recklessness standard in Michigan

2021Therefore, to determine the standard of care applicable when an injury arises involving coparticipants in a recreational activity, a court must consider whether the injuries arose from risks inherent in that recreational activity. [Composto, 328 Mich App at 500 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).] -2- In adopting this standard, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that it set forth the standard as applying broadly to all recreational activities, however, “the precise scope of this rule is best established by allowing it to emerge on a case-by-case basis, so that we might carefully

2021In Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 87, 89 (1999), we adopted the “reckless misconduct” standard of care for coparticipants in recreational activities with regard to “certain risks inherent in that activity.” We reasoned that participants in recreational activities do not expect to be sued for mere carelessness, that the recklessness standard “lends itself to common-sense application,” and that the recklessness standard 3 “encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct.” Id. at 89 .

2020Id. at 91-93 ; Behar v Fox, 249 Mich App 314, 319, 321 ; 642 NW2d 426 (2001).

2020Id. at 91-93 ; Behar v Fox, 249 Mich App 314, 319, 321 ; 642 NW2d 426 (2001).

2016Here, the parties do not dispute that golfing, in general, constitutes a recreational activity, as demonstrated by the Michigan Supreme Court’s reliance on, and quotation of Hathaway v Tascosa Country Club, Inc, 846 SW2d 614, 616-617 (Tex App, 1993) (citations omitted), which expressly extended the “reckless or intentional” standard applicable in the context of “competitive contact sports” to the sport of golf where the plaintiff had been hit by an errant shot.

1999Furthermore, common sense dictates that none of the advantages of the recklessness standard that the majority cites actually support its conclusion. 2 I believe that the majority is wrong in overruling this aspect of our holdings in Felgner and Wood . i I begin with the majority’s assertion that the recklessness standard “encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities.” Ante at 89; see id. at 82-83, quoting Ross v Clouser, 637 SW2d 11, 14 (Mo, 1982); Crawn v Campo, 136 NJ 494, 508; 643 A2d 600 (1994).

1999I I begin with the majority's assertion that the recklessness standard "encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities." Op. at 525; see id. at 523-24, quoting Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo., 1982); Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 , 643 A.2d 600, 607 (1994).

1999Furthermore, common sense dictates that none of the advantages of the recklessness standard that the majority cites actually support its conclusion. 2 I believe that the majority is wrong in overruling this aspect of our holdings in Felgner and Wood . i I begin with the majority’s assertion that the recklessness standard “encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities.” Ante at 89; see id. at 82-83, quoting Ross v Clouser, 637 SW2d 11, 14 (Mo, 1982); Crawn v Campo, 136 NJ 494, 508; 643 A2d 600 (1994).

1999The heightened recklessness standard recognizes a commonsense distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur freely on the playing fields and should not be second-guessed in courtrooms. [ Crawn, supra, 136 N.J. at 508 , 643 A.2d 600 .] Courts have also recognized the potential flood of litigation that might result from the use of an ordinary negligence standard: If simple negligence were adopted as the standard of care, every punter with whom contact is made, every midfielder high sticked, every basketball player fouled, every