meritless claim in California

2024(See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections.”]; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“trial attorney’s failure to assert a meritless defense does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel”].) 15 B.

2024(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“attorney’s failure to assert a meritless defense does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel”]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections”].) 5 Our Supreme Court is poised to resolve the issue, having granted review in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, to decide the following questions: “Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments?

2024(See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections.”]; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“trial attorney’s failure to assert a meritless defense does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel”].) 15 B.

2024(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“attorney’s failure to assert a meritless defense does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel”]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections”].) 5 Our Supreme Court is poised to resolve the issue, having granted review in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 , review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, to decide the following questions: “Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments?

2016(South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 659 ; Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 ; see also Tendler v. www.jewishsurvivors.blogspot.com (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 802 , 811–812 (conc. opn. by McAdams, J.).) Thus, a plaintiff who “ ‘can show a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim’ ” does not have a meritless claim and a motion to strike is not proper—“ ‘the entire cause of action stands.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis), third italics added.) So, if a cause of action arising entirely f

2014As explained above, a trial court may stop its analysis and deny an anti-SLAPP motion once it determines the plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on at least one protected act because the plaintiff thereby has shown the cause of action is not a meritless claim designed to punish the defendant for exercising First Amendment rights. ( Oasis, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 820-821; Wallace, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211 .) A plaintiff’s decision to settle the portion of a cause of action the trial court found to have merit does not free the appellate court to examine and strike the rem

2025(See, e.g., Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [discussing wrongful institution of civil proceedings]; see also TransUnion, supra, 594 U.S. at p. 424-426 [examining the common law to identify concrete harms].) However, because he has not alleged any adverse consequences from cross-defendants’ alleged failure to provide statutorily required notices, Guracar has not shown a traditionally recognized, concrete harm from that failure.

2025(See, e.g., Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [discussing wrongful institution of civil proceedings]; see also TransUnion, supra, 594 U.S. at p. 424-426 [examining the common law to identify concrete harms].) However, because he has not alleged any adverse consequences from cross-defendants’ alleged failure to provide statutorily required notices, Guracar has not shown a traditionally recognized, concrete harm from that failure.

2025(See, e.g., Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 50-51 [discussing wrongful institution of civil proceedings]; see also TransUnion, supra, 594 U.S. at p. 424-426 [examining the common law to identify concrete harms].) However, because he has not alleged any adverse consequences from cross-defendants’ alleged failure to provide statutorily required notices, Guracar has not shown a traditionally recognized, concrete harm from that failure.

2024(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 ; accord, Curiel, supra, at p. 460 .) In this circumstance, requiring petitioner, as the moving party, to minimally assist himself by informing the court and the prosecutor of a basis for what appears to be a meritless claim does not contravene Curiel.

2021They are awarded fees to compensate them for defending against a meritless claim brought by a “party seeking to ‘chill the [defendants’] valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131 ; see also Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 750 [“The purpose of section 425.16 is clearly to give relief, including financial relief in the form of attorney’s fees and costs, to persons who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their ‘participation in matters of public

2021They are awarded fees to compensate them for defending against a meritless claim brought by a “party seeking to ‘chill the [defendants’] valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131 ; see also Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 750 [“The purpose of section 425.16 is clearly to give relief, including financial relief in the form of attorney’s fees and costs, to persons who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their ‘participation in matters of public

2016(South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 659 ; Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 ; see also Tendler v. www.jewishsurvivors.blogspot.com (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 802 , 811–812 (conc. opn. by McAdams, J.).) Thus, a plaintiff who “ ‘can show a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim’ ” does not have a meritless claim and a motion to strike is not proper—“ ‘the entire cause of action stands.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis), third italics added.) So, if a cause of action arising entirely f

2016(Id. at p. 821; see also Bently Reserve, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 426 [“When a cause of action states multiple grounds for relief, ‘the plaintiff may satisfy its obligation in the second prong by simply showing a probability of prevailing on any’ one of those grounds.”]; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 382 ; Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1211 ; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 106 ; cf. Cho v. Chang (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 521, 527 [recognizing Oasis and holding a trial court could nonetheless strike those meritless portions of

2016(Id. at p. 821; see also Bently Reserve, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 426 [“When a cause of action states multiple grounds for relief, ‘the plaintiff may satisfy its obligation in the second prong by simply showing a probability of prevailing on any’ one of those grounds.”]; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 382 ; Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1211 ; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 106 ; cf. Cho v. Chang (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 521, 527 [recognizing Oasis and holding a trial court could nonetheless strike those meritless portions of

2010The appellate court concluded that it did because the plaintiff had obtained sanctions against the defendant under Rule 11 for filing a meritless claim, reflecting a determination on the merits in favor of the malicious-prosecution plaintiff. ( Mattel , at pp. 1190-1191.) With respect to the probable cause and malice elements, however, the court in Mattel stated only the following, with no additional authority or analysis: "The findings made in connection with the [R]ule 11 ... sanctions, the appropriate subject of judicial notice requested of the trial court (Evid.

2005(Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] (Oren).) Similarly, although continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 968-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ]), the “mere . . . maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action” (Oren, supra, at p. 1169 ).

2005(Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] (Oren).) Similarly, although continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 968-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ]), the “mere . . . maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action” (Oren, supra, at p. 1169 ).

2005(See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 810 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ] [failure to raise a meritless claim is not deficient performance].) K.

2005(See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 810 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ] [failure to raise a meritless claim is not deficient performance].) K.

2005(Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] (Oren).) Similarly, although continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 968-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ]), the “mere . . . maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action” (Oren, supra, at p. 1169 ).

2005(Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168-1169 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 728 P.2d 1202 ] (Oren).) Similarly, although continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the claim is meritless can expose a party to damages for malicious prosecution (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 968-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ]), the “mere . . . maintenance of a lawsuit—even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action” (Oren, supra, at p. 1169 ).