commonsense rule in Michigan

2022Thus, that the ELCRA protects persons who engage in sexual activity while at work is simply not a reasonable interpretation. 49 Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich at 13 .

2022Thus, that the ELCRA protects persons who engage in sexual activity while at work is simply not a reasonable interpretation. 49 Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich at 13 .

2022This Court has always recognized and enforced this commonsense rule. 50 When read in context it becomes eminently clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “sex” in 1976 did not include sexual orientation. 51 This conclusion 48 Rather, the ELCRA “is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022This Court has always recognized and enforced this commonsense rule. 50 When read in context it becomes eminently clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “sex” in 1976 did not include sexual orientation. 51 This conclusion 48 Rather, the ELCRA “is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2018When analyzing whether the proffered reasons is merely pretextual, we are mindful that “[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not.?” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “ ‘At the summary disposition stage, the issue is whether plaintiff has produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably doubt the employer’s explanation.

2018When analyzing whether the proffered reasons is merely pretextual, we are mindful that “[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not.?” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “ ‘At the summary disposition stage, the issue is whether plaintiff has produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably doubt the employer’s explanation.

2019“The party proffering the expert’s testimony must persuade the court that the expert possesses specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 112 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986). 1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 57 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -9- Because the critical inquiry is whether the expert’s testimony will aid the factfinder, the expert testimony must touch on something “beyond common knowledge”: [W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a

2019“The party proffering the expert’s testimony must persuade the court that the expert possesses specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 112 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986). 1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 57 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -9- Because the critical inquiry is whether the expert’s testimony will aid the factfinder, the expert testimony must touch on something “beyond common knowledge”: [W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a

2019“The party proffering the expert’s testimony must persuade the court that the expert possesses specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 112 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986). 1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 57 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -9- Because the critical inquiry is whether the expert’s testimony will aid the factfinder, the expert testimony must touch on something “beyond common knowledge”: [W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a

2019“The party proffering the expert’s testimony must persuade the court that the expert possesses specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 112 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986). 1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 57 ; 113 S Ct 2786 ; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). -9- Because the critical inquiry is whether the expert’s testimony will aid the factfinder, the expert testimony must touch on something “beyond common knowledge”: [W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a

2015If the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute, then expert testimony is unnecessary. [Kowalski, 492 Mich at 123 (footnote omitted).] However, even if expert testimony would assist the trier of fact, the proffered testimony must also meet the so-called “trilogy of restrictions,” which includes a searching inquiry into “qualification, reliability, and fit.” Elher v Misra, 308 Mich App 276 ; ___ NW2d ___ (2014), sli

2014While we conclude that. . . the common law controls in this case, we note that the modern trend is to adopt what has been described as the more commonsense rule that a person attains a certain age on that person’s corresponding birthday.”); State of New Jersey in the Interest of FW, 130 NJ Super 513; 327 A2d 697 (Juvenile and Domestic Relations Ct, 1974) (applying the common-law rule in finding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction where the offense was committed at 5:03 a.m. on the day before the defendant’s 18th birthday); State v Brown, 443 SW2d 805, 807 (Mo, 1969) (“[A] person reache

2014This exception has been followed for such a long period of time that it has achieved a status of its own and should be followed in the absence of a statutory enactment to the contrary.”); Fox v Manchester, 88 NH 355, 361-362; 189 A 868 (1937), quoting Wright, 197 F at 298 (“ ‘The law ordinarily’ takes ‘no cognizance of fractions of days, one becomes of full age the first moment of the day before his twenty-first anniversary.’ ”); Inhabitants of Town ofGouldsboro v Inhabitants of Town of Sullivan, 132 Me 342, 343; 170 A 900 (1934) (an individual “attained full age July 18, 1922, the day precedi

2008Particularly relevant here is the commonsense principle that “ ‘ “[identical language should certainly receive identical construction when found in the same act.” ’ ” Empire Iron Mining Partnership v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410 , 426 n 16; 565 NW2d 844 (1997), quoting Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 155 ; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (Riley, J., dissenting).

2008Particularly relevant here is the commonsense principle that “ ‘ “[identical language should certainly receive identical construction when found in the same act.” ’ ” Empire Iron Mining Partnership v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410 , 426 n 16; 565 NW2d 844 (1997), quoting Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 155 ; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (Riley, J., dissenting).

2008Particularly relevant here is the commonsense principle that “ ‘ “[identical language should certainly receive identical construction when found in the same act.” ’ ” Empire Iron Mining Partnership v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410 , 426 n 16; 565 NW2d 844 (1997), quoting Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 155 ; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (Riley, J., dissenting).

2008Particularly relevant here is the commonsense principle that “ ‘ “[identical language should certainly receive identical construction when found in the same act.” ’ ” Empire Iron Mining Partnership v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410 , 426 n 16; 565 NW2d 844 (1997), quoting Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 155 ; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) (Riley, J., dissenting).

2006The “absurd results” rule, the commonsense rule that statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, was rejected by this Court in People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147 ; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).

2006The "absurd results" rule, the commonsense rule that statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, was rejected by this Court in People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147 , 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). [2] The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: "`(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [P

2006The “absurd results” rule, the commonsense rule that statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, was rejected by this Court in People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147 ; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).

2006The "absurd results" rule, the commonsense rule that statutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, was rejected by this Court in People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147 , 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). [2] The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: "`(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [P

2006The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: “ ‘(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury. “ ‘(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred. “ ‘(3) Recovery is limi

2006The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: “ ‘(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury. “ ‘(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred. “ ‘(3) Recovery is limi

2006The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: “ ‘(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury. “ ‘(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred. “ ‘(3) Recovery is limi

2006The majority states that the no-fault act contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: “ ‘(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury. “ ‘(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred. “ ‘(3) Recovery is limi