judicial-temperance presumption in Indiana

2019Terpstra contends that the trial court impermissibly relied upon the judicial temperance presumption because the presumption is an appellate concept that may not be applied at the trial court level. [24] The judicial temperance presumption, succinctly stated, is the presumption “that in a proceeding tried to the bench a court renders its decisions solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011).

2014The judicial temperance presumption is “‘a curious ratiocinative process which presumes that the trial court will disregard that which it holds admissible over specific objection.’” Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 134 , 340 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1976)).

2019As a result, applying the judicial temperance presumption we can presume “the trial judge is aware of and knows the law and considers only evidence properly before him or her in reaching a decision.” Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

2017See Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (if trial court does not rely on disputed evidence, the appellant “fail[s] to rebut the judicial-temperance presumption”), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2014The judicial temperance presumption is “‘a curious ratiocinative process which presumes that the trial court will disregard that which it holds admissible over specific objection.’” Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 134 , 340 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1976)).

2014The judicial temperance presumption is “‘a curious ratiocinative process which presumes that the trial court will disregard that which it holds admissible over specific objection.’” Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 134 , 340 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1976)).

2019The presumption exists because “[t]he risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the trial court.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012).

2011After discussing the judicial-temperance presumption issue, the majority in Shanks found "no overwhelming evidence of guilt" which would "lessen[ ] the probability that the inadmissible evidence had a prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact.” Id. at 739 (majority opinion).

2011The Court of Appeals in Shanks found three reasons the judicial-temperance presumption was overcome: (1) the trial court expressly stated a prohibited purpose for admitting the evidence; (2) the type of evidence was admissible at the time of trial but was held inadmissible while defendant’s appeal was pending; and (3) the trial court admitted the evidence over a specific objection. 640 N.E.2d at 737-739 .

1994As recently as 1984, our Supreme Court relied upon Fletcher in stating that “under other circumstances we might be hard pressed to say that [the evidence] was disregarded by the trial judge” as it “was admitted over specific objection.” Altman, supra, 466 N.E.2d at 719 (reversal not required because trial judge indicated that he did not rely upon the contested evidence and in fact found the defendant not guilty on the count supported by the evidence). 12 We recognize that the consequence of Fletcher is a virtual abolition of the judicial-temperance presumption.

1994As recently as 1984, our Supreme Court relied upon Fletcher in stating that “under other circumstances we might be hard pressed to say that [the evidence] was disregarded by the trial judge” as it “was admitted over specific objection.” Altman, supra, 466 N.E.2d at 719 (reversal not required because trial judge indicated that he did not rely upon the contested evidence and in fact found the defendant not guilty on the count supported by the evidence). 12 We recognize that the consequence of Fletcher is a virtual abolition of the judicial-temperance presumption.