11 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.green2 sentences2006See Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 540-41 (2001) (finding plaintiff in a sexual harassment claim survived summary judgment by providing evidence that her supervisors, foremen, and line workers collectively rubbed against or bumped her on a consistent basis, made sexually explicit comments about her body, and made sexually suggestive gestures in her direction, all over an extended period of time). 2003Claims of sexual harassment and disparate treatment are subsets of the broad sex discrimination category made unlawful in §4(1). 6 See e.g., Cuddyer v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 522 (2001) (allowing sexual harassment claim under both 151B, §4(1) and (16A)); Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 674 (1993) (sexual harassment part of sex discrimination claim); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. MCAD, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987) (“sexual harassment may constitute discrimination in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(1)”). | 2 | 2 |
Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co.green2 sentences2004As the court stated in Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285, 290 (1997), “nowhere is discrimination because of a victim’s sex made an essential element of a sexual harassment claim in Massachusetts.” This is because “the prohibition against sexual harassment is contained in the black letter text of G. 2002Melnychenko , at 291 (in Melnychenko , the plaintiffs co-worker repeatedly exposed himself and fondled plaintiffs genital, buttocks, and chest areas while at work). | 2 | 2 |
Lowery v. Klemmgreen1 sentence2020See Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572 , 580 & n.10 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discriminationgreen1 sentence2003Claims of sexual harassment and disparate treatment are subsets of the broad sex discrimination category made unlawful in §4(1). 6 See e.g., Cuddyer v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 522 (2001) (allowing sexual harassment claim under both 151B, §4(1) and (16A)); Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 674 (1993) (sexual harassment part of sex discrimination claim); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. MCAD, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987) (“sexual harassment may constitute discrimination in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(1)”). | 1 | 1 |
Ramsdell v. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, Inc.green1 sentence2003Claims of sexual harassment and disparate treatment are subsets of the broad sex discrimination category made unlawful in §4(1). 6 See e.g., Cuddyer v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 522 (2001) (allowing sexual harassment claim under both 151B, §4(1) and (16A)); Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 674 (1993) (sexual harassment part of sex discrimination claim); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. MCAD, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987) (“sexual harassment may constitute discrimination in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(1)”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Century Fire & Marine Insurance v. Bank of New England-Bristol County, N.A.
green
1 sentence2026This argument alone does not support equitable tolling as it does not suggest the plaintiff did not have "information essential to bringing suit." Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Preferred Mutual Insurance v. Gamache
green
1 sentence2020Co. v. Gamache, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 194 , 200- 201, S.C., 426 Mass. 93 (1997) (where underlying claim was that insured had injured police officer's knee by forcibly grabbing his belt, insured's intent to injure officer could not be determined as matter of law). 10In the current appeal, no party has focused on whether Marculetiu in fact qualified as L.C.'s employer or teacher for purposes of maintaining a sexual harassment claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Preferred Mutual Insurance v. Gamache
green
1 sentence2020Co. v. Gamache, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 194 , 200- 201, S.C., 426 Mass. 93 (1997) (where underlying claim was that insured had injured police officer's knee by forcibly grabbing his belt, insured's intent to injure officer could not be determined as matter of law). 10In the current appeal, no party has focused on whether Marculetiu in fact qualified as L.C.'s employer or teacher for purposes of maintaining a sexual harassment claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ladd v. Everett Savings Bank
neutral
2 sentences1999Ladd v. Everett Savings Bank, supra Civil No. 973690, 8 Mass. L. 1999Ladd v. Everett Savings Bank, supra Civil No. 973690, 8 Mass. L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Guzman v. Lowinger
green
2 sentences1997Charland, Clarke and Jancey appear to stand for the proposition that where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of.c. 151B, he may thereafter proceed to bring an action in the Superior Court under other relevant statutes. 6 See also Guzman v. Lowinger, 422 Mass. 570 (1996) (“where G.L.c. 151B applies, its procedural requirements may not be bypassed by reconstituting a sexual harassment claim as a violation of the civil rights act or the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act. . . or as a new common law claim.” Id. at 571 ). 1997Charland, Clarke and Jancey appear to stand for the proposition that where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of.c. 151B, he may thereafter proceed to bring an action in the Superior Court under other relevant statutes. 6 See also Guzman v. Lowinger, 422 Mass. 570 (1996) (“where G.L.c. 151B applies, its procedural requirements may not be bypassed by reconstituting a sexual harassment claim as a violation of the civil rights act or the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act. . . or as a new common law claim.” Id. at 571 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co.
green
1 sentence1997In Green v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 422 Mass. 551 (1996), the defendant terminated the plaintiffs employment in June, 1992. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
cluster 697653
green
1 sentence1997Mass. 1995), which have held that, “where an employee may avail herself of [G.L.c. 151B], this statute provides the exclusive state-law remedy for a sexual harassment claim.” Id. at 31 , citing Clarke, 57 F.3d at 26-27 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Johnson v. Plastic Packaging, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Mass. 1995), which have held that, “where an employee may avail herself of [G.L.c. 151B], this statute provides the exclusive state-law remedy for a sexual harassment claim.” Id. at 31 , citing Clarke, 57 F.3d at 26-27 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
O'CONNELL v. Chasdi
green
2 sentences1996In O’Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686 (1987), this court allowed a plaintiff to pursue a sexual harassment claim against her employer under the civil rights act, where the employer was not covered by c. 151B. 1996Id. at 693-694 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
green
2 sentences1987The Supreme Court cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958), and noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission believes “that when a sexual harassment claim rests exclusively on a ‘hostile environment’ theory, ... the usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear.” Meritor, supra at 77-78 . 1987The Supreme Court cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958), and noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission believes "that when a sexual harassment claim rests exclusively on a `hostile environment' theory, ... the usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear." Meritor, supra at 77-78 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.