first three Barker factors in New Mexico

2022See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 (“[U]nless the first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendant[] must demonstrate actual prejudice.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 60 (“[T]he prejudice factor weighs heavily against [the d]efendant and is outcome determinative.”).

2020See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 40 (holding that because “[the d]efendant failed to demonstrate particularized prejudice” and “the other factors do not weigh heavily in [the d]efendant’s favor[,]” the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated); State v. Hayes, 2009-NMCA-008, ¶ 16 , 145 N.M. 446 , 200 P.3d 99 (holding that even though the first three Barker factors weigh against the state, “the absence of prejudice to [the d]efendant fulfills the [s]tate’s burden to overcome the presumption of prejudice that arises from the delay in this case”).

2022See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 33 (explaining that a defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial need not be “impressive or aggressive” in order to be sufficient); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 35 , 148 N.M. 253 , 233 P.3d 782 (stating that a defendant’s assertion of speedy trial rights made in pro forma demands weighs only slightly in the defendant’s favor). {6} Because none of the first three Barker factors weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, the issue of prejudice is central to our analysis.

2022See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 33 (explaining that a defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial need not be “impressive or aggressive” in order to be sufficient); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 35 , 148 N.M. 253 , 233 P.3d 782 (stating that a defendant’s assertion of speedy trial rights made in pro forma demands weighs only slightly in the defendant’s favor). {6} Because none of the first three Barker factors weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, the issue of prejudice is central to our analysis.

2022See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 33 (explaining that a defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial need not be “impressive or aggressive” in order to be sufficient); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 35 , 148 N.M. 253 , 233 P.3d 782 (stating that a defendant’s assertion of speedy trial rights made in pro forma demands weighs only slightly in the defendant’s favor). {6} Because none of the first three Barker factors weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor, the issue of prejudice is central to our analysis.

2022See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 (“[U]nless the first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendant[] must demonstrate actual prejudice.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 60 (“[T]he prejudice factor weighs heavily against [the d]efendant and is outcome determinative.”).

2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors

2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors

2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors

2021See, e.g., State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 , 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”); Serros, 2016- NMSC-008, ¶ 87; Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 37 (“Because the first three Barker factors weigh so heavily in Defendant’s favor, we presume undue prejudice and no further showing of prejudice is required.”).

2021See, e.g., State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 , 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”); Serros, 2016- NMSC-008, ¶ 87; Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 37 (“Because the first three Barker factors weigh so heavily in Defendant’s favor, we presume undue prejudice and no further showing of prejudice is required.”).

2019See State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-074, ¶ 17 , 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (stating that a delay of six months beyond the presumptive period weighed only slightly against the state); State v. Brown, 2003-NMCA-110, ¶ 16 , 134 N.M. 356 , 76 P.3d 1113 (holding that a delay of three months beyond the presumptive minimum was weighed in the defendant’s favor, although not heavily). {15} The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that where the first three Barker factors do not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor, the defendant will be required to demonstrate actual prejudice.

2019See State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-074, ¶ 17 , 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (stating that a delay of six months beyond the presumptive period weighed only slightly against the state); State v. Brown, 2003-NMCA-110, ¶ 16 , 134 N.M. 356 , 76 P.3d 1113 (holding that a delay of three months beyond the presumptive minimum was weighed in the defendant’s favor, although not heavily). {15} The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that where the first three Barker factors do not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor, the defendant will be required to demonstrate actual prejudice.

2016The first three Barker factors all weigh slightly in Defendant’s favor, but “only where the length of delay and the reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [a] defendant’s favor and [the] defendant has asserted his right and not acquiesced to the delay [does] the defendant need not show [particularized] prejudice in order to prevail on a speedy trial claim.” Samora, 2013-NMSC-038, ¶ 27 (fourth alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2009This presumed prejudice, although insufficient to carry a speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Barker factors is nonetheless part of the mix of relevant facts in the ultimate balancing analysis” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he settled rule in this circuit is that unless the first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendants must demonstrate actual prejudice.”); Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375 , 379 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (“When the first three factors of

2000See Perez, 793 F.2d at 256 (noting that necessity of showing substantial prejudice dominates the four-part balancing test in speedy sentencing ease). {21} We further note that even assuming the first three factors weigh in Defendant’s favor, the first two factors — the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay — weigh only slightly in his favor.