preceding analysis in California

2023Lexis 165185, at p. *9 [noting no controlling authority addressing constitutional validity of geofence warrants].) Furthermore, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, “the permissibility of geofence warrants is a complex topic, requiring a detailed, nuanced understanding and application of Fourth Amendment principles.” (Chatrie, at p. 938.) Meza and Meneses argue the good faith exception should not apply here because, instead of following the three steps described in the warrant, “Haas and Bailey disregarded the express terms set forth in the warrant, and essentially fashioned their own searc

2023Lexis 165185, at p. *9 [noting no controlling authority addressing constitutional validity of geofence warrants].) Furthermore, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, “the permissibility of geofence warrants is a complex topic, requiring a detailed, nuanced understanding and application of Fourth Amendment principles.” (Chatrie, at p. 938.) Meza and Meneses argue the good faith exception should not apply here because, instead of following the three steps described in the warrant, “Haas and Bailey disregarded the express terms set forth in the warrant, and essentially fashioned their own searc

2023Lexis 165185, at p. *9 [noting no controlling authority addressing constitutional validity of geofence warrants].) Furthermore, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, “the permissibility of geofence warrants is a complex topic, requiring a detailed, nuanced understanding and application of Fourth Amendment principles.” (Chatrie, at p. 938.) Meza and Meneses argue the good faith exception should not apply here because, instead of following the three steps described in the warrant, “Haas and Bailey disregarded the express terms set forth in the warrant, and essentially fashioned their own searc

2023Lexis 165185, at p. *9 [noting no controlling authority addressing constitutional validity of geofence warrants].) Furthermore, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, “the permissibility of geofence warrants is a complex topic, requiring a detailed, nuanced understanding and application of Fourth Amendment principles.” (Chatrie, at p. 938.) Meza and Meneses argue the good faith exception should not apply here because, instead of following the three steps described in the warrant, “Haas and Bailey disregarded the express terms set forth in the warrant, and essentially fashioned their own searc

1956(McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243, 246 [ 124 P. 1016 , Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 303 ] ; Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 455 [ 95 P. 882 , 17 L.R.A.N.S. 1018 ]; Estate of Hill, supra, at p. 63 [ 167 Cal. 59 ( 138 P. 690 )] ; Lee v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., 177 Cal. 656, 659 [ 171 P. 677 ]; Steele v. Scott, 192 Cal. 521, 525 [ 221 P. 342 ].) The preceding principle of law which is uniformly declared in the foregoing cases and in many others, is concisely stated in McKay v. Gesf.ord, supra, as follows: “ ‘It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate finding . . . which is

1956(McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243, 246 [ 124 P. 1016 , Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 303 ] ; Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 455 [ 95 P. 882 , 17 L.R.A.N.S. 1018 ]; Estate of Hill, supra, at p. 63 [ 167 Cal. 59 ( 138 P. 690 )] ; Lee v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., 177 Cal. 656, 659 [ 171 P. 677 ]; Steele v. Scott, 192 Cal. 521, 525 [ 221 P. 342 ].) The preceding principle of law which is uniformly declared in the foregoing cases and in many others, is concisely stated in McKay v. Gesf.ord, supra, as follows: “ ‘It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate finding . . . which is

1956(McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243, 246 [ 124 P. 1016 , Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 303 ] ; Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 455 [ 95 P. 882 , 17 L.R.A.N.S. 1018 ]; Estate of Hill, supra, at p. 63 [ 167 Cal. 59 ( 138 P. 690 )] ; Lee v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., 177 Cal. 656, 659 [ 171 P. 677 ]; Steele v. Scott, 192 Cal. 521, 525 [ 221 P. 342 ].) The preceding principle of law which is uniformly declared in the foregoing cases and in many others, is concisely stated in McKay v. Gesf.ord, supra, as follows: “ ‘It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate finding . . . which is

1956(McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243, 246 [ 124 P. 1016 , Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 303 ] ; Corea v. Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 455 [ 95 P. 882 , 17 L.R.A.N.S. 1018 ]; Estate of Hill, supra, at p. 63 [ 167 Cal. 59 ( 138 P. 690 )] ; Lee v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., 177 Cal. 656, 659 [ 171 P. 677 ]; Steele v. Scott, 192 Cal. 521, 525 [ 221 P. 342 ].) The preceding principle of law which is uniformly declared in the foregoing cases and in many others, is concisely stated in McKay v. Gesf.ord, supra, as follows: “ ‘It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate finding . . . which is

2021(See Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, 503 [general rules of contract interpretation “disfavor constructions of contractual provisions that would render other provisions surplusage”].) We must give effect to both attorney fee clauses.

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2016Our precedents establish that the abuse of discretion test applies in reviewing a trial court’s determination that the hearsay statement, as Evidence Code section 1230 requires, “ ‘so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 535 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ]; see People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ].) Citing People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 1

2015Of course, a provision’s title “is never allowed to enlarge or control the language in the body of the [provision].” (Hagar v. Sup. of Yolo Co. (1874) 47 Cal. 222, 232 ; see DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ] [“Title or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.”].) Consistent with the preceding analysis, we disapprove Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 129 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], insofar as it suggests that a proposed pro

2015Of course, a provision’s title “is never allowed to enlarge or control the language in the body of the [provision].” (Hagar v. Sup. of Yolo Co. (1874) 47 Cal. 222, 232 ; see DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ] [“Title or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.”].) Consistent with the preceding analysis, we disapprove Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 129 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], insofar as it suggests that a proposed pro

2015Of course, a provision’s title “is never allowed to enlarge or control the language in the body of the [provision].” (Hagar v. Sup. of Yolo Co. (1874) 47 Cal. 222, 232 ; see DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ] [“Title or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.”].) Consistent with the preceding analysis, we disapprove Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 129 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], insofar as it suggests that a proposed pro

2015Of course, a provision’s title “is never allowed to enlarge or control the language in the body of the [provision].” (Hagar v. Sup. of Yolo Co. (1874) 47 Cal. 222, 232 ; see DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ] [“Title or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.”].) Consistent with the preceding analysis, we disapprove Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 129 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], insofar as it suggests that a proposed pro

2015Specifically, the court weighs factors such as the ‘nature, relevance, and possible remoteness [of the evidence], the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses . . . .’ [Citation.].” (People v. Merr

2013(Williams Communications v. City of Riverside (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 642, 651-654 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 ].) The preceding analysis indicates that the PUC’s interpretation of sections 233, 234, and 7901 was correct, even disregarding any deference owed to the commission. 8 The plain language of the pertinent statutory provisions leads to only one reasonable conclusion: The definition of “telephone corporations” for purposes of section 7901 is not limited to those entities utilizing technology invented at the time section 7901 or its prior iterations in the Civil Code were enacted.

2013(Williams Communications v. City of Riverside (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 642, 651-654 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 ].) The preceding analysis indicates that the PUC’s interpretation of sections 233, 234, and 7901 was correct, even disregarding any deference owed to the commission. 8 The plain language of the pertinent statutory provisions leads to only one reasonable conclusion: The definition of “telephone corporations” for purposes of section 7901 is not limited to those entities utilizing technology invented at the time section 7901 or its prior iterations in the Civil Code were enacted.

2013(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 (Kipp).) We review the trial (footnote continued from previous page) ―Within the meaning of the preceding instruction, such other crime purportedly committed by defendant must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

2011If the statements are consistent, the court’s ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 63 , 231 P.3d 416 ].) The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 8.

2011If the statements are consistent, the court’s ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 63 , 231 P.3d 416 ].) The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 8.

2011VI, § 11), can or should decide in the first instance an issue that is not moot and is within the original jurisdiction of the superior court (see id., § 10), like the issues raised in the CEQA actions at issue here. “[T]he ordinary and widely accepted meaning of the term ‘appellate jurisdiction’ is simply the power of a reviewing court to correct error in a trial court proceeding.” (Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 666 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 , 995 P.2d 191 ].) “An appeal is not a trial but simply a method given litigants of rectifying errors, legal or factual, that may have occurred

2011VI, § 11), can or should decide in the first instance an issue that is not moot and is within the original jurisdiction of the superior court (see id., § 10), like the issues raised in the CEQA actions at issue here. “[T]he ordinary and widely accepted meaning of the term ‘appellate jurisdiction’ is simply the power of a reviewing court to correct error in a trial court proceeding.” (Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 666 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 , 995 P.2d 191 ].) “An appeal is not a trial but simply a method given litigants of rectifying errors, legal or factual, that may have occurred

2010Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) The preceding analysis demonstrates that the Legislature's clear intent was to use the term "section" to refer to the entirety of section 1026.5.

2010Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) The preceding analysis demonstrates that the Legislature's clear intent was to use the term "section" to refer to the entirety of section 1026.5.

2008You are further instructed that such evidence is to be included within the meaning of factor (a), the circumstances of the offenses, in the preceding instruction (CALJIC No. 8.85) and is not a separate factor in aggravation.’ ” (People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 358.)

2005(People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 ].) Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant’s constitutional claim was preserved, it lacks merit, as explained in the text above. 6 As with the preceding claim, we assume without deciding that the constitutional claim was preserved by defendant’s efforts to meet the prosecutor’s evidentiary objections, despite *84 defendant’s failure to have claimed, in the trial court, that constit

2005(People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 ].) Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant’s constitutional claim was preserved, it lacks merit, as explained in the text above. 6 As with the preceding claim, we assume without deciding that the constitutional claim was preserved by defendant’s efforts to meet the prosecutor’s evidentiary objections, despite *84 defendant’s failure to have claimed, in the trial court, that constit