9 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mauergreen2 sentences2017Mauer, 741 N.W.2d at 115 (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). 2017Mauer, 741 N.W.2d at 115 (internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Yarboroughgreen2 sentences2022Further, Defendant argues that UJI 14-241, unless 12 modified, fails to present to the jury the element of “conscious wrongdoing” as 13 required by State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 14 131, and State v. Omar-Muhammad, 1985-NMSC-006 , ¶¶ 20-22, 102 N.M. 274 , 694 15 P.2d 922 .1 16 {12} Defendant fails to explain how Valencia modifies the recklessness standard 17 used in UJI 14-241. 2022Further, Defendant argues that UJI 14-241, unless 12 modified, fails to present to the jury the element of “conscious wrongdoing” as 13 required by State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 14 131, and State v. Omar-Muhammad, 1985-NMSC-006 , ¶¶ 20-22, 102 N.M. 274 , 694 15 P.2d 922 .1 16 {12} Defendant fails to explain how Valencia modifies the recklessness standard 17 used in UJI 14-241. | 1 | 3 |
Delfino v. Griffogreen2 sentences2021The recklessness standard presents a “sizeable hurdle[ ]” to recovery and “acts as a safeguard against indiscriminately imposing liability upon a person who gives someone else an alcoholic beverage.” Delfino, 2011-NMSC-015, ¶ 33-34 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2021The recklessness standard presents a “sizeable hurdle[ ]” to recovery and “acts as a safeguard against indiscriminately imposing liability upon a person who gives someone else an alcoholic beverage.” Delfino, 2011-NMSC-015, ¶ 33-34 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Dube v. Lanpheargreen1 sentence2011We agree with Dube that [ajpplying existing social values and customs, it cannot reasonably be argued that the common practice of patronizing eating and drinking establishments with companions, each participant paying a fair share of the charges, imposes social host liability on each member of the group in the event one individual visibly drinks to excess and causes damage afterward. 868 N.E.2d at 623 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yarboroughgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Yarborough, 120 N.M. 669, 674 , 905 P.2d 209, 214 (Ct.App.1995) (requiring conduct that is “reckless, wanton, or willful” in order to establish involuntary manslaughter (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd, 1996-NMSC-068 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 131 ; see also NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1 (D), (E) (2005) (amended 2009) (identifying the intent for child abuse as “knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause”). 2009See State v. Yarborough, 120 N.M. 669, 674 , 905 P.2d 209, 214 (Ct.App.1995) (requiring conduct that is “reckless, wanton, or willful” in order to establish involuntary manslaughter (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd, 1996-NMSC-068 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 131 ; see also NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1 (D), (E) (2005) (amended 2009) (identifying the intent for child abuse as “knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad
green
2 sentences2022Further, Defendant argues that UJI 14-241, unless modified, fails to present to the jury the element of “conscious wrongdoing” as required by State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 131 , and State v. Omar- Muhammad, 1985-NMSC-006 , ¶¶ 20-22, 102 N.M. 274 , 694 P.2d 922 . 1 {12} Defendant fails to explain how Valencia modifies the recklessness standard used in UJI 14-241. 2022Further, Defendant argues that UJI 14-241, unless 12 modified, fails to present to the jury the element of “conscious wrongdoing” as 13 required by State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 14 131, and State v. Omar-Muhammad, 1985-NMSC-006 , ¶¶ 20-22, 102 N.M. 274 , 694 15 P.2d 922 .1 16 {12} Defendant fails to explain how Valencia modifies the recklessness standard 17 used in UJI 14-241. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Henley
green
1 sentence2026“Our case law has long integrated the requirement of 5 subjective knowledge into the showing of criminal negligence required by our 6 involuntary manslaughter statute.” Henley, 2010-NMSC-039 , ¶ 17. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen 2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Clarkson
green
2 sentences2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen 2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
S. W. Straus & Co. v. County of Los Angeles
neutral
2 sentences2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen 2026Even though 14 Yarborough relied on precedent in cases that employ a recklessness standard, using 15 terms such as “‘reckless, willful and wanton disregard of consequences,’” 1996- 16 NMSC-068, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Harris, 1937-NMSC-046 , ¶ 6, 41 N.M. 426 , 70 17 P.2d 757 ), “‘conscious abandonment of any consideration for . . . safety,’” id. ¶ 13 18 (quoting State v. Hayes, 1966-NMSC-260 , ¶ 3, 77 N.M. 225 , 421 P.2d 439 ), and 19 “‘wanton and reckless’” action, id. (quoting State v. Clarkson, 1954-NMSC-007 , ¶ 23 1 11, 58 N.M. 56 , 265 P.2d 670 ), Yarborough used the term criminal negligen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Conley v. Conley
green
1 sentence2022Further, Defendant argues that UJI 14-241, unless 12 modified, fails to present to the jury the element of “conscious wrongdoing” as 13 required by State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 14 131, and State v. Omar-Muhammad, 1985-NMSC-006 , ¶¶ 20-22, 102 N.M. 274 , 694 15 P.2d 922 .1 16 {12} Defendant fails to explain how Valencia modifies the recklessness standard 17 used in UJI 14-241. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Osborne v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2017The court said that in Osborne, 495 U.S. at 115 , the United States Supreme Court “approved a recklessness standard,” and concluded that the phrase “has reason to know” in Minnesota’s statute should likewise require a recklessness standard. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
New York v. Harris
green
1 sentence2017The court said that in Osborne, 495 U.S. 14 at 115 , the United States Supreme Court “approved a recklessness standard,” and 15 concluded that the phrase “has reason to know” in Minnesota’s statute should 16 likewise require a recklessness standard. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Solberg v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2011A plaintiff, therefore, has two sizeable hurdles to be successful in a suit under a social host liability theory: to establish facts from which a well-instructed jury could identify a guest/host relationship, and to prove reckless misconduct resulting from that relationship. {34} The Liquor Liability Act’s recklessness standard for social hosts indicates that the Legislature did not intend to impose on “social host” a meaning as broad as that attributed to the phrase by Solberg, where an individual who “antes up” at a tavern may be liable as a social host. 760 P.2d at 870 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Begay v. United States
red
1 sentence2009For support, Defendant again cites Begay, in which the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the application of a recklessness standard because unlike the other crimes listed in the ACCA, the act of driving drunk “need not be purposeful or deliberate.” 553 U.S. at-, 128 S.Ct. at 1587 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.