meritless claim in Indiana

2020Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ind. 1990) (counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim). 14.

2020Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. 1996) (a defendant cannot prove that counsel’s failure to raise an objection constituted inadequate representation without showing that, had the objection been made, “the court would have had no choice but to sustain it”); Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ind. 1990) (counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim). 4.

2015“Appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise what would have been a meritless claim.” Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 167 (Ind. 2007). [39] A fundamental error argument was unavailable to appellate counsel.

2015Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 167 (Ind. 2007). 1.

2013Stowers v. State, 657 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.

2013Stowers v. State, 657 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.

2020Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. 1996) (a defendant cannot prove that counsel’s failure to raise an objection constituted inadequate representation without showing that, had the objection been made, “the court would have had no choice but to sustain it”); Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ind. 1990) (counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim). 4.

2016See In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 359-60 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (explaining that “[w]e presume that the General Assembly intended that the language used in [a] statute be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result” (quoting Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), aff 'd of reh’g, 15 N.E.3d 72 (Ind.App.2014)), trans. denied.) If the legislature had wished to place such limitations on the reach of the incest statute, it would have done so explicitly and in the statute defining the offense, not impliedly and by way of the statute of limitations. [14] In sum, Pavan

2016See In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 359-60 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (explaining that “[w]e presume that the General Assembly intended that the language used in [a] statute be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result” (quoting Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), aff 'd of reh’g, 15 N.E.3d 72 (Ind.App.2014)), trans. denied.) If the legislature had wished to place such limitations on the reach of the incest statute, it would have done so explicitly and in the statute defining the offense, not impliedly and by way of the statute of limitations. [14] In sum, Pavan

2016See In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 359-60 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (explaining that “[w]e presume that the General Assembly intended that the language used in [a] statute be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result” (quoting Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), aff 'd of reh’g, 15 N.E.3d 72 (Ind.App.2014)), trans. denied.) If the legislature had wished to place such limitations on the reach of the incest statute, it would have done so explicitly and in the statute defining the offense, not impliedly and by way of the statute of limitations. [14] In sum, Pavan

2016Peak v. State, 26 N.E.3d 1010, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2015Peterson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 1987) (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (“We hold, then, that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.”)). [54] Because Beals’ argument with regard to the photographic array is legally baseless, we cannot fault his appellate counsel for failing to present this meritless claim on direct appeal.6 III.

2015Peterson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 1987) (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (“We hold, then, that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.”)). [54] Because Beals’ argument with regard to the photographic array is legally baseless, we cannot fault his appellate counsel for failing to present this meritless claim on direct appeal.6 III.

2015“Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

2015“Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

2013See Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 . 2.

1991See Canfield, supra, 563 N.E.2d at 531 .

1991See Canfield, supra, 563 N.E.2d at 531 .