issue of qualified immunity in Connecticut

2003See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 , 98 S. Ct. 2674 , 57 L.

2003See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 , 98 S. Ct. 2674 , 57 L.

1999Under that test, factual disputes are extraneous to the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity “ ‘if the affidavit accompanying the warrant is sufficient, after correcting for material misstatements or omissions, to support a reasonable officer’s belief that probable cause existed.’ ” Cartier v. Lussier, supra, 955 F.2d 845 , quoting Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1990).

1994Under that test, factual disputes are immaterial to the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity if “ ‘the affidavit accompanying the warrant is sufficient, after correcting for material misstatements or omissions, to support a reasonable officer’s belief that probable cause existed.’ ” Id., quoting Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1990).

2003Therefore, before taking the issue of qualified immunity away from the jury as a matter of law, the trial court must first determine that there are no material issues of fact relevant to the existence of probable cause.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, supra, 248 Conn. 521 ; see also Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1992).

1994The trial court merely concluded that Cartier v. Lussier, supra, 955 F.2d 841 , was “dispositive of the issue of qualified immunity and the defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.” In reaching this conclusion, the trial court neither considered nor cited any state cases.

2015See Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669 , 673 n.4, 830 A.2d 193 (2003). 12 The plaintiff also claims, as he did in his motion for reargument, that the court erred in considering the issue of qualified immunity sua sponte without affording him the right to be heard on that issue.

2015See Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669 , 673 n.4, 830 A.2d 193 (2003). 12 The plaintiff also claims, as he did in his motion for reargument, that the court erred in considering the issue of qualified immunity sua sponte without affording him the right to be heard on that issue.

2003In the context of an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, the objective reasonableness standard bars the defense of qualified immunity [o]nly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 520 ; see also Simkunas v. Tardi, 930 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1991). “[I]n the context of a § 1983 claim, and for purposes of deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment or to direct a verdict, the determination of whether factual disputes are material to the resolution

1995Whether the monopolistic conduct of the defendant was “specifically directed or required” by the government is a mixed question of fact and law; see Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (question of immunity predicated on factual issues as well as law); and the record before us is insufficient to make such a determination.

1995Whether the monopolistic conduct of the defendant was “specifically directed or required” by the government is a mixed question of fact and law; see Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (question of immunity predicated on factual issues as well as law); and the record before us is insufficient to make such a determination.

1994Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District, 877 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In this case there were enough undisputed facts for the court to have made a legal determination that [the defendant] was entitled to immunity.