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11 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 2009–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa 2013On the defendant’s consolidated appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, the Commonwealth concedes that the admission of certificates of drag analysis (drug certificates) violated the defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-311 (2009) (Melendez-Diaz)■ We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the Melendez-Diaz error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 577 (2011) (Melendez-Diaz error not harmless where officer "was called as an expert concerning the charge of intent to distribute and thus was never asked directly to identify the marijuana"); Commonwealth v. King, 461 Mass. 354, 358 (2012) 15 (officer "not asked about his specific training in the identification of cocaine"). 2017See Commonwealth v. Nelson , 460 Mass. 564 , 577, 953 N.E.2d 164 (2011) ( Melendez-Diaz error not harmless where officer "was called as an expert concerning the charge of intent to distribute and thus was never asked directly to identify the marijuana"); Commonwealth v. King , 461 Mass. 354 , 358, 960 N.E.2d 894 (2012) (officer "not asked about his specific training in the identification of cocaine"). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kinggreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 577 (2011) (Melendez-Diaz error not harmless where officer "was called as an expert concerning the charge of intent to distribute and thus was never asked directly to identify the marijuana"); Commonwealth v. King, 461 Mass. 354, 358 (2012) 15 (officer "not asked about his specific training in the identification of cocaine"). 2017See Commonwealth v. Nelson , 460 Mass. 564 , 577, 953 N.E.2d 164 (2011) ( Melendez-Diaz error not harmless where officer "was called as an expert concerning the charge of intent to distribute and thus was never asked directly to identify the marijuana"); Commonwealth v. King , 461 Mass. 354 , 358, 960 N.E.2d 894 (2012) (officer "not asked about his specific training in the identification of cocaine"). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Vasquezgreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 355 (2010) (standard of review for preserved Melendez-Diaz error is harmlessness beyond reasonable doubt). 2010Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350 (2010) (applying Melendez-Diaz rule retroactively). 1 This bright line distinction between cases still pending on appeal when a new rule is announced and those which have already concluded makes perfect sense when one considers the implications if no bright line were drawn. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Connollygreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigangreen1 sentence2013While Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 149-150 , speaks of instances in which the defense may seek to invoke the protocol of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), and request a hearing to challenge the manner in which certain field tests were conducted, or the particular test kit used, that issue is not present in this appeal, there having been no Lanigan challenge raised below. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Uptongreen2 sentences2011The affiant qualified this informant, “CIA,” as “a known and admitted drug user who is familiar with the methods of packaging and distribution of illicit narcotics in the Greater Lowell Area.” See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 369-377 (1985). 2011The affiant qualified this informant, “CIA,” as “a known and admitted drug user who is familiar with the methods of packaging and distribution of illicit narcotics in the Greater Lowell Area.” See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 369-377 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Vasquezgreen2 sentences2010See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 451 (2009). 2010See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 451 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 636, 641 (2006) (unobjected-to constitutional error is subject to review under substantial risk standard). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman
green
2 sentences2014The fact that the records were requested in anticipation of trial is irrelevant, as they were “maintained independent of any prosecutorial purpose.” Ellis, supra, quoting from Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167 , 171 n.3 (2010). 2011The registration records are kept in the ordinary course of the business of the RMV and were admissible as business records and as summaries of records regularly maintained by the RMV. 8 See Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167 , 171 n.3 (2010) (noting that defendant’s challenge to RMV records had not been preserved, but reasoning that, “[i]n any event, this claim is without merit where it is clear that the RMV is an independent agency of State government charged with keeping complete records on the status of drivers’ licenses and ‘a record of all convictions of persons charg | 2 | 2011–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Ellis
green
2 sentences2014However, Ellis makes clear that there is no Melendez-Diaz error in the admission of RMV records “kept in the ordinary course of business.” Ellis, supra at 335 . 2014The fact that the records were requested in anticipation of trial is irrelevant, as they were “maintained independent of any prosecutorial purpose.” Ellis, supra, quoting from Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167 , 171 n.3 (2010). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Fernandez
green
1 sentence2013While Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 149-150 , speaks of instances in which the defense may seek to invoke the protocol of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), and request a hearing to challenge the manner in which certain field tests were conducted, or the particular test kit used, that issue is not present in this appeal, there having been no Lanigan challenge raised below. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
1 sentence2009The defendant argues that, because three quantities of cocaine were presented to the grand jury but only two indictments were returned 8 and only two quantities were introduced in evidence at trial, “this set of facts presents an excellent illustration of why a live witness from the State Laboratory was needed to present this evidence, in order to give [the defendant] the opportunity to explore what happened with the drug evidence in this case.” In his initial brief, dated June, 6, 2008, the defendant cites Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and the case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachuse | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.