advantage of seeing hearing in Massachusetts

1998The defendant asks that we order a new trial based on his “background and the utter senselessness surrounding his having run amok, which can only be explained as the incredibly unfortunate result of mental illness . . . [and] since the record generates a ‘profound doubt’ as to the defendant’s scienter on December 14, 1992.” “The duty imposed on us by the statute does not ‘convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.’ ” Commonwealth

1987Furthermore, this court does not sit as “a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 181 (1970).

2023At the same time, our statutory obligation to conduct "a more searching and comprehensive" review of convictions of murder in the first degree than is granted by ordinary appellate 12 procedure, Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606 , 610 (2020), "does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses." Gricus, supra. It is not enough that, "if on the jury, [we] would have felt a reasonable doubt which the jury did not sha

2023At the same time, our statutory obligation to conduct "a more searching and comprehensive" review of convictions of murder in the first degree than is granted by ordinary appellate 12 procedure, Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606 , 610 (2020), "does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses." Gricus, supra. It is not enough that, "if on the jury, [we] would have felt a reasonable doubt which the jury did not sha

2016Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 916 (2013).

2015Section 33E “does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant .. . without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Franklin, 465 Mass. at 916 , quoting Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 416 Mass. 258, 265 (1993). “[F]or this court under the statute ... to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, it must appear that the verdict . .. would work a miscarriage of justice ....

2015Section 33E “does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant .. . without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Franklin, 465 Mass. at 916 , quoting Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 416 Mass. 258, 265 (1993). “[F]or this court under the statute ... to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, it must appear that the verdict . .. would work a miscarriage of justice ....

2013Section 33E, however, “does not . . . convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Jefferson, supra, quoting Gricus, supra. “For a trial judge, or for this court under the statute ... to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, it must appear that the verdict, if allowed to stand, would work a miscarriage of justice.” Jefferson, supra at 266 , quoting Gricus, supra at 407 .

2016See Goddard v. Dupree, 322 Mass. 247, 248 (1948) (“The value of the testimony of the witnesses depended in great measure upon their appearance and their manner of testifying on the stand”).

1999See Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 408 Mass. 230, 236 (1990). 3.

1998The defendant asks that we order a new trial based on his “background and the utter senselessness surrounding his having run amok, which can only be explained as the incredibly unfortunate result of mental illness . . . [and] since the record generates a ‘profound doubt’ as to the defendant’s scienter on December 14, 1992.” “The duty imposed on us by the statute does not ‘convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.’ ” Commonwealth

1998“The issue of criminal responsibility is for the jury, not this court.” Commonwealth v. Lunde, supra. We conclude that justice does not require entry of a lesser degree of guilt or a new trial.