Ross standard in Illinois

2012City of Rockford, 362 Ill.App.3d at 562-63 , 298 Ill.Dec. 848 , 840 N.E.2d 1283 . ¶ 39 Count III is barred for similar reasons.

2012City of Rockford, 362 Ill.App.3d at 562-63 , 298 Ill.Dec. 848 , 840 N.E.2d 1283 . ¶ 39 Count III is barred for similar reasons.

1984In considering the question of legitimate reliance on the previous law as proclaimed by the Supreme Court, we noted in Smith that no legitimate reliance interests would be affected by the prospective application of the Ross standard and quoted the following from that case: “ ‘Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would not be legitimate.’ ” People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422 , quoting United States v. Ross (1982

1984In considering the question of legitimate reliance on the previous law as proclaimed by the Supreme Court, we noted in Smith that no legitimate reliance interests would be affected by the prospective application of the Ross standard and quoted the following from that case: “ ‘Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would not be legitimate.’ ” People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422 , quoting United States v. Ross (1982

2026“Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43 . ¶ 27 Ross’s brief consists primarily of a recitation of facts and repeated assertions that the court erred in not finding he was an innocent owner where the State failed to provide evidence showing he knew or should have known the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime.

2022Under the plain language of section 122-1(c) at the time, the relevant filing period for the Ross defendant should have been either six months from the date he had to file a petition for leave to appeal or three years from the date of conviction, whichever was - 17 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210197 sooner.

2021In Ross, postconviction counsel offered “no affidavits or depositions and offered no oral testimony or other evidence to support Ross’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. -8- No. 1-19-0223 at ¶ 17.

1995The same distinction also applies to the per curiam decision of Simler v. Conner (1963), 372 U.S. 221 , 9 L.

1995The same distinction also applies to the per curiam decision of Simler v. Conner (1963), 372 U.S. 221 , 9 L.

1995Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees (2d Cir. 1985), 776 F.2d 1563 , 1564.) 1 In none of these cases did the courts consider the Ross factors or conceptualize the practical abilities and limitations of juries in determining "open-ended” contractual damages.

1984In considering the question of legitimate reliance on the previous law as proclaimed by the Supreme Court, we noted in Smith that no legitimate reliance interests would be affected by the prospective application of the Ross standard and quoted the following from that case: “ ‘Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would not be legitimate.’ ” People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422 , quoting United States v. Ross (1982

1984In considering the question of legitimate reliance on the previous law as proclaimed by the Supreme Court, we noted in Smith that no legitimate reliance interests would be affected by the prospective application of the Ross standard and quoted the following from that case: “ ‘Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would not be legitimate.’ ” People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422 , quoting United States v. Ross (1982

1984Recently the Supreme Court, although it did not discuss retroactivity, nonetheless applied Gates retroactively in Massachusetts v. Upton (1984), 466 U.S. ___ , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 .

1984Recently the Supreme Court, although it did not discuss retroactivity, nonetheless applied Gates retroactively in Massachusetts v. Upton (1984), 466 U.S. ___ , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 .

1983In United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 73 L.

1983In United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 73 L.

1981(People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 445, 461-62 .) Unlike People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 486 , which the majority cites to sustain its “fair trial” theory, the Ross opinion positively refers to Rruton as the source for its holding denying Ross’ motion to sever.

1981The Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly referred to the confrontation clause as the guarantee invoked by the Bruton -type challenge McVay *720 advances in his motion to sever. ( People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill.2d 445, 461-62 .) Unlike People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486 , which the majority cites to sustain its "fair trial" theory, the Ross opinion positively refers to Bruton as the source for its holding denying Ross' motion to sever.

1981(People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 445, 461-62 .) Unlike People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 486 , which the majority cites to sustain its “fair trial” theory, the Ross opinion positively refers to Rruton as the source for its holding denying Ross’ motion to sever.

1981The Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly referred to the confrontation clause as the guarantee invoked by the Bruton -type challenge McVay *720 advances in his motion to sever. ( People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill.2d 445, 461-62 .) Unlike People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486 , which the majority cites to sustain its "fair trial" theory, the Ross opinion positively refers to Bruton as the source for its holding denying Ross' motion to sever.