recklessness standard in Texas

2025This recklessness standard requires a showing that “the driver committed an act he knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury.” Rivera v. City of Houston, No. 01-19-00629-CV, 2022 WL 2163025 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667 , 672 n.19 (Tex. 2006) 11 (“conscious indifference” and “reckless disregard” have been interpreted to require proof that party knew relevant facts but did not care about result).

2021This recklessness standard requires “proof that a party knew the relevant facts but did not care about the result.” See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667 , 672 n.19 (Tex. 2006).

2011Corp. , 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant "recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth" by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden , 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.--Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guar

2011Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant “recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth” by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden, 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guarant

2011Corp. , 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant "recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth" by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden , 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.--Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guar

2011Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant “recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth” by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden, 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guarant

2011Corp. , 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant "recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth" by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden , 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.--Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guar

2011Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977) (reversing summary judgment granted in favor of defendant because fact issue existed as to whether defendant committed fraud where the defendant “recklessly made a statement as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth” by making representations based on hearsay when documents in his possession contradicted that hearsay); Matis v. Golden, 228 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (holding that evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support fraud finding where investment advisors told clients that their investments were guarant

2011Co. v. Giles , 950 S.W.2d 48, 72 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts and explaining that "reason to know" is a recklessness standard under which the actor has knowledge of facts that would disclose danger to a reasonable person, which is not equivalent to "should know," which denotes a negligence standard under which the actor has merely failed to take precautions).

2011Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 72 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts and explaining that “reason to know” is a recklessness standard under which the actor has knowledge of facts that would disclose danger to a reasonable person, which is not equivalent to “should know,” which denotes a negligence standard under which the actor has merely failed to take precautions).

2025We observed that this recklessness standard requires “conscious indifference” or “subjective awareness of an extreme risk.” Id. (quoting Tarrant County v. Bonner, 574 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. 2019)).

2024Inst. 1965)); accord id. at 627 (concurring and dissenting op. of Phillips, C.J.); id. at 630 (concurring and dissenting op. of Hecht, then-J., joined by Enoch, J.); see Ross, 2004 WL 792317 , at *8; see also Standard Fruit & Vegetable, 985 S.W.2d at 65–66 (“In Twyman, we specifically adopted the recklessness standard . . . and defined it generally.” (citing 855 S.W.2d at 624 (op. of Cornyn, J.)).

2024The Supreme Court of Texas has refined the required mental state for IIED claims by holding that IIED “is available only in those situations in which severe emotional distress is the intended consequence or primary risk of the actor’s conduct”—that is, “only when the tortfeasor desired or anticipated that the plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress.” See Standard Fruit & Vegetable, 985 S.W.2d at 67 ; accord Ross, 2004 WL 792317 , at *8.

2015The prosecutors made the mistake of not realizing that the document contained a statement that was covered by the second motion in limine and the trial court’s order and was not admissible in its then- current form.25 The defense made the mistake of not objecting to the admission of 24 See Ex parte Wheeler at 330-31 (finding that though the question about whether the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert was aware that the defendant’s insurer had found her at fault was manifestly improper, the trial court “was entitled to conclude that the prosecutor acted with unwarranted zeal rather tha

2015The prosecutors made the mistake of not realizing that the document contained a statement that was covered by the second motion in limine and the trial court’s order and was not admissible in its then- current form.25 The defense made the mistake of not objecting to the admission of 24 See Ex parte Wheeler at 330-31 (finding that though the question about whether the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert was aware that the defendant’s insurer had found her at fault was manifestly improper, the trial court “was entitled to conclude that the prosecutor acted with unwarranted zeal rather tha

2014Gross negligence requires a plaintiff to prove that, "1) when viewed objectively from the defendant's standpoint at the time of the event, the act or omission involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others and 2) the defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.” U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 137 (Tex.2012).

2011The “reckless disregard” test, which requires a showing of more than a momentary judgment lapse, is better suited to the legislative goal of encouraging emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public’s safety to the extent practicable. -3- 04-10-00619-CV Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 , 620 N.Y.S.2d 297 , 644 N.E.2d 988, 992 (1994)).

2011The “reckless disregard” test, which requires a showing of more than a momentary judgment lapse, is better suited to the legislative goal of encouraging emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public’s safety to the extent practicable. -3- 04-10-00619-CV Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 , 620 N.Y.S.2d 297 , 644 N.E.2d 988, 992 (1994)).

2009See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 6.03 , 19.04(a); see Kennedy v. State , 193 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd) (holding instruction on manslaughter not warranted because no rational juror could find defendant acted recklessly based on evidence describing self-defense); Martinez v. State , 16 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (noting one cannot accidentally or recklessly act in self-defense).

2009See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 6.03 , 19.04(a); see Kennedy v. State , 193 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd) (holding instruction on manslaughter not warranted because no rational juror could find defendant acted recklessly based on evidence describing self-defense); Martinez v. State , 16 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (noting one cannot accidentally or recklessly act in self-defense).

2008That is, appellant contends that the State did not prove that the act clearly dangerous to human life, “operat[ing] a motor vehicle southbound in a northbound lane on Interstate 35 and collid[ing] with another vehicle,” was committed recklessly.1 1 As authority, appellant cites the State’s response to his motion to quash, in which the statement was made that “[b]y requiring proof of an act clearly dangerous to life, the statute implicitly adopts a recklessness requirement.” 3 In Lomax, however, the court of criminal appeals noted that it had previously decided that a culpable mental state is n

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See id. *66 at 624 (citing the Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 500, cmt. a (1965)).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1998See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 , 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649 , 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 , 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666 , 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995).

1997If the actor knows or, from facts which she possesses, has reason to know that there is only a very strong probability, and not a substantial certainty, that harm may result from the act, the conduct is classified as "reckless." Henderson II, supra, at 44 (footnotes omitted). *72 "Reason to know", a recklessness standard, is not equivalent to "should know", a negligence standard.

1996Courts have recognized that, in the heat of an athletic contest, normal energetic conduct may include accidentally careless behavior.” Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Ky.1995).