advantage of seeing hearing in Iowa

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).

2022We come to a claim of an excessive award disinclined to disturb the jury’s verdict and will only intervene if we find it “flagrantly excessive or inadequate,” “so out of reason as to shock the conscience or sense of justice,” “a result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motive,” or “lacking in evidentiary support.” Rees, 461 N.W.2d at 839 (quoting Olsen v. Drahos, 229 N.W.2d 741, 742 (Iowa 1975)).

1999See Rees v. O’Malley, 461 N.W.2d 833, 840 (Iowa 1990) (“In determining whether the damage award is excessive, we must abide by the principle that each case depends upon its own facts, and precedents are of little value.”).

2022We come to a claim of an excessive award disinclined to disturb the jury’s verdict and will only intervene if we find it “flagrantly excessive or inadequate,” “so out of reason as to shock the conscience or sense of justice,” “a result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motive,” or “lacking in evidentiary support.” Rees, 461 N.W.2d at 839 (quoting Olsen v. Drahos, 229 N.W.2d 741, 742 (Iowa 1975)).

2020See State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 2010) (noting “[w]e give deference to the district court’s findings of fact due to its ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses” including factual findings made following suppression hearings). 9 According to the transcript, Officer Hansen testified as follows: Q.