collateral estop-pel doctrine in Missouri

2010In Ashe , the Supreme Court stated that when the previous acquittal was based on a general verdict, the collateral estop-pel inquiry ‘requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 .

2010“Recently our Supreme Court has expressed the view that collateral estoppel forecloses consideration of an issue only when that issue was unambiguously decided in the earlier case.” Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , citing State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1987). “ ‘Since it is usually impossible to, determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.’ ” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting United State v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.1974).

2010“Recently our Supreme Court has expressed the view that collateral estoppel forecloses consideration of an issue only when that issue was unambiguously decided in the earlier case.” Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , citing State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1987). “ ‘Since it is usually impossible to, determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.’ ” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting United State v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.1974).

1989Judge Rendlen, speaking for our court in Booker , quoted from Tramunti in which the court noted, “Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estop-pel defense will be available to a defendant.” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting Tramunti, 500 F.2d at 1346 .

2010“Recently our Supreme Court has expressed the view that collateral estoppel forecloses consideration of an issue only when that issue was unambiguously decided in the earlier case.” Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , citing State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1987). “ ‘Since it is usually impossible to, determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.’ ” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting United State v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.1974).

2003Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. banc 1991)). 10 “The doctrine of collateral estop-pel, or issue preclusion, precludes the same parties or those in privity from relit-igating issues that were necessarily and unambiguously decided in a previous judgment.” Jeffrey, 104 S.W.3d at 430 .

1994The court in Moore stated: “[I]f estoppel is asserted against the corporation based on prior litigation by a shareholder, preclusion is only denied where the interests of third parties would be unfairly concluded by barring relit-igation.” Aetna Cas. and Sur. v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 875 F.2d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir.1989). “[T]he public policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, ‘as a bar to repetitious litigation, would support a finding of privity between a close corporation and its sole or controlling stockholder.’ ” In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1983). 841

1994The court in Moore stated: “[I]f estoppel is asserted against the corporation based on prior litigation by a shareholder, preclusion is only denied where the interests of third parties would be unfairly concluded by barring relit-igation.” Aetna Cas. and Sur. v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 875 F.2d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir.1989). “[T]he public policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, ‘as a bar to repetitious litigation, would support a finding of privity between a close corporation and its sole or controlling stockholder.’ ” In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1983). 841

1991Count III is based upon the allegation that such fraud existed and it has now been determined that fraud did not exist. *957 In Sunshine Realty v. Killian, 702 S.W.2d 95, 98-101 (Mo.App.1985), this court discussed the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, set forth the elements of that doctrine, and pointed out that it precludes the reexamination of previously litigated issues whether those issues are of fact or law.

1991This court also pointed out that the doctrine may properly come into play “on the basis of an adjudication of a portion of one proceeding when that portion has become final prior to the review of other portions of that proceeding.” Id. at 99 .

1991Oates “set out the ... principles for application of collateral es-toppel.” Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. banc 1984).

1988The ruling is not res judicata.”); Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863, 866-67 [2] (1986); State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash.App. 459 , 698 P.2d 1109, 1112 (1985) (if doctrine of collateral estoppel is to apply to result of first suppression hearing, a “valid and final judgment is necessary_”).

1988The ruling is not res judicata.”); Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863, 866-67 [2] (1986); State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash.App. 459 , 698 P.2d 1109, 1112 (1985) (if doctrine of collateral estoppel is to apply to result of first suppression hearing, a “valid and final judgment is necessary_”).

1988The ruling is not res judicata.”); Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863, 866-67 [2] (1986); State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash.App. 459 , 698 P.2d 1109, 1112 (1985) (if doctrine of collateral estoppel is to apply to result of first suppression hearing, a “valid and final judgment is necessary_”).

1988The ruling is not res judicata.”); Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477 , 509 A.2d 863, 866-67 [2] (1986); State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash.App. 459 , 698 P.2d 1109, 1112 (1985) (if doctrine of collateral estoppel is to apply to result of first suppression hearing, a “valid and final judgment is necessary_”).

1988See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1969) (suppression hearing final only when there has been adjudication in a separate proceeding); People v. Busija, 155 Ill.App.3d 741 , 108 Ill.Dec. 742 , 745, 509 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1986) (doctrine of collateral estop-pel applies only where there is a final judgment and a nonfinal action does not bar a subsequent action); State v. Schmieg, 344 N.W.2d 425, 427 [4] (Minn.App.1984) (“[a]t trial, the trial court is free to reconsider its suppression ruling ... if a proper motion or application is made.

1988See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1969) (suppression hearing final only when there has been adjudication in a separate proceeding); People v. Busija, 155 Ill.App.3d 741 , 108 Ill.Dec. 742 , 745, 509 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1986) (doctrine of collateral estop-pel applies only where there is a final judgment and a nonfinal action does not bar a subsequent action); State v. Schmieg, 344 N.W.2d 425, 427 [4] (Minn.App.1984) (“[a]t trial, the trial court is free to reconsider its suppression ruling ... if a proper motion or application is made.

1988See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1969) (suppression hearing final only when there has been adjudication in a separate proceeding); People v. Busija, 155 Ill.App.3d 741 , 108 Ill.Dec. 742 , 745, 509 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1986) (doctrine of collateral estop-pel applies only where there is a final judgment and a nonfinal action does not bar a subsequent action); State v. Schmieg, 344 N.W.2d 425, 427 [4] (Minn.App.1984) (“[a]t trial, the trial court is free to reconsider its suppression ruling ... if a proper motion or application is made.

1988See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1969) (suppression hearing final only when there has been adjudication in a separate proceeding); People v. Busija, 155 Ill.App.3d 741 , 108 Ill.Dec. 742 , 745, 509 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1986) (doctrine of collateral estop-pel applies only where there is a final judgment and a nonfinal action does not bar a subsequent action); State v. Schmieg, 344 N.W.2d 425, 427 [4] (Minn.App.1984) (“[a]t trial, the trial court is free to reconsider its suppression ruling ... if a proper motion or application is made.

1987Lewis v. Barnes Hospital, 685 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Mo.App. 1985).