issue of qualified immunity in New York

2016Similarly, as there are triable issues of fact as to whether it *804 was objectively reasonable for the police officers to believe that exigent circumstances existed to justify their warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s home and whether the officers acted with probable cause in arresting the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403 [2006]; Diederich v Nyack Hosp., 49 AD3d 491, 493 [2008]; Sirlin v Town of New Castle, 35 AD3d 713 [2006]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 6

2008Similarly, as there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer McNeill acted with probable cause in arresting the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (see Sirlin v Town of New Castle, 35 AD3d 713 [2006]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 644 [2000]).

2016Similarly, as there are triable issues of fact as to whether it *804 was objectively reasonable for the police officers to believe that exigent circumstances existed to justify their warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s home and whether the officers acted with probable cause in arresting the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403 [2006]; Diederich v Nyack Hosp., 49 AD3d 491, 493 [2008]; Sirlin v Town of New Castle, 35 AD3d 713 [2006]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 6

2008Similarly, as there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer McNeill acted with probable cause in arresting the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (see Sirlin v Town of New Castle, 35 AD3d 713 [2006]; Kubik v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 278 AD2d 644 [2000]).

2025For the same reason, the defendant-officers were not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Macareno v City of New York , 187 AD3d at 1167 ).

2024Here, contrary to the City defendants' contention, they did not sustain their prima facie burden on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Giske v State of New York , 191 AD2d 675, 676-677 ).

2024Specifically, the City defendants failed to establish, as a matter of law, that once they were made aware of the alleged dangerous condition involving the subject intersection, they undertook an adequate study of the intersection ( see Langer v Xenias , 134 AD3d 906 ; Giske v State of New York , 191 AD2d at 676-677 ).

2024Specifically, the City defendants failed to establish, as a matter of law, that once they were made aware of the alleged dangerous condition involving the subject intersection, they undertook an adequate study of the intersection ( see Langer v Xenias , 134 AD3d 906 ; Giske v State of New York , 191 AD2d at 676-677 ).

2022As the City defendants failed to establish that the original design of the subject intersection was based on a deliberative decision-making process which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury, the City defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Warren v Evans , 144 AD3d 901, 902 ; Iacone v Passanisi , 133 AD3d at 718-719 ; Mare v City of New York , 112 AD3d 793, 794 ; Kuhland v City of New York , 81 AD3d 786, 787 ).

2022As the City defendants failed to establish that the original design of the subject intersection was based on a deliberative decision-making process which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury, the City defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Warren v Evans , 144 AD3d 901, 902 ; Iacone v Passanisi , 133 AD3d at 718-719 ; Mare v City of New York , 112 AD3d 793, 794 ; Kuhland v City of New York , 81 AD3d 786, 787 ).

2022As the City defendants failed to establish that the original design of the subject intersection was based on a deliberative decision-making process which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury, the City defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Warren v Evans , 144 AD3d 901, 902 ; Iacone v Passanisi , 133 AD3d at 718-719 ; Mare v City of New York , 112 AD3d 793, 794 ; Kuhland v City of New York , 81 AD3d 786, 787 ).

2022As the City defendants failed to establish that the original design of the subject intersection was based on a deliberative decision-making process which entertained and passed on the very same question of risk that the plaintiff would put to a jury, the City defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Warren v Evans , 144 AD3d 901, 902 ; Iacone v Passanisi , 133 AD3d at 718-719 ; Mare v City of New York , 112 AD3d 793, 794 ; Kuhland v City of New York , 81 AD3d 786, 787 ).

2020For the same reason, Officer Rendon was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity ( see Williams v City of New York , 129 AD3d 1066, 1067 ).

2016However, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them by demonstrating that the underlying criminal proceeding was not terminated in favor of the plaintiff (see MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d 859, 860 [1996]; Avgush v Town of Yorktown, 35 AD3d 331 [2006]; De Cicco v Madison County, 300 AD2d 706 [2002]; Ellsworth v City of Gloversville, 269 AD2d 654 [2000]).

2016However, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them by demonstrating that the underlying criminal proceeding was not terminated in favor of the plaintiff (see MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d 859, 860 [1996]; Avgush v Town of Yorktown, 35 AD3d 331 [2006]; De Cicco v Madison County, 300 AD2d 706 [2002]; Ellsworth v City of Gloversville, 269 AD2d 654 [2000]).

2016However, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them by demonstrating that the underlying criminal proceeding was not terminated in favor of the plaintiff (see MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d 859, 860 [1996]; Avgush v Town of Yorktown, 35 AD3d 331 [2006]; De Cicco v Madison County, 300 AD2d 706 [2002]; Ellsworth v City of Gloversville, 269 AD2d 654 [2000]).

2015The County failed to demonstrate, inter alia, that its placement of the sensor station cabinet and its decision to refrain from trimming the hedge were highway safety planning decisions resulting from a deliberative decision-making process of the type af *719 forded immunity from judicial interference (see Hepburn v Croce, 295 AD2d 475, 477 [2002]; Norton v Village of Endicott, 280 AD2d at 854-855 ; Trent v Town of Riverhead, 262 AD2d 260 [1999]; cf. Hannon v State of New York, 13 AD3d 770 [2004]; Monfiston v Ekelman, 248 AD2d 518 [1998]).

2015The County failed to demonstrate, inter alia, that its placement of the sensor station cabinet and its decision to refrain from trimming the hedge were highway safety planning decisions resulting from a deliberative decision-making process of the type af *719 forded immunity from judicial interference (see Hepburn v Croce, 295 AD2d 475, 477 [2002]; Norton v Village of Endicott, 280 AD2d at 854-855 ; Trent v Town of Riverhead, 262 AD2d 260 [1999]; cf. Hannon v State of New York, 13 AD3d 770 [2004]; Monfiston v Ekelman, 248 AD2d 518 [1998]).

2015The County failed to demonstrate, inter alia, that its placement of the sensor station cabinet and its decision to refrain from trimming the hedge were highway safety planning decisions resulting from a deliberative decision-making process of the type af *719 forded immunity from judicial interference (see Hepburn v Croce, 295 AD2d 475, 477 [2002]; Norton v Village of Endicott, 280 AD2d at 854-855 ; Trent v Town of Riverhead, 262 AD2d 260 [1999]; cf. Hannon v State of New York, 13 AD3d 770 [2004]; Monfiston v Ekelman, 248 AD2d 518 [1998]).

2015The County failed to demonstrate, inter alia, that its placement of the sensor station cabinet and its decision to refrain from trimming the hedge were highway safety planning decisions resulting from a deliberative decision-making process of the type af *719 forded immunity from judicial interference (see Hepburn v Croce, 295 AD2d 475, 477 [2002]; Norton v Village of Endicott, 280 AD2d at 854-855 ; Trent v Town of Riverhead, 262 AD2d 260 [1999]; cf. Hannon v State of New York, 13 AD3d 770 [2004]; Monfiston v Ekelman, 248 AD2d 518 [1998]).

2000Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315 ).

1998Here, by contrast, the complaint was the subject of the motion, plaintiff and defendants were parties to the motion, the issue of qualified privilege is raised in the answer as an affirmative defense, qualified privilege was the basis of the City’s and Chechak’s prediscovery motion for summary judgment and that issue had been argued in the prior appeal but remained open pending further discovery (Lee v City of Rochester, 195 AD2d 1000, 1001 ).