initially out of contract with Bahin. “[T]hus, privity would be required unless [appellant] comes within the last stated exception, i.e., those cases where the party would have had a right of action independent of the contract.” Beam v. Omark Industries, 143 Ga. App. 142, 146 ( 237 SE2d 607 ) (1977). “[A] mere breach of warranty or violation of a contractual obligation will not support a right of action by a third party in tort where such third party could not recover independently of the

1982Appellee’s duty to inspect the premises for wood destroying organism infestation in the instant case arose initially out of contract with Bahin. “[T]hus, privity would be required unless [appellant] comes within the last stated exception, i.e., those cases where the party would have had a right of action independent of the contract.” Beam v. Omark Industries, 143 Ga. App. 142, 146 ( 237 SE2d 607 ) (1977). “[A] mere breach of warranty or violation of a contractual obligation will not support a right of action by a third party in tort where such third party could not recover independently of the

1982Appellee’s duty to inspect the premises for wood destroying organism infestation in the instant case arose initially out of contract with Bahin. “[T]hus, privity would be required unless [appellant] comes within the last stated exception, i.e., those cases where the party would have had a right of action independent of the contract.” Beam v. Omark Industries, 143 Ga. App. 142, 146 ( 237 SE2d 607 ) (1977). “[A] mere breach of warranty or violation of a contractual obligation will not support a right of action by a third party in tort where such third party could not recover independently of the