Ross rule in Indiana

2016However, a claim of innocence during a pre-sentence investigative interview is an unsworn out-of-court statement, and not only has our supreme court specifically declined to extend the Ross rule to out-of-courtroom protestations of innocence, “it also explicitly held the acceptance of a guilty plea from a defendant who protests his innocence to a probation officer in a presentence interview is not a basis for post-conviction relief.” Mayberry v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied.

2016However, a claim of innocence during a pre-sentence investigative interview is an unsworn out-of-court statement, and not only has our supreme court specifically declined to extend the Ross rule to out-of-courtroom protestations of innocence, “it also explicitly held the acceptance of a guilty plea from a defendant who protests his innocence to a probation officer in a presentence interview is not a basis for post-conviction relief.” Mayberry v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied.

2023It holds only that immunity does not apply to claims of medical negligence arising out of a doctor-patient relationship between the claimant and the physician. 4 In Tarr v. Jablonski, this court declined to extend the Ross exception to paramedics, observing that the essence of the exception was “the independent professional judgment which a physician must necessarily exercise.” 569 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied.

2023It holds only that immunity does not apply to claims of medical negligence arising out of a doctor-patient relationship between the claimant and the physician. 4 In Tarr v. Jablonski, this court declined to extend the Ross exception to paramedics, observing that the essence of the exception was “the independent professional judgment which a physician must necessarily exercise.” 569 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied.

2018“While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, we will deem alleged errors waived where an appellant’s noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors.” Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). [10] Additionally, Ross’s brief contains lengthy citations from the U.S. Constitution, Indiana statutes, and caselaw but fails to explain how these provisions and cases should be applied to the issues raised.

2018“While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, we will deem alleged errors waived where an appellant’s noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors.” Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). [10] Additionally, Ross’s brief contains lengthy citations from the U.S. Constitution, Indiana statutes, and caselaw but fails to explain how these provisions and cases should be applied to the issues raised.

2016Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015).

2005Indiana courts "have long held that plea agreements are in the nature of contracts entered into between the defendant and the State." Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind.2004); see also Brewer v. State, 830 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ("(al plea agreement is a contract, binding upon both parties when accepted by the trial court.") (citation omitted).

2005Indiana courts "have long held that plea agreements are in the nature of contracts entered into between the defendant and the State." Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind.2004); see also Brewer v. State, 830 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ("(al plea agreement is a contract, binding upon both parties when accepted by the trial court.") (citation omitted).

1998NOTES [1] 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind.1991). [2] Since the motion for summary judgment was directed only to Ross's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we do not reach any claims by Ross regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. [3] At the time Shuamber was decided only two states other than Indiana required that a plaintiff's emotional trauma arise out of her physical injury, and that only three states required any impact at all.

1998Shuamber, 579 N.E.2d at 455, n. 1 .

1992See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (admission of guilt is not constitutional requisite to imposition of criminal penalty).

1992See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (admission of guilt is not constitutional requisite to imposition of criminal penalty).