inability to pay doctrine in Louisiana

2000In Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73 , 52 N.E. 679 (App.Div.1899), the court stated: "It has ever been the theory of our government, and a cardinal principal of our jurisprudence, that the rich and poor stand alike in courts of justice, and neither the wealth of one nor the poverty of the other shall be permitted to affect the administration of the law." Traylor , p.1188. * * * * * * * * While we are hesitant to overrule a longstanding jurisprudential rule, after careful consideration, we feel that the wealth or poverty of a party to a lawsuit is not a proper consideration in the determination of c

2000In Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73 , 52 N.E. 679 (App.Div.1899), the court stated: "It has ever been the theory of our government, and a cardinal principal of our jurisprudence, that the rich and poor stand alike in courts of justice, and neither the wealth of one nor the poverty of the other shall be permitted to affect the administration of the law." Traylor , p.1188. * * * * * * * * While we are hesitant to overrule a longstanding jurisprudential rule, after careful consideration, we feel that the wealth or poverty of a party to a lawsuit is not a proper consideration in the determination of c

1986In reversing nearly one hundred years of jurisprudence, the Court stated: The inability to pay rule originated in Williams v. McManus, 38 La.Ann. 161 (1886) and Loyacanno v. Jurgens, [ 50 La.Ann. 441 ], 23 So. 717 (1898) and has been applied by Louisiana courts ever since.

1985The inability to pay rule originated in Williams v. McManus, 38 La.Ann. 161 (1886) and Loyacano v. Jurgens, [ 50 La.Ann. 441 ], 23 So. 717 (1898) and has been applied by Louisiana courts ever since.

1986In reversing nearly one hundred years of jurisprudence, the Court stated: The inability to pay rule originated in Williams v. McManus, 38 La.Ann. 161 (1886) and Loyacanno v. Jurgens, [ 50 La.Ann. 441 ], 23 So. 717 (1898) and has been applied by Louisiana courts ever since.

1986In reversing nearly one hundred years of jurisprudence, the Court stated: The inability to pay rule originated in Williams v. McManus, 38 La.Ann. 161 (1886) and Loyacanno v. Jurgens, [ 50 La.Ann. 441 ], 23 So. 717 (1898) and has been applied by Louisiana courts ever since.

1986Moreover, in Daniels v. Conn, 382 So.2d 945 (La.1980) this court restricted the use of inability to pay rule by preventing its application to joint tortfeasors where one joint tortfeasor was solvent.

1980Recently, in Daniels v. Conn, 382 So.2d 945 (La.1980), we considered the application of the inability to pay rule where joint tortfeasors are liable in solido.

2000The Supreme Court in Rodriguez, supra at p. 1188 , went on to say: "While Louisiana has begun to restrict the inability to pay doctrine, other jurisdictions have never sanctioned its use.

1986Although the Trial Judge was correct in considering the inability to pay doctrine, in Rodriguez v. Traylor, 468 So.2d 1186 (La.1985), decided after the Trial Court's judgment, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled the jurisprudentially established inability to pay doctrine.

1986In Davis v. Moore, 353 So.2d 740 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978), in concurring opinions by Judge, now Associate Justice Lemmon of this Court and Judge Boutall, termination of the inability to pay rule was advocated.

1985In Davis v. Moore, 353 So.2d 740 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978), in concurring opinions by Judge, now Associate Justice Lemmon of this Court and Judge Boutall, termination of the inability to pay rule was advocated.

1986The rationale for this jurisprudentially created rule is found in Cole v. Sherill, 7 So.2d 205 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1942): It has never been good policy to bankrupt one to pay another even though the award granted is not in line with other cases involving the same injuries and might not fully compensate the plaintiff for injuries he received.

1985The rationale for this jurisprudentially created rule is found in Cole v. Sherrill, 7 So.2d 205 (La.App. 2d Cir.1942): *1188 It has never been good policy to bankrupt one to pay another even though the award granted is not in line with other cases involving the same injuries and might not fully compensate the plaintiff for injuries he received.

1985Being of the opinion that all damage awards were affected by the inability to pay doctrine, we granted writs to reconsider this jurisprudential rule. 462 So.2d 1254 (La.1985).

1984Furthermore, despite appellant’s argument to the contrary, Suhor, supra, does not distinguish between special and general damages in the application of the inability to pay doctrine.

1984Relying on Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So.2d 497 (La.1980) U.S. cert denied 459 U.S. 1061 , 103 S.Ct. 484 , 74 L.Ed.2d 629 (1982) appellants argue that the inability to pay doctrine cannot be used when the disparity is so great between the damages and the defendant’s inability to pay that they cannot be meaningfully reconciled.

1984This Court’s decision in Becnel v. Ward, 286 So.2d 731 (La.App. 4th Cir.1974); writ denied 290 So.2d 900 (La.1974) held that special damages may not be reduced since they are not a matter of the trial court’s discretion as are general damages.

1984Relying on Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So.2d 497 (La.1980) U.S. cert denied 459 U.S. 1061 , 103 S.Ct. 484 , 74 L.Ed.2d 629 (1982) appellants argue that the inability to pay doctrine cannot be used when the disparity is so great between the damages and the defendant’s inability to pay that they cannot be meaningfully reconciled.

1984Relying on Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So.2d 497 (La.1980) U.S. cert denied 459 U.S. 1061 , 103 S.Ct. 484 , 74 L.Ed.2d 629 (1982) appellants argue that the inability to pay doctrine cannot be used when the disparity is so great between the damages and the defendant’s inability to pay that they cannot be meaningfully reconciled.

1984This Court’s decision in Becnel v. Ward, 286 So.2d 731 (La.App. 4th Cir.1974); writ denied 290 So.2d 900 (La.1974) held that special damages may not be reduced since they are not a matter of the trial court’s discretion as are general damages.

1981Landry v. Martin, 353 So.2d 449 (La.App.3rd Cir.1977); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So.2d 223 (La.App.3rd Cir.1973); Rollins v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, 225 So.2d 663 (La.

1981In reaching this decision the court relied on the inability to pay doctrine as applied in Barnett v. Vanney, 360 So.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1978).

1981Cf. Tarver v. U-Haul Co., Inc., et al., 362 So.2d 1157 (La.

1981Landry v. Martin, 353 So.2d 449 (La.App.3rd Cir.1977); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So.2d 223 (La.App.3rd Cir.1973); Rollins v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, 225 So.2d 663 (La.

1981Landry v. Martin, 353 So.2d 449 (La.App.3rd Cir.1977); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So.2d 223 (La.App.3rd Cir.1973); Rollins v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, 225 So.2d 663 (La.

1980Williams v. Garner, 268 So.2d 56 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972). [5] Recognition of the inability to pay doctrine is not the problem in the instant case.