grantee presumption in Illinois

2021Id. ¶ 39 In this case, the grantee clause of the October 15, 2014, deed for the Lawndale Property stated as follows: “The GRANTOR *** for valuable consideration of ten dollars ($10.00), and other good and valuable consideration, cash in hand paid, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby convey and warrant unto M.

1986(Wiedrich v. Howard (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 589, 594 , 131 N.E.2d 508, 511 .) The record in the instant case does not indicate that Glenn ever apprised Gale that Glenn claimed title to the farmland which was “repugnant” to the terms of the 1947 deed.

1986(Wiedrich v. Howard (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 589, 594 , 131 N.E.2d 508, 511 .) The record in the instant case does not indicate that Glenn ever apprised Gale that Glenn claimed title to the farmland which was “repugnant” to the terms of the 1947 deed.

1957Oswald v. Caldwell (1907) 225 Ill. 224 held that a deed and two associated written instruments were testamentary, had no binding force, and the property was intestate upon the grantor’s decease, — the title did not vest in the grantee during the life of the grantor, — it appearing the grantor received the net income therefrom after as well as before the deed, it continued to be insured in her name, the operating expenses were paid as before, there was no apparent change in ownership or possession, the grantor had not surrendered dominion over it, the grantee did not claim it, and she tried onc

1956(Turney v. Chamberlain, 15 Ill. 271, 273 ; Town of Kaneville v. Meredith, 351 Ill, 620.) Possession of a grantor is regarded as subservient to the title of the grantee in the absence of acts manifesting hostility to the grantee and a claim of exclusive ownership.

1956Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. State Bank of Chicago, 290 Ill. 72, 83 ; Peoria and Pekin Union Railway Co. v. Tamplin, 156 Ill. 285, 298, 299 .

1925(Whipple v. Carrico, 305 Ill. 164 ; Johnson v. Fleming, 301 id. 139; Waters v. Lawler, 297 id. 63; Jones v. Schmidt, 290 id. 97.) It is also well established that where a deed duly executed is found in the hands of the grantee a presumption of delivery arises, and this presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.

1925Maule v. Maule, 312 Ill. 129 ; Pemberton v. Kraper, 289 id. 295; Johnson v. Fulk, 282 id. 328.

1924Wiggins v. Lusk, 12 Ill. 132 ; Reed v. Douthit, 62 id. 348; Griffin v. Griffin, 125 id. 430; Dunlop v. Lamb, 182 id. 319; Roche v. Roche, 286 id. 336; Post v. Weaver, 302 id. 169.

1924(Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 260 Ill. 179 .) Where a deed duly executed is found in the hands of the grantee the presumption of delivery arises, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

1923(O’Brien v. O’Brien, 285 Ill. 570 ; Valter v. Blavka, 195 id. 610 ; Reed v. Douthit, 62 id. 348.) The rule is established in this State that a deed cannot be delivered to the grantee as an escrow, to take effect upon a condition not appearing upon the face of the deed, but such deed becomes absolute at law unless delivery is made to a stranger.

1923(O’Brien v. O’Brien, 285 Ill. 570 ; Valter v. Blavka, 195 id. 610 ; Reed v. Douthit, 62 id. 348.) The rule is established in this State that a deed cannot be delivered to the grantee as an escrow, to take effect upon a condition not appearing upon the face of the deed, but such deed becomes absolute at law unless delivery is made to a stranger.

1922(Griffin v. Griffin, 125 Ill. 430 ; Dunlop v. Lamb, 182 id. 319; Roche v. Roche, 286 id. 336.) An acceptance by the grantee is essential to render a deed operative, and the plaintiffs in error argue that an acceptance will not be presumed where the deed, as in this case, imposes a liability upon the grantee.

1921(Moore v. Downing, 289 Ill. 612 .) Where a deed is found in the possession of the grantee there is a presumption that it has been delivered; (Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 ; Inman v. Swearingen, 198 id. 437 ; Potter v. Barringer, 236 id. 224; Schroeder v. Smith, 249 id. 574;) and this is especially true where the deed reserves a life estate to the grantor.

1921(Moore v. Downing, 289 Ill. 612 .) Where a deed is found in the possession of the grantee there is a presumption that it has been delivered; (Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 ; Inman v. Swearingen, 198 id. 437 ; Potter v. Barringer, 236 id. 224; Schroeder v. Smith, 249 id. 574;) and this is especially true where the deed reserves a life estate to the grantor.

1921Riegel v. Riegel, 243 Ill. 626 ; Prince v. Prince, 258 id. 304; Sellers v. Rike, 292 id. 468; Young v. Payne, 283 id. 649.

1921(Moore v. Downing, 289 Ill. 612 .) Where a deed is found in the possession of the grantee there is a presumption that it has been delivered; (Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 Ill. 378 ; Inman v. Swearingen, 198 id. 437 ; Potter v. Barringer, 236 id. 224; Schroeder v. Smith, 249 id. 574;) and this is especially true where the deed reserves a life estate to the grantor.

1920The deed was handed to the grantee when the contract was made, and when a deed is found in the hands of the grantee there is a presumption that it has .been delivered, (Inman v. Swearingen, 198 Ill. 437 ; Schroeder v. Smith, 249 id. 574 ; O’Brien v. O’Brien, 285 id. 570 ;) but that presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by proof of‘a different intention.

1920The deed was handed to the grantee when the contract was made, and when a deed is found in the hands of the grantee there is a presumption that it has .been delivered, (Inman v. Swearingen, 198 Ill. 437 ; Schroeder v. Smith, 249 id. 574 ; O’Brien v. O’Brien, 285 id. 570 ;) but that presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by proof of‘a different intention.

1908(Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42 ; City of Belleville v. Citizens’ Horse Railway Co. 152 id. 171 .) It cannot be disputed that the village of Madison had the power, when it adopted the ordinance granting appellant the right to occupy a portion of its streets in the operation of a street railway system, to require it to pave its right of way, or the part of the street occupied by it, at such time and with such material as the village authorities requiredbut it is contended by appellee that the designation in the ordinance of the particular material with which appell

1908(Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42 ; City of Belleville v. Citizens’ Horse Railway Co. 152 id. 171 .) It cannot be disputed that the village of Madison had the power, when it adopted the ordinance granting appellant the right to occupy a portion of its streets in the operation of a street railway system, to require it to pave its right of way, or the part of the street occupied by it, at such time and with such material as the village authorities requiredbut it is contended by appellee that the designation in the ordinance of the particular material with which appell

1904The rule of strict construction in favor of the public and against the grantee of special rights or privileges in a public street is also recognized in Snell v. City of Chicago, 133 Ill. 413 , in which the supreme court held that in the construction of such grants “they should be strictly construed in favor of the public and against the grantee of the privilege.” It must be constantly held in mind in construing these ordinances that the city does not own or control the streets as it does the engine stations or other property that it owns and controls.

1900In Weaver v. Wilson, 48 Ill. 125 , we held that where a purchaser of land receives a deed, which, by mistake, mis-describes the land, and afterwards the vendor corrects the mistake by executing a deed for the land actually sold, the grantee can claim color of title only from the date of the last deed, the first deed not being color of title as it did not purport to convey the land actually sold.