11 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Busik v. Levinegreen2 sentences2008See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364 , 307 A.2d 571 , appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (permitting a court to “decide issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted”). 2008See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364 , 307 A.2d 571 , appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (permitting a court to “decide issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted”). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Egangreen1 sentence2008See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364 , 307 A.2d 571 , appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (permitting a court to “decide issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted”). | 1 | 1 |
Outpost Development Corp. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2008See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364 , 307 A.2d 571 , appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (permitting a court to “decide issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted”). | 1 | 1 |
Levine v. Busickgreen1 sentence2008See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364 , 307 A.2d 571 , appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (permitting a court to “decide issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted”). | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. Township of Voorheesgreen2 sentences2000See Simon v. Voorheex Tp., 289 N.J.Super. 116 , 672 A.2d 1292 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A.2d 714 (1996) (stating that a settlement of a tax appeal “cannot bind the holders of a tax sale certificate or deprive them of their statutory rights.” Id. at 124, 672 A.2d 1292 .) Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that, in defining a payment from one specific source — the purchaser of a tax sale certificate — as inadequate to constitute payment of taxes for tax appeal purposes, the Tax Sale Provisions prohibit an appeal under circumstances where the tax payment requirements 2000See Simon v. Voorheex Tp., 289 N.J.Super. 116 , 672 A.2d 1292 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A.2d 714 (1996) (stating that a settlement of a tax appeal “cannot bind the holders of a tax sale certificate or deprive them of their statutory rights.” Id. at 124, 672 A.2d 1292 .) Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that, in defining a payment from one specific source — the purchaser of a tax sale certificate — as inadequate to constitute payment of taxes for tax appeal purposes, the Tax Sale Provisions prohibit an appeal under circumstances where the tax payment requirements | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dugangreen1 sentence2000See Simon v. Voorheex Tp., 289 N.J.Super. 116 , 672 A.2d 1292 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A.2d 714 (1996) (stating that a settlement of a tax appeal “cannot bind the holders of a tax sale certificate or deprive them of their statutory rights.” Id. at 124, 672 A.2d 1292 .) Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that, in defining a payment from one specific source — the purchaser of a tax sale certificate — as inadequate to constitute payment of taxes for tax appeal purposes, the Tax Sale Provisions prohibit an appeal under circumstances where the tax payment requirements | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davidsongreen2 sentences1995A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413 [ 177 A. 87 ] (Sup.Ct. 1935), but the court's power to quash is not to be exercised except on " the clearest and plainest ground, " State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 328 [ 184 A. 330 ] (Sup.Ct. 1936), and an indictment should stand unless it is " palpably defective, " State v. Russo, 6 N.J. 1995A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413 [ 177 A. 87 ] (Sup.Ct. 1935), but the court's power to quash is not to be exercised except on " the clearest and plainest ground, " State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 328 [ 184 A. 330 ] (Sup.Ct. 1936), and an indictment should stand unless it is " palpably defective, " State v. Russo, 6 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Russogreen1 sentence1995A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413 [ 177 A. 87 ] (Sup.Ct. 1935), but the court's power to quash is not to be exercised except on " the clearest and plainest ground, " State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 328 [ 184 A. 330 ] (Sup.Ct. 1936), and an indictment should stand unless it is " palpably defective, " State v. Russo, 6 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
General Trading Co. v. Taxation Div. Director
green
2 sentences2005Our Supreme Court’s decision in General Trading Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 83 N.J. 122 , 416 A.2d 37 (1980) does not affect the preceding analysis and conclusions. 2005Our Supreme Court’s decision in General Trading Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 83 N.J. 122 , 416 A.2d 37 (1980) does not affect the preceding analysis and conclusions. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Paper Products Co. v. Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences2004Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa.Super. 234 , 130 A.2d 219 (1957), aff'd 391 Pa. 87 , 137 A.2d 253 (1958) (stating that the Pennsylvania statute exempting wrapping supplies from sales and use tax (containing language very similar to N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.15) was based on a preceding administrative regulation that sales of wrapping supplies essential to the delivery of a product by the purchaser were exempt from tax as sales for the purpose of resale.) 3 Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and that defendant is entitled to summary j 2004Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa.Super. 234 , 130 A.2d 219 (1957), aff'd 391 Pa. 87 , 137 A.2d 253 (1958) (stating that the Pennsylvania statute exempting wrapping supplies from sales and use tax (containing language very similar to N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.15) was based on a preceding administrative regulation that sales of wrapping supplies essential to the delivery of a product by the purchaser were exempt from tax as sales for the purpose of resale.) 3 Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and that defendant is entitled to summary j | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Paper Products Co. v. Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences2004Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa.Super. 234 , 130 A.2d 219 (1957), aff'd 391 Pa. 87 , 137 A.2d 253 (1958) (stating that the Pennsylvania statute exempting wrapping supplies from sales and use tax (containing language very similar to N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.15) was based on a preceding administrative regulation that sales of wrapping supplies essential to the delivery of a product by the purchaser were exempt from tax as sales for the purpose of resale.) 3 Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and that defendant is entitled to summary j 2004Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa.Super. 234 , 130 A.2d 219 (1957), aff'd 391 Pa. 87 , 137 A.2d 253 (1958) (stating that the Pennsylvania statute exempting wrapping supplies from sales and use tax (containing language very similar to N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.15) was based on a preceding administrative regulation that sales of wrapping supplies essential to the delivery of a product by the purchaser were exempt from tax as sales for the purpose of resale.) 3 Based on the preceding analysis, I conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and that defendant is entitled to summary j | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2002Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995) (citation omitted). 2002Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sutkowski v. Director, Division of Taxation
green
2 sentences2000One court described this publication as neither an authoritative pronouncement nor having the binding effect of a statute or regulation, Sutkowski v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 312 N.J.Super. 465, 480 , 712 A.2d 229 (App.Div.1998), but another' court characterized State Tax News as “an official publication” which could provide grounds for estoppel or other equitable relief against the Director. 2000One court described this publication as neither an authoritative pronouncement nor having the binding effect of a statute or regulation, Sutkowski v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 312 N.J.Super. 465, 480 , 712 A.2d 229 (App.Div.1998), but another' court characterized State Tax News as “an official publication” which could provide grounds for estoppel or other equitable relief against the Director. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mariner's Landing, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation
green
2 sentences1999Sales Tax The assessment by defendant for Sales Tax was based upon the provisions of N.J.S.A 54:32B-3(e)(1) under which a tax of six percent is imposed upon “[a]ny admission charge, where such admission charge is in excess of $0.75 to or for the use of any place of amusement in the State ...” An “admission charge” is defined in N.J.S.A. 54:32B-2(o) as “[t]he amount paid for admission, including any service charge and any charge for entertainment or amusement or for the use of facilities therefor.” A “place of amusement” is defined in N.J.S.A. 54:32B-2(t) as “[a]ny place where any facilities fo 1999Sales Tax The assessment by defendant for Sales Tax was based upon the provisions of N.J.S.A 54:32B-3(e)(1) under which a tax of six percent is imposed upon “[a]ny admission charge, where such admission charge is in excess of $0.75 to or for the use of any place of amusement in the State ...” An “admission charge” is defined in N.J.S.A. 54:32B-2(o) as “[t]he amount paid for admission, including any service charge and any charge for entertainment or amusement or for the use of facilities therefor.” A “place of amusement” is defined in N.J.S.A. 54:32B-2(t) as “[a]ny place where any facilities fo | 1 | 1999–1999 |
AMN, Inc. v. Township of South Brunswick Rent Leveling Board
green
2 sentences1996Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 525 , 461 A.2d 1138 (1983) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).] The enactment of Chapter 75 does not, based on the preceding analysis, require a change in my conclusion that Chapters 36 and 45, when properly interpreted, effected the amendment and not the repeal of N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.3. 1996Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 525 , 461 A.2d 1138 (1983) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).] The enactment of Chapter 75 does not, based on the preceding analysis, require a change in my conclusion that Chapters 36 and 45, when properly interpreted, effected the amendment and not the repeal of N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.3. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Then
green
2 sentences1995A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413 [ 177 A. 87 ] (Sup.Ct. 1935), but the court's power to quash is not to be exercised except on " the clearest and plainest ground, " State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 328 [ 184 A. 330 ] (Sup.Ct. 1936), and an indictment should stand unless it is " palpably defective, " State v. Russo, 6 N.J. 1995A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413 [ 177 A. 87 ] (Sup.Ct. 1935), but the court's power to quash is not to be exercised except on " the clearest and plainest ground, " State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 328 [ 184 A. 330 ] (Sup.Ct. 1936), and an indictment should stand unless it is " palpably defective, " State v. Russo, 6 N.J. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In Re Quinlan
green
2 sentences1987To some extent, the preceding analysis is reminiscent of the statement in Quinlan, supra, 70 N.J. at 41 , that the State’s interest in preserving life weakens “as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.” For Nancy Ellen Jobes, a best-interests analysis supports the conclusion that the life-sustaining treatment being administered to her is merely forestalling her inevitable death. 1987To some extent, the preceding analysis is reminiscent of the statement in Quinlan, supra, 70 N.J. at 41 , that the State’s interest in preserving life weakens “as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.” For Nancy Ellen Jobes, a best-interests analysis supports the conclusion that the life-sustaining treatment being administered to her is merely forestalling her inevitable death. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rutgers v. Kingsland
neutral
1 sentence1962As our former Court of Chancery pointed out in the very early case of Rutgers v. Kingsland, 7 N.J. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.