10 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoffert v. Luzegreen2 sentences2025Relying on section 321.231(5) and Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d at 684–85, the Mormanns argue, “Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k) was never intended to protect emergency responders, like Wessels, who violate the rules of the road in a reckless manner.” The defendants respond that section 321.231 merely exempts emergency responders from certain rules of the road and sets a higher culpability standard of recklessness for common law liability claims. 1998We have revisited the issue of the standard of care applicable to a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle operated during an emergency situation in Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Iowa 1998), which we file today. | 2 | 3 |
Pfister v. Shustagreen2 sentences2010Id. at 81 (“We therefore hold that paintball is a contact sport for which a participant’s liability is determined under a recklessness standard.”); see also Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417 , 212 Ill.Dec. 668 , 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1013 (1995) (holding contact-sports exception imposes “the duty to refrain from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct”); Restatement (Third) § 7 cmt. ⅞ at 78 (recognizing “some courts have modified the general duty of reasonable care for those engaging in competitive sports to a more limited duty to refrain from recklessly dangerous conduct”). 2010Id. at 81 (“We therefore hold that paintball is a contact sport for which a participant’s liability is determined under a recklessness standard.”); see also Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417 , 212 Ill.Dec. 668 , 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1013 (1995) (holding contact-sports exception imposes “the duty to refrain from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct”); Restatement (Third) § 7 cmt. ⅞ at 78 (recognizing “some courts have modified the general duty of reasonable care for those engaging in competitive sports to a more limited duty to refrain from recklessly dangerous conduct”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Torresgreen1 sentence2023See id. | 1 | 1 |
Leonard Ex Rel. Meyer v. Behrensgreen2 sentences2010Id. at 81 (“We therefore hold that paintball is a contact sport for which a participant’s liability is determined under a recklessness standard.”); see also Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417 , 212 Ill.Dec. 668 , 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1013 (1995) (holding contact-sports exception imposes “the duty to refrain from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct”); Restatement (Third) § 7 cmt. ⅞ at 78 (recognizing “some courts have modified the general duty of reasonable care for those engaging in competitive sports to a more limited duty to refrain from recklessly dangerous conduct”). 2010See Leonard, 601 N.W.2d at 80-81 (applying the recklessness standard to an informal game of paintball and rejecting formality and organization as threshold qualifications). | 1 | 1 |
Jaworski v. Kiernangreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399 , 696 A.2d 332, 337 (1997). 1999See, e.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399 , 696 A.2d 332, 337 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences1980The prior section on manslaughter did not define the crime and required us to look to the common law. § 690.10, The Code 1977 (“Any person guilty of the crime of manslaughter shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding eight years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.”); see State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1972). 1980The prior section on manslaughter did not define the crime and required us to look to the common law. § 690.10, The Code 1977 ("Any person guilty of the crime of manslaughter shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding eight years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars."); see State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morris v. Leaf
green
2 sentences1998The court analyzed our decision in Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995), and concluded that the recklessness standard adopted there applied to the case at bar. 1998The court analyzed our decision in Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995), and concluded that the recklessness standard adopted there applied to the case at bar. | 3 | 1998–1999 |
The Estate of Willys H. Fritz v. Bryson Henningar
green
2 sentences2023In so holding, the court of appeals relied on Bell v. Community Ambulance Service Agency, 579 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1998), and Estate of Fritz v. Hennigar, 19 F.4th 1067 (8th Cir. 2021), which the defendants maintain articulate a recklessness standard that conflicts with the court of appeals decision. 2023In so holding, the court of appeals relied on Bell v. Community Ambulance Service Agency, 579 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1998), and Estate of Fritz v. Hennigar, 19 F.4th 1067 (8th Cir. 2021), which the defendants maintain articulate a recklessness standard that conflicts with the court of appeals decision. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Bell v. COMMUN. AMBULANCE SERV. AGENCY
green
2 sentences2023In so holding, the court of appeals relied on Bell v. Community Ambulance Service Agency, 579 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1998), and Estate of Fritz v. Hennigar, 19 F.4th 1067 (8th Cir. 2021), which the defendants maintain articulate a recklessness standard that conflicts with the court of appeals decision. 2023In so holding, the court of appeals relied on Bell v. Community Ambulance Service Agency, 579 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1998), and Estate of Fritz v. Hennigar, 19 F.4th 1067 (8th Cir. 2021), which the defendants maintain articulate a recklessness standard that conflicts with the court of appeals decision. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Thompson v. Bohlken
green
1 sentence2023As these cases highlight, the recklessness standard requires that we look to find if the actor “has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501 , 504–05 (Iowa 1981) (emphasis added) (quoting William L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.