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6 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barbara J. HENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DUNDEE, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence2023Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 , 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th cir.1982)). ¶ 16 To determine the existence of a hostile work environment sufficient to sustain a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish that plaintiff: (1) was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct, advances, or requests; (2) because of plaintiff’s sex; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Erickson v. Wisconsin Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2023Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinsongreen2 sentences2023Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 , 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th cir.1982)). ¶ 16 To determine the existence of a hostile work environment sufficient to sustain a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish that plaintiff: (1) was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct, advances, or requests; (2) because of plaintiff’s sex; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. 2023Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 , 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th cir.1982)). ¶ 16 To determine the existence of a hostile work environment sufficient to sustain a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish that plaintiff: (1) was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct, advances, or requests; (2) because of plaintiff’s sex; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sangamon County Sheriff's Department v. Illinois Human Rights Commission
green
2 sentences2011"The 180-day filing requirement is mandatory in order to vest the Commission with subject matter jurisdiction of the charge. [Citations.] * * * A sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment generally is made up of a series of events rather than a single event. * * * Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within 180 days of the filing date, a fact finder may consider all of the conduct that makes up the hostile environment claim. [Citation.]" Sangamon County Sheriff's Department, 233 Ill.2d at 141 , 330 Ill.Dec. 187 , 908 N.E.2d 39 . ¶ 19 According to petitioners, 2011"The 180-day filing requirement is mandatory in order to vest the Commission with subject matter jurisdiction of the charge. [Citations.] * * * A sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment generally is made up of a series of events rather than a single event. * * * Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within 180 days of the filing date, a fact finder may consider all of the conduct that makes up the hostile environment claim. [Citation.]" Sangamon County Sheriff's Department, 233 Ill.2d at 141 , 330 Ill.Dec. 187 , 908 N.E.2d 39 . ¶ 19 According to petitioners, | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Jenkins v. Lustig
green
2 sentences2011Alternatively, petitioners assert that Lockard's complaint was not timely filed because the only two acts that occurred less than 180 days before she filed the charge with the Department occurred after certain intervening action by the employer and, therefore, are not components of the actionable hostile environment that may have existed before the intervention. ¶ 20 In Jenkins, the court held that the Morgan rule applies "unless (1) the acts within the jurisdictional period have no relation to those outside the period or (2) are no longer part of the same hostile environment claim. [Citation. 2011Alternatively, petitioners assert that Lockard's complaint was not timely filed because the only two acts that occurred less than 180 days before she filed the charge with the Department occurred after certain intervening action by the employer and, therefore, are not components of the actionable hostile environment that may have existed before the intervention. ¶ 20 In Jenkins, the court held that the Morgan rule applies "unless (1) the acts within the jurisdictional period have no relation to those outside the period or (2) are no longer part of the same hostile environment claim. [Citation. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Damato v. Jack Phelan Chevrolet Geo, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996The court stated that "[w]here a claim for tortious battery rests on the same facts as a sexual harassment claim ( i.e., an offensive touching of a sexual nature) the battery claim is preempted under Geise." Damato, 927 F.Supp. at 290 . 1996The court stated that "[w]here a claim for tortious battery rests on the same facts as a sexual harassment claim (i.e., an offensive touching of a sexual nature) the battery claim is preempted under Geise.” Damato, 927 F. Supp. at 290 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Kimberly Passananti v. Cook County
green
1 sentence2023“Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to enter judgment against a party who has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial if a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Id. ¶ 25 The seventh circuit held that the jury verdict on the sexual harassment claim must be reinstated because the district court erred by resolving both the question of sexual harassment and the affirmative defense in favor of defendants as a matter of law where there was ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Szkoda v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COM'N
green
2 sentences2020Id. 2020App. 3d at 540 . - 10 - No. 1-19-0944 ¶ 29 In Szkoda, our court held that “the elements of proof in the [federal] Fair Housing Amendment Act accord with the purpose of section 3-102(B) and are necessary to establish a sexual harassment violation of section 3-102(B) of the Act.” Id. at 541 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.