preceding rule in Kansas

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

1981Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768 , 443 P.2d 314 (1968); In re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612 , 215 P.2d 203 (1950); International Mortgage Trust Co. v. Henry, 139 Kan. 154 , 30 P.2d 311 (1934); Barrett v. Montgomery County, 109 Kan. 685 , 201 Pac. 1098 (1921); Douglas County v. Woodward, 73 Kan. 238 , 84 Pac. 1028 (1906).

2020But this court held that the preceding factors did not provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation. 23 Kan.

2000Without expressly saying so, the B.M.W. court suggests that the payment of 23 percent or more of court-ordered child support is sufficient to rebut the preceding presumption: “Based on C.RD., the district court’s finding that the natural father provided a substantial amount of court-ordered support would be supported by the record.” 268 Kan. at 883-84 .

1994"The general rule of statutory construction just discussed is modified, however, where the statutory change is merely procedural or remedial in nature and does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties. [Citations omitted.] The rule is stated in Jones v. Garrett , 192 Kan. 109 , 386 P.2d 194 (1963), as follows: "`It is the law of this state that a statute which merely changes a remedy is not invalid, as there are no vested rights in any particular remedy.

1994"The general rule of statutory construction just discussed is modified, however, where the statutory change is merely procedural or remedial in nature and does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties. [Citations omitted.] The rule is stated in Jones v. Garrett , 192 Kan. 109 , 386 P.2d 194 (1963), as follows: "`It is the law of this state that a statute which merely changes a remedy is not invalid, as there are no vested rights in any particular remedy.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1975(Smith v. Gore, 23 Kan. 488 ; Pefly v. Reynolds, Sheriff, 115 Kan. 105 , 222 Pac. 121 ; Independence Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sellars, 149 Kan. 652 , 88 P. 2d 1059 ; and State Department of Social Welfare v. Carlson, 176 Kan. 299 , 270 P. 2d 200 .) Most other jurisdictions agree with the preceding rule.

1920(Rose v. Lanyon, 68 Kan. 126 , 74 Pac. 625 .) It is- insisted that the clause upon which the plaintiffs rely does not, by any clear, express language, cut down the one-year period granted by the preceding clause; that if the word “unavoidably” had not been written in the lease, we would have the ordinary oil and gas lease, and by the payment of $15 monthly rental in advance the lessees could postpone drilling if they desired, and still hold the lease for the full period of one year.

1920(Rose v. Lanyon, 68 Kan. 126 , 74 Pac. 625 .) It is- insisted that the clause upon which the plaintiffs rely does not, by any clear, express language, cut down the one-year period granted by the preceding clause; that if the word “unavoidably” had not been written in the lease, we would have the ordinary oil and gas lease, and by the payment of $15 monthly rental in advance the lessees could postpone drilling if they desired, and still hold the lease for the full period of one year.

1908If, after conveying the property, the grantor undertook to keep a string upon the land and retain the power to mortgage, control and convey it, we would, as was said in Durand v. Higgins, 67 Kan. 110, 72 Pac. 567 , “be bound to disregard that clause and hold that it did not serve to defeat the conveyance of the fee.” (Page 125.) However, under a fair interpretation of the clause it may be given effect and made to accord with the preceding clause importing the conveyance of a present interest.

1908If, after conveying the property, the grantor undertook to keep a string upon the land and retain the power to mortgage, control and convey it, we would, as was said in Durand v. Higgins, 67 Kan. 110, 72 Pac. 567 , “be bound to disregard that clause and hold that it did not serve to defeat the conveyance of the fee.” (Page 125.) However, under a fair interpretation of the clause it may be given effect and made to accord with the preceding clause importing the conveyance of a present interest.