11 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brodie v. Jordangreen1 sentence2025On the implied covenant claim, the jury found the defendants liable 3 The jury ultimately found no breach of the parties' contract, so we do not discuss that claim further. 4 Although the fiduciary duty claim is equitable in nature, Brodie v. Jordan, 447 Mass. 866, 871 (2006), the parties have referred to certain relief available on that claim as "damages." While a term such as restitution might be more appropriate, we adopt the parties' usage for purposes of this decision. 2 and awarded damages of $400,000. | 1 | 1 |
Barchock v. CVS Health Corporationgreen1 sentence2025See Barchock v. CVS Health Corp., 886 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clemmeygreen2 sentences2023See Section 913 study, supra at vi-vii (investment advisers are subject to duties of loyalty and care). 36Our decision in Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 135-136 , disposes of Robinhood's concern that the Secretary's interpretation vests him with the effective "authority to establish new crimes," see G. 2023As we explained, the Legislature may, with sufficient guardrails, delegate to an agency the definition of criminal conduct; such a delegation does not violate due process where "fair notice of the conduct proscribed has been provided," Clemmey, supra at 136 , as was provided here. 37 fiduciary obligations to preserve retail investor access to investment options that, Robinhood predicts, may become economically unfeasible for broker-dealers to continue to offer if they must comply with the fiduciary duty rule. i. Assumption against preemption. "[P]re-emption fundamentally is a question of congr | 1 | 1 |
Pepin v. Division of Fisheries & Wildlifegreen1 sentence2023Our analysis begins with the recognition that "[d]uly promulgated regulations of an administrative agency are presumptively valid and 'must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.'" Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520 (2019), quoting Pepin v. Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
English v. General Electric Co.green1 sentence2023Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.green1 sentence2023As we explained, the Legislature may, with sufficient guardrails, delegate to an agency the definition of criminal conduct; such a delegation does not violate due process where "fair notice of the conduct proscribed has been provided," Clemmey, supra at 136 , as was provided here. 37 fiduciary obligations to preserve retail investor access to investment options that, Robinhood predicts, may become economically unfeasible for broker-dealers to continue to offer if they must comply with the fiduciary duty rule. i. Assumption against preemption. "[P]re-emption fundamentally is a question of congr | 1 | 1 |
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrechtgreen1 sentence2023See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019) (Federal regulation issued pursuant to statutorily delegated authority can preempt State law). | 1 | 1 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marinegreen1 sentence2023Robinhood alternatively argues that the fiduciary duty rule is invalid under the doctrine of conflict preemption, contending that the rule "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the Federal government]," Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 492 Mass. 641 , 648 n.18 (2023), quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002), as those purposes and objectives are set forth in the SEC's Regulation Best Interest. | 1 | 1 |
Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsfordgreen1 sentence2023"No formula exists for determining whether a delegation of legislative authority is 'proper,'" Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 190 (1984), but three considerations are relevant: "(1) Did the Legislature delegate the making of fundamental policy decisions, rather than just the implementation of legislatively determined policy; (2) does the act provide adequate direction for implementation, either in the form of statutory standards or . . . sufficient guidance to including by promulgating rules to define the actions that constitute "unfair or deceptive acts or practic | 1 | 1 |
Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 771 (1980) 25Robinhood mistakenly asserts that the Secretary's definition of "unethical or dishonest conduct or practices" to include the failure to abide by the fiduciary duty rule is inconsistent with the dictionary definitions of those terms. | 1 | 1 |
Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'ngreen1 sentence2023Our analysis begins with the recognition that "[d]uly promulgated regulations of an administrative agency are presumptively valid and 'must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.'" Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520 (2019), quoting Pepin v. Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Beckles v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023L. c. 110A, § 204 (a) (2) (G), by reference to the fiduciary duty rule, presents due process concerns in that it renders MUSA "so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement" (citation omitted), Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 262 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.green1 sentence2010Compare Merola v. Exergen Corp., 423 *147 Mass. 461, 464 (1996) (“claim based on this [fiduciary] duty [of majority shareholder in close corporation] ... is a matter of law for the court, as is the remedy for such breach”), and Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501 , 527 & n.32 (1997), with O’Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 383-384 (2007) (discussing jury verdict for breach of fiduciary duty). | 1 | 1 |
O'Brien v. Pearsongreen1 sentence2010Compare Merola v. Exergen Corp., 423 *147 Mass. 461, 464 (1996) (“claim based on this [fiduciary] duty [of majority shareholder in close corporation] ... is a matter of law for the court, as is the remedy for such breach”), and Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501 , 527 & n.32 (1997), with O’Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 383-384 (2007) (discussing jury verdict for breach of fiduciary duty). | 1 | 1 |
Blue Chip Capital Fund II Ltd. Partnership v. Tubergengreen1 sentence2008“To allow a fiduciary duty claim to coexist in parallel with an implied contractual claim, would undermine the primacy of contract law over fiduciary law in matters involving the essential contractual rights and obligations of [the] shareholders.” Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 , 143 n.23 (Del. 2008), citing Bershad, 1998 WL 118022 at *5 (internal quotations omitted); See also Blue Chip Capital Fund II Limited Partnership v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 833 (Del.Ch. 2006), citing with approval Madison Realty Partners 7, LLC v. AG ISA, LLC, 2001 WL 406268 at *6 (Del.Ch. 2001) (dismissing partner’s fiduc | 1 | 1 |
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. at 850 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wood v. Baum
green
2 sentences2011Indeed, “(t]o allow a fiduciary duty claim to coexist in parallel with an implied contractual claim, would undermine the primacy of contract law over fiduciary law in matters involving the essential contractual rights and obligations of [the] shareholders.” Nahill, 2009 WL 909813 , at *3, quoting Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 , 143 n.23 (Del. 2008). 2008“To allow a fiduciary duty claim to coexist in parallel with an implied contractual claim, would undermine the primacy of contract law over fiduciary law in matters involving the essential contractual rights and obligations of [the] shareholders.” Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 , 143 n.23 (Del. 2008), citing Bershad, 1998 WL 118022 at *5 (internal quotations omitted); See also Blue Chip Capital Fund II Limited Partnership v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 833 (Del.Ch. 2006), citing with approval Madison Realty Partners 7, LLC v. AG ISA, LLC, 2001 WL 406268 at *6 (Del.Ch. 2001) (dismissing partner’s fiduc | 2 | 2008–2011 |
Clark v. Rowe
green
1 sentence2026We therefore vacate the dismissal of the fiduciary duty claim, and we note that "[i]ntentional breaches of fiduciary duties" may stand "apart from a claim of malpractice."16 Clark, 428 Mass. at 345 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Patsos v. First Albany Corp.
green
1 sentence2023Robinhood next argues that the fiduciary duty rule is invalid because it abrogates the common law as set forth in Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 433 Mass. 323 (2001). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. COMMR. OF LABOR & INDUS.
green
1 sentence2023Robinhood also maintains that, if MUSA permits the Secretary to promulgate the fiduciary duty rule, as we conclude it does, then MUSA impermissibly delegates legislative authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (art. 30).33 Article 30 "encompasses the general principle that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws." Construction Indus. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 406 Mass. 162 , 171 (1989). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023"No formula exists for determining whether a delegation of legislative authority is 'proper,'" Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 190 (1984), but three considerations are relevant: "(1) Did the Legislature delegate the making of fundamental policy decisions, rather than just the implementation of legislatively determined policy; (2) does the act provide adequate direction for implementation, either in the form of statutory standards or . . . sufficient guidance to including by promulgating rules to define the actions that constitute "unfair or deceptive acts or practic | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hays v. Ellrich
green
1 sentence2023L. c. 110A, § 415, which provides that MUSA "shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those [S]tates which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related [F]ederal regulation." We already have rejected the argument that this provision "mandate[s] that [State] courts adopt the interpretation of comparable Federal [and State] securities statutes," see Hays v. Ellrich, 471 Mass. 592, 605 , cert. denied, 577 U.S. 985 (2015); we see no reason why it would require the Secretary to do so in this context -– | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo
green
1 sentence2019To establish a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under Massachusetts law, "there must be a [fiduciary] duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the [defendant's] breach [thereof].12 Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478 , 492 12We conduct the fiduciary duty analysis in accordance with Massachusetts law, as the parties are in agreement that it should apply. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lennox, Appeal Of
green
1 sentence2009Dec. 19, 2002) (dismissing claim for aiding and abetting because the underlying fiduciary duty claim was dismissed), aff'd, 825 A.2d 239 (Del. 2003); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F.Sup. 749, 752-53 (D.Del. 1978) (“it is well settled that ‘(n)o action in tort lies for conspiracy to do something unless the acts actually done, if done by one person, would constitute a tort’ ”), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Matsushita Elec. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Instead of a constructive knowledge or objective reasonableness standard, the statute of limitations does not accrue on a fiduciary duty claim until the injured party “actually learns that the fiduciary has breached the trust.” Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc 63 Mass.App.Ct. at 345 , further appellate review granted, 445 Mass. 1101 . 5 In explaining the test, the Appeals Court stated: [T]he relevant question is whether the plaintiff actually knew before [the alleged time of discovery], that [the defendant] was not just causing her psychological harm but was by his acts breaching the fiduciary obligati | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.