Wells motion in Mississippi

1997Wells correctly points out that the interview given by the prosecutor constituted a clear violation of Uniform Circuit and Chancery Court Rule 9.01, which prohibits any attorney, prior to the conclusion of a trial, from releasing information to the news media regarding the “existence or contents of any confession, admission or statement given by the defendant.” In Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317, 1323 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 , 97 S.Ct. 1125 , 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977), we stated that “such action by a state’s attorney is the most logical and certain way to secure a reversal in a c

1997Wells correctly points out that the interview given by the prosecutor constituted a clear violation of Uniform Circuit and Chancery Court Rule 9.01, which prohibits any attorney, prior to the conclusion of a trial, from releasing information to the news media regarding the "existence or contents of any confession, admission or statement given by the defendant." In Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317, 1323 (Miss. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 , 97 S.Ct. 1125 , 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977), we stated that "such action by a state's attorney is the most logical and certain way to secure a reversal in a

2020This Court has held that a “document is testimonial when it is created for the sole purpose of the State’s use as evidence against the defendant.” Vanwey v. State, 147 So. 3d 367, 369 (¶10) (Miss. 2014) (citing Grim v. State, 102 So. 3d 1073, 1078 (¶12) (Miss. 2012)).

2020This Court has held that a “document is testimonial when it is created for the sole purpose of the State’s use as evidence against the defendant.” Vanwey v. State, 147 So. 3d 367, 369 (¶10) (Miss. 2014) (citing Grim v. State, 102 So. 3d 1073, 1078 (¶12) (Miss. 2012)).

2017Wells’s claim that he was defending his mother also fails because, in Maye v. State, 49 So. 3d 1124, 1130 (¶13) (Miss. 2010), the Court held that the “mere presence” of a third party does not entitle a defendant to an instruction on self defense/defense of others.

2017Instead, “[t]he third party must be exposed to some real and apparent danger when the defendant acts.” Id. (emphasis added).

2015Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989). ¶42.

2015Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss.1989). 1Í42.

2011The trial court denied Wells’s motion, explaining that the motion was untimely, as no contemporaneous objection was made at the time when the Court could have addressed the situation, and second, Wells’s statement referenced by Officer Gray was “imprecise, unspecific, and certainly ambiguous.” The trial court also offered to direct the jury to disregard the statement, but defense counsel declined the offer. 9 See January v. State, 928 So.2d 211, 214 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (“Our supreme court has rejected the argument that a defendant is entitled to a mistrial when he refuses the court’s off

2011See McCune, 989 So.2d at 316 (¶ 11).

2011See Johnson v. State, 9 So.3d 413, 416 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

1997Life in prison without parole is not going to protect them one iota." Wells then moved for a mistrial, which motion the trial court overruled. *512 In the case of Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 433 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 , 109 S.Ct. 1767 , 104 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989), the prosecutor stated in closing arguments, "You know, as bad as I hate to say it, what about prisoner's rights?

1987In Barker v. State, 463 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Miss. 1985), the Court stated, In passing upon a motion for directed verdict or peremptory instruction, courts must assume that all evidence for the state is true and that all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence are true and, if from all the testimony there is enough in the record to support a verdict, the motion should be overruled.

1987In Dickerson v. State, 441 So.2d 536, 538 (Miss. 1983), the Court outlined the scope of its review for such an assignment of error: Once the jury has returned a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, we are not at liberty to direct that the defendant be discharged short of a conclusion on our part that on the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find *1278 beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty.