Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnellgreen2 sentences2004Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex.1994). 2000Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801-802 (Tex.1994). | 2 | 2 |
Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green2 sentences1991Id. at 820-21 (footnote omitted). 1987Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebert, 130 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W.2d 242, 246 (1937); Steakley and Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 SW.L.J. 355, 356 (1974). | 2 | 2 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences2010We hold that it does not, as the Brazos County probation-revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does. 1 “The doctrine of collateral estop-pel ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). 2010We hold that it does not, as the Brazos County probation-revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does. 1 “The doctrine of collateral estop-pel ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). | 1 | 3 |
Reynolds v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Though the doctrine of collateral estoppel originated in common-law civil litigation, Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), it also applies in the criminal context because it is “embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2010We hold that it does not, as the Brazos County probation-revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does. 1 “The doctrine of collateral estop-pel ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). 2010We hold that it does not, as the Brazos County probation-revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does. 1 “The doctrine of collateral estop-pel ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Tarter v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen1 sentence2002See Tarter v. Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newtongreen1 sentence1992Neaves, 767 S.W.2d at 787 ; Groves, 807 S.W.2d at 776 ; See also Newton v. State, 780 S.W.2d 957 (holding that municipal judge’s finding of no probable cause to hold defendant pending the filing of D.W.I. charge does not defeat presumption of proper police conduct and did not preclude subsequent D.W.I. prosecution). | 1 | 1 |
Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebertgreen2 sentences1987Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebert, 130 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W.2d 242, 246 (1937); Steakley and Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 SW.L.J. 355, 356 (1974). 1987Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebert, 130 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W.2d 242, 246 (1937); Steakley and Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 SW.L.J. 355, 356 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Companygreen1 sentence1986The doctrine of collateral estop-pel, or estoppel by judgment is discussed in detail in Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Company, 468 S.W.2d 361, 362-63 (Tex.1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Tarver
green
2 sentences1999The Court then went on to apply the “corollary doctrine of collateral estop-pel.” Id. at 197-200 . 1992Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 200 . | 3 | 1991–1999 |
Ayre v. J.D. Bucky Allshouse, P.C.
green
1 sentence1999Bucky Allshouse, P.C., 942 S.W.2d at 27 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Neaves v. State
green
1 sentence1992Neaves, 767 S.W.2d at 787 ; Groves, 807 S.W.2d at 776 ; See also Newton v. State, 780 S.W.2d 957 (holding that municipal judge’s finding of no probable cause to hold defendant pending the filing of D.W.I. charge does not defeat presumption of proper police conduct and did not preclude subsequent D.W.I. prosecution). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Groves
green
1 sentence1992Neaves, 767 S.W.2d at 787 ; Groves, 807 S.W.2d at 776 ; See also Newton v. State, 780 S.W.2d 957 (holding that municipal judge’s finding of no probable cause to hold defendant pending the filing of D.W.I. charge does not defeat presumption of proper police conduct and did not preclude subsequent D.W.I. prosecution). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.