extradition hearing in Illinois

1994(Young, 153 Ill. 2d at 406 .) The motion to suppress in that case was therefore improperly granted, and the defendant’s confession, made after an extradition hearing at which the defendant was represented by counsel but before indictment or the filing of the criminal complaint, should have been admitted into evidence.

1994Dec. 229 , 607 N.E.2d 123 .) Even though the defendant in Young asserted in open court during his extradition hearing that he wished to assert his sixth amendment rights, and defendant's court-appointed attorney asserted the same thing, the supreme court went on to state that an extradition hearing does not mark the beginning of adversary judicial proceedings, and that consequently the sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. ( Young, 153 Ill.2d at 406 , 180 Ill.Dec. 229 , 607 N.E.2d 123 .) The motion to suppress in that case was therefore improperly granted, and the defendant's

2015The Court emphasized: "The rule is not mere formalism, but a recognition of the point at which the government has committed itself to prosecute, the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified, and the accused finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law." (Internal quotations omitted.) Id. at 198 . ¶ 36 Defendant argues that here, the extradition hearing in Nevada was a "critical stage" because at that point, the State had committed itself to prosecution.

2015App. 3d 797, 822 (2009) (recognizing that under the federal standard reaffirmed in Rothgery, " 'an accusation filed with a judicial officer is sufficiently formal, and the government's commitment to prosecute it sufficiently concrete, when the accusation prompts arraignment and restrictions on the accused's liberty to facilitate the prosecution' " and finding that defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached at lineup conducted prior to presentment to a judicial officer (quoting Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 207 )). - 12 - 1-13-0171 ¶ 37 Here, although defendant had presumably been br

1990(Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 287-88 , 58 L.

1983Ed. 2d 521 , 99 S. Ct. 530 .) However, this court has affirmed the inquiry during an extradition hearing into the question of whether the prisoner’s right to a speedy trial was violated.

2024Thereafter, the State filed this timely appeal. ¶ 12 In its form notice of appeal, the State checked the preprinted box indicating that the trial court erred in determining that the State failed to prove that the defendant posed a real and present -5- 2024 IL App (2d) 240279 threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community.

2008The State points out, though, that a long line of United States Supreme Court precedent, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, has established that irregularities in the extradition of a fugitive from justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution “affects neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him.” Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 637 (1884), aff’d, 119 U.S. 436 , 30 L.

2008The State points out, though, that a long line of United States Supreme Court precedent, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, has established that irregularities in the extradition of a fugitive from justice for an otherwise constitutional prosecution “affects neither the guilt nor innocence of the accused, nor the jurisdiction of the court to try him.” Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627, 637 (1884), aff’d, 119 U.S. 436 , 30 L.

1994"A defendant has the right to prove any fact or circumstances tending to show that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] This right is limited by the further rule that the evidence offered may not be speculative, irrelevant or immaterial." ( People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 700, 706 , 52 Ill.Dec. 98 , 421 N.E.2d 961 .) Testimony is relevant if it would, if believed, tend to make any fact in issue more or less probable than it would be without the testimony. ( People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill.2d 481, 487-88 , 154 Ill.Dec. 643 , 568 N.E.2d 864 .) Evidence is speculative if the fin

1994"A defendant has the right to prove any fact or circumstances tending to show that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] This right is limited by the further rule that the evidence offered may not be speculative, irrelevant or immaterial." ( People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 700, 706 , 52 Ill.Dec. 98 , 421 N.E.2d 961 .) Testimony is relevant if it would, if believed, tend to make any fact in issue more or less probable than it would be without the testimony. ( People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill.2d 481, 487-88 , 154 Ill.Dec. 643 , 568 N.E.2d 864 .) Evidence is speculative if the fin

1994Apparently persons applying this decision are to use the rule formulated in Michigan v. Jackson , as refined by later decisions, which hold that when a defendant invokes his right to counsel for proceedings on a criminal charge after his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached for that charge, police are not permitted to initiate any further questioning of the defendant related to that charge, and any subsequent waiver the defendant makes in interrogation on that charge is invalid. ( Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 ; People v. Jackson, 198 Ill

1994Apparently persons applying this decision are to use the rule formulated in Michigan v. Jackson , as refined by later decisions, which hold that when a defendant invokes his right to counsel for proceedings on a criminal charge after his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached for that charge, police are not permitted to initiate any further questioning of the defendant related to that charge, and any subsequent waiver the defendant makes in interrogation on that charge is invalid. ( Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 ; People v. Jackson, 198 Ill

1994"A defendant has the right to prove any fact or circumstances tending to show that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] This right is limited by the further rule that the evidence offered may not be speculative, irrelevant or immaterial.” (People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill.

1994"A defendant has the right to prove any fact or circumstances tending to show that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] This right is limited by the further rule that the evidence offered may not be speculative, irrelevant or immaterial." ( People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 700, 706 , 52 Ill.Dec. 98 , 421 N.E.2d 961 .) Testimony is relevant if it would, if believed, tend to make any fact in issue more or less probable than it would be without the testimony. ( People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill.2d 481, 487-88 , 154 Ill.Dec. 643 , 568 N.E.2d 864 .) Evidence is speculative if the fin

1994In People v. Maust (1991), 216 Ill.

1994In People v. Maust (1991), 216 Ill.App.3d 173 , 160 Ill.Dec. 11 , 576 N.E.2d 965 , on the other hand, the defendant was indicted before extradition.

1994Apparently persons applying this decision are to use the rule formulated in Michigan v. Jackson , as refined by later decisions, which hold that when a defendant invokes his right to counsel for proceedings on a criminal charge after his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached for that charge, police are not permitted to initiate any further questioning of the defendant related to that charge, and any subsequent waiver the defendant makes in interrogation on that charge is invalid. ( Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 ; People v. Jackson, 198 Ill

1994Apparently persons applying this decision are to use the rule formulated in Michigan v. Jackson , as refined by later decisions, which hold that when a defendant invokes his right to counsel for proceedings on a criminal charge after his sixth amendment right to counsel has attached for that charge, police are not permitted to initiate any further questioning of the defendant related to that charge, and any subsequent waiver the defendant makes in interrogation on that charge is invalid. ( Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 ; People v. Jackson, 198 Ill

1983People v. McInery (1980), 91 Ill.

1983Levin v. Ogilvie (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 566 , 224 N.E.2d 247 .

1983Levin v. Ogilvie (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 566 , 224 N.E.2d 247 .

1975There, in answer to appellant’s contention that it was incumbent upon courts of the asylum State to hear and determine the validity of an indictment returned in the demanding State, the court reasons as follows, at page 355: “The scope of the extradition inquiry and the issues which are presented by it have been resolved by many decisions of the Supreme Court of this nation and, in essence, the established rule is that the court may determine whether a crime has been established in the demanding State, whether the fugitive in custody is the person so charged, and whether the fugitive was in th

1975There, in answer to appellant’s contention that it was incumbent upon courts of the asylum State to hear and determine the validity of an indictment returned in the demanding State, the court reasons as follows, at page 355: “The scope of the extradition inquiry and the issues which are presented by it have been resolved by many decisions of the Supreme Court of this nation and, in essence, the established rule is that the court may determine whether a crime has been established in the demanding State, whether the fugitive in custody is the person so charged, and whether the fugitive was in th

1970(Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 16 L.

1970(Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 16 L.