preceding standard in Pennsylvania

2015Finally, we note the “[i]n a case which presents the possibility of a change in custody, it is incumbent on the court to fully discuss the possible effect on the child of the proposed transfer of custody.” E.A.L. v. L.J.W., 448 Pa.Super. 573 , 662 A.2d 1109, 1117 (1995) (quotation and citation omitted).

2015Finally, we note the “[i]n a case which presents the possibility of a change in custody, it is incumbent on the court to fully discuss the possible effect on the child of the proposed transfer of custody.” E.A.L. v. L.J.W., 662 A.2d 1109, 1117 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quotation and citation omitted).

1983We note that the preceding standard is equivalent to that used to rule on a sufficiency of the evidence argument. 7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrison, 289 Pa.Super. 126 , 432 A.2d 1083 (1981).

1983We note that the preceding standard is equivalent to that used to rule on a sufficiency of the evidence argument. 7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrison, 289 Pa.Super. 126 , 432 A.2d 1083 (1981).

2025See Township of Lower Milford, 799 A.2d at 970-71 ; Borough of Latrobe v. Pohland, 702 A.2d 1089, 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (“The [enforcement notices] were adequate and sufficient to inform the [landowners] that the [b]orough intended to stop all ‘business activity’ on their premises.”).7 In each instance, whether finding notice valid or invalid, these cases refrained from engaging in more than a face-value analysis of whether the municipality’s enforcement notice informed the landowner as to the precise authority being relied on by the municipality (including a specific citation to the municip

2025See Township of Lower Milford, 799 A.2d at 970-71 ; Borough of Latrobe v. Pohland, 702 A.2d 1089, 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (“The [enforcement notices] were adequate and sufficient to inform the [landowners] that the [b]orough intended to stop all ‘business activity’ on their premises.”).7 In each instance, whether finding notice valid or invalid, these cases refrained from engaging in more than a face-value analysis of whether the municipality’s enforcement notice informed the landowner as to the precise authority being relied on by the municipality (including a specific citation to the municip

2024See Estate of Maddi, supra. In addition to the preceding analysis, the court noted that Appellant did not present testimony from a handwriting expert.

2024See Turner, 544 A.2d at 928 .

2015Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa.Super.2008), quoting In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504 , 445 A.2d 1243, 1249 (1982): The record herein demonstrates that all four of the preceding factors have been met such that shared legal and physical custody of Child is in his best interest.

2015Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa.Super.2008), quoting In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504 , 445 A.2d 1243, 1249 (1982): The record herein demonstrates that all four of the preceding factors have been met such that shared legal and physical custody of Child is in his best interest.

2015Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa.Super.2008), quoting In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504 , 445 A.2d 1243, 1249 (1982): The record herein demonstrates that all four of the preceding factors have been met such that shared legal and physical custody of Child is in his best interest.

2013The Court, applying the rules of statutory construction, including the last antecedent rule, held that “organized for profit” was limited to “legal entity”: For one, when interpreting the “organized for profit” qualifier in context, it is notable that the limitation appears at the end of the definition, and thus, under the last-antecedent principle of statutory construction as applied in other cases, see, e.g., McKinley v. Penn., DOT, 564 Pa. 565 , 577 n. 10, 769 A.2d 1153 , 1160 n. 10 (2001), it only to applies to the final item, “any legal entity.” See generally Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. T

2009Skarica that claimed the police violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 431. 1 We reverse. ¶ 2 “[W]here the Commonwealth is appealing the adverse decision of a suppression court, a reviewing court must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontra-dicted.” Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 216 , 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983). ¶ 3 Herein, under the preceding standard, it is undisputed that a warrant had been issued by Magisterial District Judge Antos for Appellee’s failure to respond to a traf

2009Skarica that claimed the police violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 431. 1 We reverse. ¶ 2 “[W]here the Commonwealth is appealing the adverse decision of a suppression court, a reviewing court must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontra-dicted.” Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 216 , 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983). ¶ 3 Herein, under the preceding standard, it is undisputed that a warrant had been issued by Magisterial District Judge Antos for Appellee’s failure to respond to a traf

2008We agree with the Board and Employer that the two clauses in paragraph 18(f) can be read independently and that the second clause is not dependent on the preceding clause certifying that Claimant was not suffering from a life-threatening or terminal illness. 9 In applying common principles of contract interpretation, we note that “[t]he fundamental rule in construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.” Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Mount Pleasant Township, 727 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999).

2008Generally, the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained within the contract itself, and when the words are “clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be found only in the express language of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 425 Pa.Super. 204 , 624 A.2d 638, 642 (1993)).

2008Generally, the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained within the contract itself, and when the words are “clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be found only in the express language of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 425 Pa.Super. 204 , 624 A.2d 638, 642 (1993)).

2008Generally, the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained within the contract itself, and when the words are “clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be found only in the express language of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 425 Pa.Super. 204 , 624 A.2d 638, 642 (1993)).

2007Kelaco v. Davis & McKean, 743 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa.Super.1999). ¶2 Keeping the preceding standard in mind, the record discloses that in 1982, at the age of eleven, Appellant became acquainted with Father Brzyski while a parishioner at St.

1999The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency, except that the agency shall not be liable for damages on account of any injury sustained by a person intentionally trespassing on real property in the possession of the local agency ....” Id. (3) Based on the preceding standard the defendant has also moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant must be dismissed because the defendant is immune from liability within the meaning of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act discussed supra. (4) In 1997, the Supreme Court

1999“The [Grieff] court noted that section 8542(b)(3) expressly states that liability may arise from negligence in the ‘care, custody or control of real property Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 696 A.2d 909, 912 (Pa. Commw. 1997). (6) Thus, in view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expansion of the real property exception to governmental immunity to include negligence committed by those in the care, custody and control of governmental real property the defendant’s right to summary judgment is not clear and free from doubt and thus, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as matter of law and i

1991Added to the preceding standard is the “duty of a reviewing court ... to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding] that probable cause existed.’ ” Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 418-19 , 555 A.2d 1254, 1261 (1989).

1991Added to the preceding standard is the “duty of a reviewing court ... to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding] that probable cause existed.’ ” Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 418-19 , 555 A.2d 1254, 1261 (1989).

1991Accord Commonwealth v. Karns, 389 Pa.Super. 58 , 566 A.2d 615, 616 (1989).

1991Accord Commonwealth v. Karns, 389 Pa.Super. 58 , 566 A.2d 615, 616 (1989).

1984July 1, 1980; 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6); see also Bickley v. Bickley, 301 Pa.Super. 396 , 447 A.2d 1025 (1982).

1984July 1, 1980; 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6); see also Bickley v. Bickley, 301 Pa.Super. 396 , 447 A.2d 1025 (1982).

1981Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).” (Footnote omitted) Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 228 , 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975). *203 Under the preceding standard, an order denying a motion to suppress has been interpreted to be interlocutory—the rationale being that such a ruling is merely a step in the criminal process and any rights involved therein are adequately protected in subsequent trial proceedings.

1981Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).” (Footnote omitted) Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 228 , 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975). *203 Under the preceding standard, an order denying a motion to suppress has been interpreted to be interlocutory—the rationale being that such a ruling is merely a step in the criminal process and any rights involved therein are adequately protected in subsequent trial proceedings.