geico motion in New York

2024It was not made after the time for filing an appeal from a final judgment had expired ( cf. Matter of Huie [Furman] , 20 NY2d 568 [1967]; [*8]Glicksman v Board of Educ./Cent.

2024It was not made after the time for filing an appeal from a final judgment had expired ( cf. Matter of Huie [Furman] , 20 NY2d 568 [1967]; [*8]Glicksman v Board of Educ./Cent.

2024II Corp. , 137 AD3d 767, 770 ).

2024The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Geico's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action for punitive damages against it because "no separate cause of action for punitive damages lies for pleading purposes" ( Crown Fire Supply Co., Inc. v Cronin , 306 AD2d 430, 431 ; see Podesta v Assumable Homes Dev.

2024The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Geico's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action for punitive damages against it because "no separate cause of action for punitive damages lies for pleading purposes" ( Crown Fire Supply Co., Inc. v Cronin , 306 AD2d 430, 431 ; see Podesta v Assumable Homes Dev.

2019Moreover, while Flores and GEICO claim prejudice on the ground that Flores's ex-husband has left the country, Global Liberty has made it clear that it would consent to having him testify by electronic means ( cf. Yu Hui Chen v Chen Li Zhi , 109 AD3d 815 [2d Dept 2013]), a concession not addressed by Flores and GEICO or the court below.

2016The Second Department reversed and granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment declaring GEICO is not required to reimburse Avanguard for OBS facility fees ( 127 AD3d 60 [2d Dept 2015]).

2016Subsequently the Second Department dismissed GEICO’s appeal from the order denying the preliminary injunction as “aca demic” ( 125 AD3d 803 , 803 [2d Dept 2015]).

2009The arbitrator denied GEICO’s claim based on the case of Riley v County of Broome ( 95 NY2d 455 [2000]); implicit in the arbitrator’s decision was his legal conclusion that the applicable standard of care for defendants in this case was reckless disregard for the safety of others or gross negligence.

2005Accordingly, upon renewal, GEICO’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action should have been denied (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Tate v Freeport Union School Dist., 7 AD3d 695 [2004]; Corcoran v Babylon Tr., 295 AD2d 392 [2002]; Roth v Barreto, 289 AD2d 557 [2001]).

2005Accordingly, upon renewal, GEICO’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action should have been denied (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Tate v Freeport Union School Dist., 7 AD3d 695 [2004]; Corcoran v Babylon Tr., 295 AD2d 392 [2002]; Roth v Barreto, 289 AD2d 557 [2001]).

2005Accordingly, upon renewal, GEICO’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action should have been denied (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Tate v Freeport Union School Dist., 7 AD3d 695 [2004]; Corcoran v Babylon Tr., 295 AD2d 392 [2002]; Roth v Barreto, 289 AD2d 557 [2001]).

2003Although the foregoing authorities would be sufficient to deny GEICO’s motion, this court would be obliged to grant leave to renew which would only further congest the huge daily Special Term calendars, clogged by motions involving no-fault first-party benefits (see discussion in Zlatnick v GEICO, 2 Misc 3d 347 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2003]; Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs. v Lumbermens Mut.

1998Providing truthful information to the police is certainly no ground for damages for false arrest or malicious prosecution (see, Eisenkraft v Armstrong, 172 AD2d 484 ).

1990Defendants dispute the value of plaintiffs lost GEICO claim, arguing that under ordinary contract principles the $100,000 recovery from GEICO should be reduced by one third, the amount of their original retainer agreement, because that is the sum plaintiff would have recovered if defendants had performed the contract (see, Lieberman v Templar Motor Co., 236 NY 139, 149 ; Spitz v Lesser, 302 NY 490, 492 ).

1990Thus, plaintiff’s recoverable damages are the value of her GEICO claim, without any deduction for the fee she would have paid defendants had they performed the contract. 3 We reject defendants’ contention that this rule of damages permits plaintiff a windfall by allowing her to recover her attorney’s fees in the legal malpractice action in contravention of the long-standing American rule that litigants pay their own attorney’s fees (see, Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Socy., 421 US 240, 248 ).

1990Defendants dispute the value of plaintiffs lost GEICO claim, arguing that under ordinary contract principles the $100,000 recovery from GEICO should be reduced by one third, the amount of their original retainer agreement, because that is the sum plaintiff would have recovered if defendants had performed the contract (see, Lieberman v Templar Motor Co., 236 NY 139, 149 ; Spitz v Lesser, 302 NY 490, 492 ).